Culture policies and Sino-Soviet relations in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang, 1917-60 by Schachner, Gerhard
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Schachner, Gerhard (1980) Culture policies and Sino-Soviet relations in 
Kazakhstan and Sinkiang, 1917-60. PhD thesis. 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/5318/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
culture Policies and Sino-Soviet Relations in 
Kazakhstan and Sink{an9, 1917-60 
Gerhard Schachner 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Faculty of Social Sciences of the 
University of Glasgow 
The Institute of S~viet and East European studies 
I 
end 
The Department of Modern History 
BEST COpy 
AVAILABLE 
V.ariabIe print quality 
PREFACE 
This study arose essentially out of my long-standing interest in 
the relations between the Soviet Union and Chinese People's Republio. 
As an undergraduate in the D~partment of History at the Univarsity of 
Toronto I was able to acquire the backround in RUBsian and Chinese 
history that the present research required. In the present work it was 
intended originally to assess the influence of the Turkic people of 
Central Asia on the Sino-Soviet relationship. As the research progres-
sed it became obvious that this aspect of the Sino-Soviet question 
could not be dealt with witho~t first understanding something of the 
Turkic people and their cultUral heritage. It was from this that the 
present historical, political and social analysis emerged. 
In the CQurse of this work I became ever more conscious of the 
great debt lowe to a number of people. Foremost among these are 
Dr. Hannes Adomeit, Jack Gray and John A. Newth who undertook the 
supervision of this project. Their many thought provoking suggestions 
no doubt helped to improve my work and added new dimensions to it. In 
addition they permitted me to draw on their considerable knowledge of 
both the field of study and the source materials that were available. 
My study of the Chinese language was assisted by Jack Gray, who 
taught me during 1976-77. Additional assistance was rendered in this 
regard by Professor Alfred L. Brown, who was instrumental in the award 
to me of a Post-Graduate Travel Grant by the University of Glas~ow. 
This enabled me to attend the ;egular Chinese language classes-at 
Edinburgh University during 1977-78. 
I was fortunate alsQ to become acquainted with Jack Miller. He 
was ever willing to assist Bnd never hesitated to allow me to benefit 
from his knowledge of the Soviet Union and his experience as an editor. 
Similarly Dr. Vladimir V. Kusin readily provided me with numerous 
source references and was willing always to listen and discuss my 
iii 
ideas. 
The research for this thesis would have been far mora difficult 
had it not been for the staff of the Glasgow University Library. Their 
dedication and willingness to help in matters ranging from my research 
to study accommodation have geen very much appreciated. I am particu-
larly indebted to Graham H. Whitaker and Mrs. Catherine E. Carr who 
dealt with the inter-library loans. Without their considerable effort 
some of this research would not have been possible. 
This work was assisted also by, those people with whom I interacted 
on a social level over the past several years. Alfred L. Brown and 
Andrew did far more trnan I,could ever have expected to ensure that my 
i 
stay was pleasant. vtadimir and Daniela Kusin generously opened their 
home and allowed me t9 spend many enjoyable and memorable hours in 
their company. There also were excursion trips to the Scottish High-
lands with Roger A. Clarke and many hours of enlightening and enjoyable 
discussion with Gordon K. Anderson Bnd Nigel R. Thorp. And, when 
escape became absolutely essential, I was welcomed always in the midst 
of relatives and friends on the Continent. I am sincerely grateful for 
all these people have done. 
A special thanks goes to my parents. It was their foresight and 
courage that made this study possible. Their determination to stand in 
the face of adversity provided both a source of inspiration and moral 
support. In addition they were prepared always to lend financial sup-
port when this was needed most. It is to them that these pages are 
dedicated. 
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SUMMARY 
The object of this study is to assess the extent to which the 
Turkic people of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang have been aligned politically 
and socially with the socialist societies of their respective counT 
tries. It is not intended to consider this question in the light of 
sUccess or failure. There are several reasons for not doing so. It 
~ould be realistic to consider the question in this light only if a 
definite goel was to be achieved within a specified period of time. 
This was not the case in either Kazakhstan or Sinkiang. There was and 
is no definable periop of time within which Communism is to be 
I 
I 
achieved. Equally important, Communism remains a hazy expression for a 
state of existence that yet has to be defined in a manner that is uni-
versally accepted. 
In this study the various political, cultural, religious and edu-
cational aspects of the Turkic people will be considered. The in ten-
tion is to discover to what extent these traditions have been replaced 
by the social institutions of the socialist societies. This in turn 
should allow some insight into the advances made by both the Russian 
and Chinese Communists in their attempts to transform their respective 
Turkic people. At the same time the study deals with specific diffi-
culties that the Governments had to overcome in the course of the 
transformation process. These include getting the Turkic people to 
participate in the various socialist institutions. From this there 
arise new questions and proble~s. The Islamic society of the rurkic 
people had not prepared the latter to participate in a modern, indus-
trial society. They lacked the required educational background to be 
usefully employable in the bureaucracy on any but a superficial level. 
As a result non-Turkic cadres had to be used in many leading positions. 
This raised the question of great Russian and Han-Chinese chauvinism. 
Another problem was that of attacking the traditional Turkic way 
x 
of life without alienating the Turkic people. The direct attack on 
Islam was complex. In general both Governments demonstrated a lack of 
understanding for the Islamic way of life. As a consequence they 
launched an attaok on an Islamic orthodoxy that did not exist. Also, 
the Soviet policy of an outright attack forced the Soviet Government to 
define a new way of life for the Kazakh and other Muslim people. In 
China the need for this was avoided because of the less antagonistic 
attitude towards Islam. 
To a great extent this study compares the policies of the Soviet 
and Chinese Governments. This in itself raises some questions. The 
i 
Russian revolution pr~ceded the Chinese by nearly 32 years. This gave 
the Chinese a consideFable advantage. They did not have to make the 
same mistakes that ha~ been made by the Soviet Union, particularly the 
collectivisation drive in Kazakhstan. But the Chinese not only bene-
fitted from the Soviet mistakes. They'were able also to make use of 
the advanced experience of the Soviet Union in advancing their econo-
mic development programme. In addition the more industrially advanced 
Soviet Union could and did assist the Chinese in their industriali-
sation. 
From the discussion of the connection between the two countries 
their logically follows an assessment of the inter-state relationship. 
The intention is to discover to what extent the Turkic people influ-
enced the Sino-Soviet relationship. But the economic question hardly 
can be excluded from the discussion. This in turn leads to the analy-
sis of some of the historical)-political, ideological and econ~mic 
causes of the Sino-Soviet rift. 
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CHI N A 
INTRODUCTION 
In this study the emphasis will be placed on two geographic 
regions--Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. Although they are a part of different 
countries, they are similar in many respects. Both were included in 
the larger geographic region' formerly known as Turkestan and inhabited 
by the Turkic people. While the people were divided into different 
Turkic groups, they share a common ethnic, cultural and religious 
heritage. In addition they speak mutually intelligible languages. 
Although some were settled the larger proportion remained nomadic. The 
latter group moved about the Kazakh steppes and mountainous regions and 
freely crossed from eastern into western Turkestan and vice-versa. It 
was also common for relatives to live in both parts of the region, as 
there were no restrictions on access to either. 
Turkestan was an ethnically homogeneous region and its division 
into eastern and western Turkestan was based on geographic rather than 
cultural differences. While this division was geographic as long as 
Turkestan remained independent, it became political after the region 
was divided by the Russian and Chinese conquests. 
The Russian drive towards Asia began under Peter the Great. But 
this was not a systematic conquest. It was not until the nineteenth 
century that the Russians conquered the Kazakh steppes militarily. On 
the other hand, the Chinese suzerainty over eastern Turkestan had been 
established during the Han dynasty in 36 B.C. After the fall of the 
Han the region was lost. It was reconquered under the T'ang who ruled 
I 
over it from 657-751. The region was subsequently conquered by the 
Mongols and not brought under Chinese rule again until 1759 under the 
Manchus. Hence, Turkest~n had not only been divided into eastern and 
western parts. Each part was also ruled over by a different nation--
east Turkestan by the Chinese and west Turkestan by the Russians. 
following the communist takeovers in Russia and China this condi-
2 
tion prevailed. But while the people remained under foreign rule 
throughout the period of the conquests, no systematic attempts had been 
made to alter their traditional way of life. The ~ommunist takeover 
changed this. Marx's theories were devoted to complete social change. 
This change was not only limited to the social system, but also was 
intended to alter the thinking and values of the people living in the 
socialist states. These theories committed the Communists of both 
countries to changing the traditions of their respective Turkic people. 
The aim of this study is to analyse and compare the Soviet and 
Chinese attempts to transform the Turkic traditions in Kazakhstan and 
5inkiang in the 1917-60 period. In the course of this analysis the 
political, religious, cultural and educational developments within the 
two regions will be discussed. This discussion should offer some 
insights into the extent to which the indigenous people were drawn 
into the new social order. It also should give some indication of 
whether a new socialist people are emerging. That is, a people devoid 
of their Turkic cultural consciousness and traditions. Finally, the 
study will consider the relationship between the two socialist states 
--the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The inter-
national conflict within the communist block is also a conflict between 
different national groups. As such it permits a wider perspective 
within which to frame the nationality problems. These can then be seen 
in the context of both the intra-block and intra-state conflict. 
In the course of changing the political and cultural traditions of 
the Turkic people the two Governments were bound to encounter ,opposi-
tion. The social values of Socialism and Islam stand in direct opposi-
tion to each other. They represent the differing cultural values and 
material needs of two different ethnic groups. A similar situation, 
although not in ideological terms, prevailed within the Sino-Soviet 
relationship. In essence the Soviet Union and China were two countriss 
that had different cultural values and material needs. They were to 
3 
co-exist on the basis of a common ideology. The ideology was to over-
come their national differences, Just as it was to overcome the dif-
ferenees bet~eBn the national groups within each country. But in the 
Sino-Soviet relationship there was a crucial differance. Both the 
Soviet Union and the People1s Republic are sovereign states. This gave 
them the right and freedom to break their mutual ties. A similar choice 
is not available to the ethnic groups within each of the two states. 
In this analysis it is not intended to evaluate the Soviet and 
Chinese efforts to transform their ~espective Turkic groups in terms of 
success or failure. These are relative terms and quite impossible to 
relate to a goal that is itself undefined. This goal, Communism, is a 
hazy axpression fot a state of existence that is to be achieved over a 
I 
period of time. But neiter this state nor the period of time in which 
it is to be achieved are defined. These variables make any assessment 
on the basis of success or failure unrealistic. for this particular 
study the best that may be attained is some indication of how the 
respe£tive Governments intended to bring the transformation about and 
how the indigenous people reacted to these endeavours. Another approach, 
one that lies beyond the scope Df the present work, is to measure the 
advances among similar ethnic groups in both communist and non-commu-
nist states. This sort of comparison may well produce some indication 
of how well the two systems are able to meet the needs ~f their people. 
It may provide also a basis for asse99ing the systems in terms of 9UC-
cess and failure. 
The population of Turkestan 
One of the greatest problems in dealing with Kazakhstan and Sin-
kiang is that related to their popUlations. In the six districts that 
were incorporated largely into the Kazakh SSR in 1936--Ural
'
sk, Turgai, 
Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semireche and Syr-Darya--the people were 
mixed ethnically. According to the 1897 and 1911 census statistics, 
they included Russians, Kirghiz (Kazakhs), Sarts (Turkic town dwellers), 
Uzbeks, Tatars, Kerakalpaks, Taranchi (settled Uighurs) and Tadjiks. 
In addition there were various other Turkic, Asiatic and European 
1 groups. So long as the influx of people into the Kazakh steppes was 
4 
confined to a trickle of settlers there was little difficulty. However, 
this situation was changed markedly by the large-scale influx of sett-
lers following the Russian penetration of the Asian region. In the 
eighteenth century Cossack colonists were settled in the most fertile 
regions of the Kazakh steppes. The immediate areas of settlement inclu-
ded the northern regions of the Ural'sk, Turgai, Akmolinsk and 5emi-
palatinsk districts and the entire Semireche district. from the latter 
nineteenth century onward the Europeans, primarily Russians, settled 
2 in the regions colonized by the Cossacks. As more land was settled, 
including the best agricultural and pasture land, the Kazakhs became 
increasingly confined in their nomadic pursuits. Consequently, some 
began to settle also. 
for the analyst dealing with the Turkic people this mixture of 
people creates difficulties. The data that is available, particularly 
that for the post-1917 period, is often ethnically mixed. It is not 
immediately discernable always whether it applied to the Kazakhs, the 
Europeans or the other Asiatic people. 
A similar difficulty arises in Sinkiang. There too the population 
is mixed ethnically. It consists of Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, 
Uzbeks, Taters, Mongols, Manchus, Chinese, Tadjiks (Iranians) and 
Russians. 3 As a result the data too is not clearly distinguishable 
always as applying to one pa~t~cul~r group. 
f 
Another aspect of this problem is the relative size of each ethnic 
group in the two regions. for Kazakhstan reasonably comprehensive 
statistics are available dating back to 1897. It must be borne in mind 
though, that the present boundaries of Kazakhstan were established in 
1936. The statistics predating this, therefore, are not entirely 
representative of the present region. They do allow, nevertheless, a 
5 
general overview of the population trend. (See table 1) from this 
trend it is evident that there was a large influx of slavic settlers--
Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians--and that the Kazakhs are becom-
ing only gradually a majority in their republic once again. 
The Chinese population figures for Sinkiang cannot be relied upon, 
although many contradictory statistics have been published. (See 
tables 2 and 3) These only allow for estimates to be made of the actual 
size of Sin kiang's population. Since such estimates necessarily must be 
based on the figures that themselves are in question, the accuracy of 
the estimates is equally dubioue. They nonetheless provide a general 
indicator, but they must not be accepted as absolute values under any 
circumstances. 
In both regions the mixed popUlations and the different and in-
compatible economic pursuits of the people led to difficulties. The 
Cossack colonists encroached on the lands of the Kazakhs in Semireche. 
4 This resulted in disputes during the 1860's. When the Kazakhs became 
more politically conscious and active in the affairs of government 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the settle-
ment of the steppes understandably received most of their attention. 
In Sinkiang che influx of Chinese settlers resulted in similar prob-
lems. In 1944 Chinese peasants from Honan province were settled in the 
5 Altai district. There they became one of the main causes of the 
Kazakh rebellion tha t broke out in the s.ame year. 
The geographic factor 
i A better understanding of the difficulties caused by the ~ettle-
ment of the two regions may be geined by considering some basic geo-
graphic factors. The first point to be borne 'in mind is the vastness 
of the two regions. Combined they are eighteen and one-half times 
larger than the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, or nearly one-half 
the size of the United States of America. The area of Kazakhstan is 
2,756,000 and that of Sinkiang 1,707,000 square kilometers. for the 
Table 1 
rhe Population statistics for Kazakhstan 
Ethnic group/year 1897 1911 1926 1959 1970 1979 
Kazakhs (Kirghiz) 3,644,911 4,168,918 3,713,394 2,794,966 4,234,166 5,289,000 
Russians 633,311 1,851,312 1,279,979 3,974,229 5,521-,917 5,991,000 
Ukrainians nd nd 860,822 762,131 933,461 898,000 
8elorussians nd nd 25,614 107,463 198,275 181,000 
Uzbeks 64,235 76,784 213,498 136,570 216,340 263,000 
Uighurs (Taranchi) 60,999 83,000 51,803 59,840 120,881 148,000 
- I 
Azerbaidzhanis nd nd nd 38,362 57,699 73,000 
Tadjiks 7,494 8,179 7,666 8,075 15,991 nd 
Tatars 55,252 77,452 80,642 191,925 287,712 313,000 
Others 465,794 586,786 267,477 1,236,286 1,422,294 1,528,000 
Totals 4,931,996 6,852,431 6,500,895 9,309,847 13,008,726 14,684,000 
Sources: Turchaninov, "Naselenie Aziatskoi Rossii: Statisticheskii ocherk," in Aziatskaya Rossiya, ed., by Glinki 
~ .• , I, 82-85.; Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie SSSR, Vsesoyuznava Perepis Naseleniya 1926 gada, Vol. VIII, 
Kazakhskaya AS5R Kirghizkaya A5SR (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1928).; Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Itogi 
Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1959 gada: Kazakhskaya SSR (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1962).; Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe 
Upravlenie SSSR, Itoqi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya, Vol. IV, Natsional'nyi Sostav Naseleniya SSSR (Moscow: Statis-
tika, 1973).; Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie SSSR, "Vsesoyusnaya Perepis Naseleniya," Vestnik Statistiki, NOo,2 
(February 1980), 28. 
Source and (date) 
Date applicable 
Han-Chinese 
Hui-Chinese 
Kazakhs 
Khalkhas 
Russians 
Sibos 
Tadjiks 
Tatars 
Uighurs 
Uzbeks 
Others 
Totals 
Notes: 
Census (1953) 
1953 
nd 
nd 
475,000 
60,000a 
13,000 
20,000 
80,000 
nd 
3,640,125. 
13,000 
4,701,125 
Table 2 
Chinese Population Statistics for Sinkiang 
People's Handbook Nationalities in 
(1957) China (1961) 
1953 1953 
nd nd 
nd nd 
500,000 533,160 
70,000 68,862 
20,000 9,766 
19,000 21,405 
14,000 15,014 
6,000 4,370 
3,640,000 3,901,205 
13,000 11,557 
4,282,000 4,565,339 
People's Daily 
(6 June 1952) 
1950-51 _ 
485,700 
nd 
437,130 
nd 
nd 
nd 
nd 
nd 
3,399,000 
no 
625,170 
4,857,000 
Sinkiang Administra-
tion release (1952) 
1950-52 
500,000 
300,000 
400,000 
nd 
nd 
nd 
nd 
nd 
3,400,000 
nd 
126,000 
4,726,000 
aDictionary of New Terms, Shanghai, 1953. This source also gives 400,000 Kazakhs for 1953. 
Source: Amrit Lal, "Sinification of Ethnic Minorities in China," Current Scene, VIII, No., 4 (15 February 1970), 
6-8 and 12. 
Tabla 3 
Non-Chines8 Population Statistics for Sinkiang 
Source Lattimore Bruk Encyclopedia Serdyuchenko Jackson Orleans 
Date applicable 1949 1953 1953 1953 1953- 1953 
Han-Chinese 294,000a 300,000 300,000 nd 300,000 300,000 
Hui-Chinese nd 200,000 250,000 nd 200,000 200,000 
Kazakhs 319,000 475,000 350,000 509;000 475,000 475,000 
Kirghiz 65,000 70,000 75,000 nd 70,000 70,000 
Manchus 12,000 nd nd nd 20,000b nd 
Daurs nd 17,OOOc 2,000 nd nd 
Sibos nd 20,0008 20,000 13,000 nd nd 
Solons nd 6,700d nd nd 
Mongols 63,000 120,000 180,000 59,000 120,00d 120,000 
Russians 13,000 13,000 10,000 nd 13,000 nd 
Tadjiks (Iranians) 9,000 15,000 17,000 nd 15,000 nd 
Tatars 5,000 5,000 nd nd nd nd 
Uighurs 2,941,000 3,640,000 3,600,000 nd 3,640,000 3,640,000 
Uzbeks 8,000 8,000 8,000 13,600 nd nd 
Others 8,000 8,000 21,000 69,000 
Totals 3,729,000 4,874,000 4,874,000 
Notes: aIncludes Hui-Chinese; bIncludes 5ibos and Solons; cIncludes Solons; dIncludes the whole CPR; elncludes 
Manchus, Sibos~ Solons and Daurs. 
Sources: Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 106.; 5.1. Bruk, "Etnichesky sostav i razmeshchenie naseleniya v 
Sin'tszyanskom Uigurskom Aftonomnom Raione Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki," Sovetskaya Etnografiya, No., 2 (1956), 91.; 
Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, "Sin'tszyansky Uigursky Aftonomnuy Raion," 1956, XXXIX, 131.; G.P. Serdyuchenko, 
"On the question of the classification of the people and languages of China," Sovetskoye vostokovedeniye, part 4 (1957), 
119-121.; W.A. Douglas Jackson, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands: Zone of peaceful contact or potential conflict? 
(Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), p. 12.; Leo A. Orleans, Every Fifth Child: The population 
of China (London: Eyre Methuen Limited, 1972), p. 90. 
early travellers, limited to animals for transportation as they were, 
the distances to be covered represented formidable obstacles. These 
were made less formidable by the advent of motor transportation. By 
the 1930's the automobile hed eased the lot of the travellers a great 
deal. 
Motor transport has revolutionized travel in Chinese 
Central Asia, an8 one can nowadays accomplish in a few 
weeks the long journeya which formerly occupied many weary 
months of travel by camel caravan or cart. It took one in 
all thirty-eight travelling days to cover the 2,550 miles 
by motor truck from Suiyuan, the railhead on the Chinese 
border, to Kashgar. This does not sound very fast, but 
the same journey used to take about six months by caravan, 
and one meets, of course, with all kinds of incidents and 
mishaps on the way. The roads, if they exist at all, are 
mere caravan trails, and, especially in the Gobi desert, 
one is entirely dependent on one's own resources, and each 
day's journey is apt to be a continuous adventure. 6 
But the vast si~~ of the regions is in no way indicative of the 
amount of land available for use. Kazakhstan may be divided into four 
9 
natural geographic regions. From north to south these are the steppes, 
semi-desert, desert and mountains. On the southern and eastern borders 
are the Tien Shan and Altai ranges respectively. In the west the whole 
of Kazakhstan is a region of flat lands. Except for the mountains, the 
only change in the terrain is provided by the Kazakh Uplands of the 
north-east. These consist of mountains in the centre and rolling hills 
on the outer edges. The annual precipitation ranges from over 24 
inches in the Tien Shan to less than 4 inches in the desert. In the 
agricultural regions it ranges from B-16 inches. 
Sinkiang's terraIn is much more varied. The border of the pro-
vince is a natural frontier of mountain ranges. In the west the Pamir 
and Karakoram ranges, the Kunlun range in the south, the Tien Shan in 
the north and the Altai range in the north-east. The province itself 
is effectivaly divided into two parts by the Tien Shan. Ozungaria in 
the north and Kashgaria in the south. In Ozungaria the annual preci-
pitation may be as much as 10 inches, while in the Tarim basin in the 
south the average is less than 4 inches. 
The temperatures! in Kazakhstan end Sinkiang reach extremes in 
both summer and winter. As a result the growing season is limited. 
In addition the very limited annual rainfall leaves agriculture to 
depend 
land. 
on the water rrsources that can be utilised for irrigating the 
This severely restricts the amount of land available for agri-
I • 
10 
cultural use. In Sinkiang approximately 40 per cent of the total area 
is habitable, while in Kazakhstan approximately 11 per cent of the 
7 land was used for agriculture in 1968. 
The agriculture that has developed is of the oasis type. It 
depends on springs, canals, reservoirs and rivers for irrigation. 
These sources of water are in turn fed by the run off from the snow 
capped mountains. The agricultural limitations farced the settlers to 
cluster around the foothills of the mountain ranges, bodies of water 
and along river banks. 
However, the limitations that the lack of water imposes do not 
affect only agriculture. For the industrial development of the regions 
water is necessary also. To avoid the aver-exploitation and depletion 
of this limited resource a balance will have to be struck. In the 
long term water will"determine the extent to which both agriculture 
and industry may be developed. 
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CHAPTER I 
Government in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang 
1:1 Introduction 
A government whose aim it is to change the social order of the 
state it rules is ver~ much oependent on two factors--the extent of its 
political control andi ita ideologi6al influence among the masses. Of 
course it is possible, to force social change on people, but generally 
such forced change has proved only as durable as the power of the 
government that insti~ated or supported ~t. Where social change was 
brought about by the Fombination of political power and ideological 
influence it tended tb be bf a more permanent character. Political 
and ideological contrpl therefore, are two indispensable ingredients 
in the formula for subcessfullY changing a society. It is not neces-
sary to control both from the outset, as a group with ideological 
influence among a sufficently large proportion of the masses may gain 
political power by means of a revolution. On the other hand, those 
holding the political power may gain ideological influence by convin-
cing the masses that the programme of their government will benefit 
them. 
Both the Russian and Chinese revolutions gave the Communists 
political power while their ideological influence was limited to a 
relatively small proportion of their respective populations. Social 
change therefore, could be affected by either one or the combination of 
political force and ideological conversion. It ~as the problem of 
determining the correct proportion of the two elements that plagued the 
leaders of both the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. 
Among the indigenous nationalities of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang the 
task of changing the society was complicated by several factors. 
Regional governments were necessary to introduce changes, but in both 
regions governments had become associated with foreign colonists and 
military control. These developments had been viewed as threats to the 
only bonding forces among the Turkic people, their religious and cultu-
ral traditions. But foreign settlement had brought additional hard-
ships to the natives. Their lands often were simply expropriated and 
given to the foreigners. As a con~equence of this, local intellectuals 
demanded that some a~eas of land be set aside for the exclusive use of 
their ethnic kinsmen and that the local people be given a voice in the 
local administration. Before the revolutions these local demands 
enjoyed varied degrees of success tn both regions. 
Following the r~volutions the 'respective central Governments had 
to establish themsel~es as the reccigni~ed rulers and gain the support 
I 
of the indigenous people so that their revolutionary ideals could be 
II 
, i; 
realised. To achi8J~ this the loc~l distrust of foreign governments 
not only had to be overcome, but the people had to be convinced that 
their future was secure under the leadership of the Party. Union 
republics, autonomous regions, counties and districts allowed the 
leadership of both countries to reconcile the differences snd contra-
dictions arising from the union of their political ideals with the 
desires of the local people. While each nationality was given a 
nominally autonomous region, s number of political expedients ensured 
that the Party ~etained administrative and political control. In this 
manner Kazakhstan and 5inkiang were integrated into their respective 
central Party structures. 
The need to overcome local distrust and suspicions was theoreti-
cally central to the entire concep~. Errors on the part of trye oentral 
Governments would have given the local peale reason for likening 
communist rule to that of pre-revolution administrations. This only 
would have hampered the social transormation of the nationalities. It 
was important therefore, that all actions undertaken in the name of the 
th t th d ~d not arouse Party were scrutinised carefully to ensure a ey ~ 
local indignation. At the same time it was essential to draw the 
14 
Turkic people into all levels of government. During the pre-communist 
periods the indigenou~ people in both regions had been given a purely 
local role in the adm~nistrationB. To affect the social transformation 
i 
the Communists had to: change this. 
1:2 Historical and intellectual developments 
before the takeovers 
i 
Kazakh intellect~al thought during the late nineteenth and early 
i 
twentieth centuries b~came concern~d increasingly with the future of 
Kazakh culture. This. cultural awakening coincided with the Russian 
i 
I 
attempts to replace tre Tatar influence among the Kazakhs with their 
1 
own. Early Kazakh intellectuals, Vali~hanov (1835-1865), Abai (1845-
1904) and Altynsaryn ~1841~18B9), unwittingly assisted the RUBsians in 
! 
this endeavour. 
and encouraging 
I 
By aavocating the increased use of Kazakh in education 
I 
Kazakhs to learn from Russian culture, literature and 
industrial developments, they intended to strengthen and advance their 
own society.2 But this also resulted in the increased Russification of 
the Kazakhs. Some of the twentieth century intellectuals were influ-
enced by the ideas of their predecessors. Following the 1905 revolu-
tion, during which most of the revolutionary activities in Kazakhstan 
were undertaken by Russian and Ukrainian revolutionaries, the Kazakh 
intelligentsia continued to be politically moderate. A. Bukeikhanov, 
in western Kazakhstan and ~. Tanyshbaev in the east, pledged their 
support to the Kadets. In ~arch 1917 they and A. 8aitursunov, the 
editor of the newspaper Kazakh, formed the Kazakh national party Alash 
Orda. The primary aims of this party were to give the Kazakhs ~ poli-
tical voice and keep Kazakhstan free from Tatar political influence. 
Because they did not share the Tatar dominated Central Asian political 
views, they organised their own national congresses. At the first of 
these, in April 1917, they demanded a voice in the local administra-
tion and the use of Kazakh in the schools, courts and administration. 
But at the second All-Kirghiz (Kazakh) Congress in July 1917 (until 
1925 Kazakhs were officially referrad to as Kirghiz) the leaders of 
Alash Orda made it clear that they believed the Kazakh1s political 
future to lie in a Russian faderation. 3 
I;) 
These views were by no means held universally. The Kazakhs of the 
southern regions--Semireche and Syr-Darya--which were the most heavily 
colonised Kazakh regions, tended to be far more anti-Russian. Thus, 
while the. northern regions supported the provisional government those 
of the south did not. As a result the Bolsheviks did not make signi-
ficant gains in northern Kazakhstan until the Civil War. After the 
bolsh~vik seizure of power the moderate views of A1ash Orda prevailed. 
A1thowgh the third All-Kirghiz (Kazakh) Congress in December 1917 
passed a resolution proclaiming Kazakhstan autonomous and A. 8ukei-
I 
• 4 khanov headed the government of th~ autonomous republic, there was no 
inconsistancy. Both the support for the provisional government and the 
desire to keep Kazakhstan a federative part of Russia logically led to 
the union of the Alash Orda with the Whites. It was the White forces l 
disunity, the failure to co-operate with the aaste!L'n A1ash Orda leaders, 
the excessive demands for Kazakh support of the war effort and, likely 
most important, the White reprisals egainst the Kazakh civilian popu-
1ation for Red partisan activities that effectively alienated A1ash 
Orda from Ko1chak 1s Siberian Government. The gains of the Reds in the 
first year of the Civil War were a more accurate indication of the 
extent of this alienation than the military superiority of the Reds. 
In the summer of 1918 only Syr-Darya, large parts of Semireche and the 
5 
southern districts of Turgai province were under Red control., One 
year later the Whites were being defeated on all fronts and most of 
Kazakhstan had come under bolshevik control. 
After the Civil War, in August 1920, the Kazakh Autonomous 
Socialist Republic was proclaimed and A. Baitursunov headed its 
ministry of education. But the co-operation between the Bolsheviks 
and Alash Orda leaders was short1ived. By 1921 the Communist Party 
10 
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was severely criticising the latter and a break was imminent. 
Sinkiang's history from 1930-49 bears certain similarities to the 
developments in Kazakhstan, but important differences must be noted. 
The early Kazakh intellectuals, Valikhanov, Abai and Altynsaryn, had 
received some of their educations in Russian schools. In the early 
twentieth century it was noted that Chinese government schools, in 
which some locel stUdents were trained to prepare them for government 
work, were located in Sinkiang. 7 From this it was not clear when they 
were established. Furthermore, the traditional Confucian education 
was far removed from the Middle Eastern and even European based Turkic 
cultural traditions. Sinkiang's intellectuals therefore, were most 
likely to have been trained in mektabs and medressehs located either in 
Sinkiang, Russian Central Asia or the Middle East. This education 
reinforced their own cultural traditions and in order to preserve these, 
like their counterpar~s in Kazakhstan, the intellectuals looked to 
Russia for a model. Although this may not have made them entirely 
anti-Chinese, the alien Chinese culture and institutions undoubtedly 
were considered a threat. This contrasted sharply with the positive 
attitude that the Kazakh intelligentsia had displayed towards the 
Russian cultural influence. 
Pre-twentieth century intellectual trends in Sinkiang are obscured 
by a lack of information. Valikhanov made two journeys to the province, 
. 8 
to Kuldja in 1856 and Kashgar in 1858. It cannot be stated with any 
certainty, but he may have made contact with local intellectuals on 
I 
these occasions. By 1931 a split ~imilar to that between the.pro- and 
anti-Russian Kazakhs was discernable also in Sinkiang. In the south 
only two leaders, Muhammad Emin Bugra and Sabit Damullah, were con-
vinced that only armed rebellion could bring the Chinese domination to 
an end. 9 Nonetheless, in 1933 the rebellion that had originated in 
Turfan enveloped southern Sinkiang and ended with the proclamation of 
the East Turkestan Republic. According to its constitution the 
17 
republic sought independence from China. 10 This indicated that there 
must have been a certain unanimity among the southern intellectuals by 
1933. 
A similar demand was not made by the Ili regime that was set up in 
the three northern districts, I1i, Altai and Chuguchak, after the 
Kazakh rebellion in 1944. Yet the Chinese farmers who had been settled 
on the Kazakh's lend were one of the primary causes of that particular 
rebellion. 11 The demands that the rebels did make compared favourably 
with those of the Alash Orda leaders after the February revolution. 
They included; local self-government, the USB of non-Chinese languages 
in the primary schools, while Chinese was to be compulsory in the 
middle schools, the right to appoint part of the provincial government 
and the use of Uighur and Kazakh as the languages of command for Muslim 
12 provincial troops. 
Like the Alash Orda leaders the I1i government too was concerned 
with the Turkic culture and gaining s voice in the local and provincial 
affairs. But in 5inkiang the Turkic people also were disunited poli-
tically and split between the more anU-Chinese south and moderate 
north. Finally, the Ili group's greatest success came also at a time 
of Civil War. In 1949 Burhan, one of its members, and Muhammad Emin 
Bugra were appointed provincial Chairman and Vice-Chairman respsc-
t ' 1 13 ~ve y. Both appointments were acceptable to the local population 
and this sUQgested that they may have been made to bolster local sup-
port for the Kuomintang. But the battle was lost even before it 
reached the province. Burhan surrendered Sinkiang to the adv~ncing 
Communists on 26 September 1949. 
Although armed resistance followed the takeover the scale of this 
can hardly be compared to the Russian Civii War that raged in and 
around Kazakhstan. Perhaps the most important anti-communist leader 
in Sinkiang was Osman Bator. He and a group of local leaders, the 
strongest of whom it was estimated commanded no more than several 
18 
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thousand men, resiated until Osman was coptured and executed in 
April 1951. After that the armed resistance generally crumbled. 
from the Civil Wars the Communists of both countries reaped bene-
fits ~hich assisted them in establishing political control in Kazakh-
stan and Sinkiang. To fight. the wars the Red Armies had to be orga~. 
nised and deployed throughout the two countries. While Sinkiang was 
surrendered peacefully, the activities of Osman Bator and his followers 
provided a reason for communist troops to be stationed in the province. 
At the end of the ~ivil Wars both regimes therefore were left with 
military fo~ces stati~ned througho~t their respective countries. As a 
! 
consec!Juence of this t,he Comm(.Jnists were left in total political and 
military control. Only ideological control at the grass-roots level 
had yet to be established. 
1:3 Marxism, autonomous areas 
and their governments 
After their respective takeovers both the Russian and Chinese 
Communists were in need of a system of self-government. This had to 
satisfy the desires of their national minorities for self-government 
and permit their transition to Communism. To satisfy the former, the 
autonomous republics, regions, districts and counties were created. 
At first glance these divisions, based as they were on nationality, 
appeared to be contredictory to Merxist theory. But on closer exami-
nation this objection becomes dubious. 
1:3;i Origin of the concept 
Several authors have noted that Marx made no definitive pronounce-
15 . 
ment on the question of nationalities. This was no oversigHt, but 
the result of Marx's method of analysis. According to this man, as he 
existed in capitalist society. was not natural man, but man alienated 
by capital and the bourgeois class society that Capitalism had 
created. Within this society there were class contradictions and it 
. t d 16 was within the limits of these contradictions that socke y move • 
19 
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Eventually the contradictions beceme obvious to some of the workers 
'I and after the numbers of this olass conscious group became sufficient 
they would rebel and seize political and economic control. The new 
proletarian society that then was to be established was to be led by 
the socially most conscious ~orkers and intellectuals, who would unite 
into the "ruling clas~."17 Their task was to ensure that all forms of 
exploitation ceased and that proletarian society was transformed into 
Communist society. 
Marx ventured so far as to lay down ten specific tasks which the 
1 proletarian 
I 
rulers ofi the "most advanced countries" were to implement 
I ; ~: 18 j 
immediately after sei~ing power. By formulating these tasks Marx 
I t 
iii' had defined his own l~vel, of social consciousness as equivalent to that 
i 
I 
of the proletariats of the most advanced countries at the time when 
they overthrew their capitalist governments. The overthrow of Capi-
talism and the implementation of the ten tasks would in effect further 
raise the level of social consciousness of both the masses as a whole 
and their leaders. Since Marx had not experienced these developments 
his level of consciousness was not raised beyond the stage of imple-
menting the tasks. Therefore he could not describe the stages that 
were to follow. It also was not possible to describe the sort of man 
or society that would comprise the socialist state except in very 
general terms based on Marx's philosophical perceptions of what a 
perfect society should be. 
When the proletariat in its battle against the bourgeoi-
sie is forced to unite as a class, make itself the ruling' 
class by means of a revqlytio~and dissolves the old produc-
tion conditions by force, so, together with the dissolution 
of these production conditions it dissolves the necessary 
condition for the existence of the class contradictions, 
classes in general and, so also its own rule as a class. 
In the place of the old bourgeois society with'its clas-
ses and class contradictions steps an association, in which 
the free development of each person is the prerequisite for 
the free development of everyone. 19 
Graphically, the period of transition that Marx appeared to envi-
sage may be represented as followa. 
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Marx foresaw a society in which man recognised that his own wel-
fare was directly linked with that of the whole society. This reali-
sation in turn gave rise to mutual concern among men, based on socialist 
rather than capitalist values. The difficulty arose in the transi-
tional stage. The problem was how to reach that social stage of 
development at which individual needs were no lo~ger put before'the 
needs of others and all indivlaual needs were taken care of never the-
less. Obviously Marx considered social consciousness to be both the 
moving and guiding force throughout the transition. 
As man's level of social consciousness rose under the leadership 
of the proletarian rulers the dialectic i.e., the contradictions exis-
tl.'ng l.'n man's ll.'fs,20 ld b i i 1 b i wou Bcome ncreas ng y more 0 v ous. As he 
21 
resolved the dialectic of each staga of social consciousness, man would 
resolve the dialectic of his own existence in a step by step reunion of 
his alienated self with his natural self. The crucial point of tha 
I 
theory was that the Pfoletarian rulers had to raise successfully the 
level of social consicousness of the masses by means of a continuous 
programme of socialist policies. 
This theory also. affected the question of nationality. Marx 
believed that the antagonism between the nationalities resulted from 
the class contradictions. Under the rule of Capitalism these national 
differences had disappeared to a limited extent because of internatio-
• i 
nal trade and mult~-n~timnal corporations. The rule of the proletariat 
would make s:uch an~agbnisms "disappear even more," as under it "The 
, 
, I ' 
hostile attitude a~on~ nations disappears together with the coritradic-
tions of the classes within the nation.,,21 Hence, the increased social 
consciousness was to resolve also the national differences that existed 
in non-socialist societies. 
1:3;ii National self-determination 
for Marx the question of national self-determination did not even 
arise. After the workers had taken over it was inconceivable that any 
state ruled by workers should wish to develop ~lything but a communist 
society in complete unity with other worker run states. This approach 
was adopted also by Lenin in arguments for a united international 
proletariat. 80th Marx and Lenin refused to sanction the division of 
the international proletariat for the sake of national self-determi-
nation. 
This may appear to contradict the 1903 resolution that Lenin per-
mitted to be passed at the Second Congress of the RSDRP. It favoured, 
"The right to self-determination for all nations entering into the 
composition of the state. 1I22 But Lenin did not consider national self-
determination to be a universal right. In 1903 he explained; 
Social democracy will always struggle against any attempt 
to influence national self-determination from without by 
means of force or whatever injustice. But undoubtedly 
recognition of the struggle for the freedom of self-deter-
mination does not commit us in the least to support every 
demand for national self-determination. Social Democrats 
as the Party of the proletariat, consider their positive 
and chief taak to assist not the self-determination of 
nationalities and nations, but the proletariat in each 
nationality. We must always and absolutely strive towards 
an itself closely Joined proletariat of all nationalities , 
and only in separate, exceptional circumstances can we pro-
pose and actively support demands intended to establish new 
class states or substituting politically fully united states 
for more feeble federative unions and so on.23 
Lenin obviously subordinated the right of nations to self-deter-
mination to the interests of the international proletariat. If 
national self-determination threatened proletarian unity it was un-
likely that Lenin would have agreed to it. He also did not feel com-
pelled to support the right of every state to separate from a larger 
union of states. In December 1913 he elaborated on his conception of 
autonomy. 
We are in favour of eutonomy for all parts, we are in 
favour of the right to separate (but not in favour of the 
separation of everyonel). Autonomy is our plan for building 
the democratic state. Separation is not in our plan at all. 
Separation we_did not envisage at all. In general, we are 
against separation. But we stand for the right to separate 
in view of the black hundreds of great Russian nationalism 
which so besmirched the case of national co-operation that 
sometimes better political ties result ~ freely 
separatingl!24 
22 
Autonomy, according to this conceptualisation, was to be found in 
the socialist union of states and not in separation. Like Marx, Lenin 
could not even envisage that anyone national group of workers would 
want to leave the union of worker states. After Finlana'did separate 
in 1917, he succeeded in having tha question of when the time ~o sepa-
rate was right made the decision of the socially most conscious group, 
the Party. The April 1917 All Russian Conference decided self-determi-
nation and separation involved two questions; the right to separate and 
the time when such a separation was to take place. The time the "Party 
of the proletariat must decide altogether independently in each case, 
from the point of view of the interests of all social development and 
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the interests of the Glass struggle of the proletariat for Socialism.»25 
In this manner self-determination and separation too became issues 
to be resolved by means of social consciousnass. The desire for self-
determination and separation were reduced to contradictions in man's 
alienated existence. That, after the revolution, with the whole future 
of the proletarian state at stake only the socially most conscious 
should be permitted to resolve the issue was entirely consistent with 
Marxist theory. 
I:3;lii The socialist1transforma-
tion of the nationalities 
AFter the Bolsheviks seized power they issued the "Declaration of 
the rights of the nations of RUBsia," which ~mbodied Lenin's political 
views. 
1) Equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia. 
2) The right of the nations of Russia to the freedom of 
self-determination, including separation and the forming 
of independent states. 
3) The abolition of all, both national and national-reli-
gious privileges and restrictions. 
4) The free development of the national minorities and 
ethnographic groups and national territories of RUBsia. 
A concrete decree ensuing from the foregoing will be worked 
out immediately after the formation of a commission for 
nationality affairs. 26 
This declaration granted nationalities the right to develop Com-
munism from their own level of social oonsciousness. If the nationa 
were to pass through the dialectic stages in accordance with Marx's 
theory this right was essential. But, at the same time, it created 
problems in multi-national states. Different nations were bound to be 
at different levels in the transitional stage. Central Governments not 
only had to be aware of this;· but they had to act in accordanc's with 
Marxist theory in guiding the transition. It was essential, therefore, 
that the theory was understood by the leaders on all levels. 
Lenin was well aware of this aspect of Marxism and chided those 
who were willing to force other nationalities to accept cultural traits 
of Russian origin. When it was proposed that Russian be mads the 
national language Lenin accused the proponent of not understanding the 
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psychological aspect of the issue, "which is especially important in 
the national question and which combined with the slightest compulsion 
defiles, dirties and calls the progressive significance of centralism, 
the large state, and the unity of l~nguage into dispute."27 
During the perio~ of Wa~ Communism Lenin could hardly be credited 
i 
with standing by his principles. Only after the Kronstadt rebellion 
had jarred him back ihto reality did he return to the ideals that had 
I 
i 
i 
characterised his ear~ier theory. His reaction to the Georgian affair 
I 
of 1922 provided conv~ncing evidence that he had returned to the con-
i 
cept of change from brlOW. At the liame time Lenin's writing about the 
affair revealed his dlsap~ointment with his contemporaries. 
Ordzhonikidze has resorted to violence in dealing with a Georgian 
Communist. This irritated Lenin to the point of sending Dzerzhinskii 
28 to investigate and dicteting extensive notes from his sickbed. It 
upset Lenin that Ordzhonikidze hDd insisted on forcing his political 
views on the Georgian, but worse still other leading Communists were 
responsible for the incident. Lenin noted that Stalin's "haste and 
administrative zeal" and his "resentment towards notorious I soc ial-
nationalism' " had played a "fatal role" in bringing the matter about, 
while Dzershinskii had displayed a flippant attitude in his invBstiga-
29 tion of the affair. 
It especially galled Lenin that important communist officials 
failed to appreciate the .theory behind his nationality policies. In 
the stenographic notes of his dictation concerning this matter the 
concluding sentence of the first s~ction, "Here already arises the 
most important question: how to understand internationalism?," is 
followed by, "I think that our comrades have not examined this most 
important question sufficiently.,,30 
Lenin was so perturbed that he asked Trotsky to take the matter 
before the Central Committee of the Party because he could not rely on 
31 . the "objectivity" of Stalin and Dzerzhinskii, who were prosecut1ng 
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the case on behalf of the Nationality Affairs Commission. However, 
this was not simply a:matter of objectivity, but one of differing views 
! 
between Lenin and statin. Lenin was the Marxist idealist, genuinely 
convinced that after the revolution the workers would be only too glad 
i 
to follow the Bolshev~ks. Stalin, ~n the other hand, was hardly a 
I 
Marxist theoretician. I He was the practical man who had to implement 
bolshevik policies. Since the masses failed to respond to these poli-
cies and Stalin faile~ to understan~ the theory behind them, much less 
i 
the ideals, it wes on~y natural that he should resort to force. 
, 
Lenin also feared that the attitudes of Ordzhonikidze, Stalin and 
Dzerzhinskii could ea~ilY lead to the Russian Communists being branded 
Russian imperialists.r2 Hbw to achieve the far-reaching changes that 
Marx had envisaged am~ng the nationalities without appearing to be 
! 
great nation chauvini~ts remained 8 delicate but crucial question. 
Marx and Lenin overcame the difficulty by resolving the dialectic from 
below, thereby permitting the nationalities to transform themselves. 
At the same time they were to be guided through the transformation by 
the socially most conscious and, 60 long as these were Russians or Han-
Chinese, problems were bound to arise. These would in turn result in 
charges of great nation chauvinism being leveled by the nationalities. 
Lenin foresaw these charges being made if social change was forced upon 
the nationalities by those who failed to understand Marx's theory. 
I:3;iv The form of the socialist 
multi-national state 
One of the difficulties both communist parties had to resolve con-
I 
cerned the form their multi-national states were to take. Lenin had 
opposed a federation of states, a concept that he believed would weaken 
economic ties. 33 As has been shown above, he also did not believe in 
separation from the socialist union of states. This concept left 
states with a simple choice. They either were sufficiently socialist 
to join the socialist union of states or, if they were not, they sepa-
rated from it. for Lenin there existed no degrees of Communism, 
either states were led by Communists or they were not. 
stalin, in his "Marxism and the nationality qUBstion," had con-
eluded; 
The right to self-determination, that is--a nation may 
establish itself according to its OWn wishes. It has the 
right to organise its o~n manner of life on the principle 
of autonomy. It has the right to join with other nations 
in a federative relationship. It has the right to abso-
lutely separate. A nation is sovereign and all nations 
are equal. 34 
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From this it was not clear entirely whether or not Stalin implied 
that states had the right to Join in a federation with other socialist 
states. It certainly may be concluded from the above formulation that 
they did. But in the same work Stalin also condemned federalism 
because within its organisation h8 saw "elements of decomposition and 
35 separation~" Hence, Lenin and Stalin agreed that the future multi-
national socialist state was to be a union. 
Among the Chihese Communists the question was not so clear cut. 
In 1922 they advocated a "Chinese Federated Republic by the unification 
of China proper, Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang into a free federa-
t ' ,,36 ~on. The Kiangsi Constitution of 1931 gave the nationalities of 
China the right to self-determination, including the right to "either 
join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own 
37 
state as they ma)' prefer." It was not until the 1954 Constitution 
that the issue was resolved decisively. Article 3 stated; 
The People's Republic of China is a unified, multina-
tional state. 
• •• 
Regional 'autonomy shall be exercised in are~s entirely or 
largely inhabited by national ~inorities. Such national 
autonomous areas are in~iienable parts of the People's 
Republic of China. 38 
This statute made the question of federation or union and the 
right to secession purely academic. Some reasons for these changes may 
haue been the Japanese invasion of China and the actual conditions 
after the Communists seized power. If the Communists had granted the 
right of secession during the Second World War they would have been 
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faced with having to recognise the Japanese puppet regimes in Manchuria 
and Mongolia. After 1949 Taiwan too would have had to be considered an 
independent state. As Mao opposed the division of China and was suffi-
ciently traditional in hie policies to want all Chinese regions to 
remain Chinese and those which once had been to be returned, it was 
likely that the communist view on separation changed after the Japanese 
invasion. By not granting the right to secede to any national group, 
the Communists made it clear that no secession in the past or future 
was considered to be legal or permanent. Without even the nominal 
right to secede, establishing union republics would haue been meaning-
less. Instead autonomous ~reas, regions, counties and districts were 
set up. 
1:4 The role of the Party 
In both the Soviet Union and the Paople's Republic of China the 
communist parties have emerged as the only parties of any political 
significance. Marx had written that the Communists always represented 
the "interests of the whole proletariat irrespective of nationality" 
and, in the battle against the bourgeoisie, lithe interests of the move-
39 
ment as a whole." How great the power of the Party was to be after 
the revolution could not be foretold by Marx because of the limitations 
his methodology imposed on him. Whatever the post-revolution signifi-
. cance of the Party was to be depended on its strength before and imme-
diately after the takeover and on how its leaders interpreted Marx. 
80th the Russian and Chinese Communists held that the Communist Party, 
the Party of the proletariat, was to continue lekding the cou~tries to 
Communism after the revolution. 
To affect the transformation the Party had to dominate all politi-
cal, economic and social aspects of daily life, but it was not to force 
itself upon the masses. In both countries therefore, the two primary 
functions of the Party were to guide the workers during the transition 
and to raise their level of social consciousness. In coping with the 
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first of these tasks the Party also had to endear itself to the people, 
infiltrate all areas of social life and inspire the transition from 
below. To accomplish this ita leaders had to strike a balance between 
the direction that was given from above to guide the transition and the 
degree of freedom the masses were granted to affect their own trans for-
mation. This balance could be struck only if a large proportion of the 
leadership personnel in minority areas was recruited from among the 
nationalities themselves. 
I:4;i Local leadership after 
the takeovers . 
Following the takeover in 5inkiang the political leaders advocated 
. i 
a union between the provincial leaders and the new "national demo-
11
40 t f1 i cracy. In he rat nstance this union involved simply a change of 
allegtance. Instead of following Chiang Kai-shek the provincial lea-
ders followed the doctrines of the Party. Burhan and Saifudin, the 
latter joined the CCP in 1950, were left in leading positions, while 
other civil servants of the Kuomintang regime were permitted to con-
tinue serving in the provincial government if they were willing to fol-
41 low the communist ideology. 
Although many appear to have continued in their civil service 
positions their loyalty and suitability for such work sometimes was 
called into question. Complaints about the quality of the Party mem-
42 bers in the north-west began as early as October 1951. During the 
Hundred Flowers and Rectification Campaign in 1957 the qualitative 
problem became even more obvious. A number of Sinkiang's government 
officials from among the indigenous nationalities were severely criti-
cised for their local nationalist tendencies. Among them there were 
local leaders of some importance. They included A. Iminov, Abtubahei 
Shitula, Yumairshelai and Apliz Aipotula, all from the Kashgar district 
administration; Mu-ha-mai-ti-chiang Ma-ho-su-mu (Muhammad-chiang 
Mahosumu), vice-chairman of the CPPCC 5inkiang Committee; Ah-pu-tu-Je-
wu-fu Ma-ho-su-mu (Abdurevov Mahosumu), deputy secretary general of the 
CCPCC Committee of the IIi Autonomous ~; Je-hei-mu-chiang Sha-pi-
erh-ah-chi-yeh-fu (Reheimu-chiang Shapirachiyev), member of the CPPCC 
Committee; Wang Chung-yuan, member of the CPPCC Committee and Islamic 
29 
federation; and Ah-pu-tu-Je-hsi-ti-ai-lai-mu (Abdure Shidiailaimu), 
member of the standing committee of the Islamic Federation of the auto-
, 43 Th nomous reg1on, ose local people who had been taken into the Party 
and, or given government posts could not be relied upon always to be 
loyal to the ideals of a single united nation. 
In Kazakhstan there was a similar development after the Civil War. 
Some of the Alash Or~a leaders, inqluding Baitursunov and Bukeikhanov, 
served in the KazakhSocialist Republic's ,governmen.t. In the first 
year of the existenc~ of ,the republic Baitursunov and Bukeikhanov 
became the nucleus of a local political group. The II Congress of 
Soviets of 1921 and the second congress of communist organisations of 
1922 blamed the Alash Orda members of the government for worsening the 
famine in Kazakhstan and accused Kazakh Communists of making conces-
. t t' I' 44 s~ons 0 na 10na 15m. 
This suggested that there may have been two reasons for purging 
the local leaders in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. First, their consi-
derable local appeal and second, the following this appeal could have 
attracted if it were to be combined with Turkism. The recruitment of 
lO,cal Party members and leaders was not, therefore, only a matter of 
recruitment. It also involved selection. To ensure loyalty local 
people who were willing to subordinate their own ideals to those of the 
Party had to be recruited. A local following wa~ essential if the 
Party was to succeed in its avowed task of guiding the masses to Com-
munism. 45 At the same time, it was more important even that the local 
following was ideologically committed to Communism. 
I:4;ii The local recruitment 
of Party members 
From the local Party membership it may be possible to make some 
deductions about the growth of influence of the Party among the natio-
30 
nalities. By 1959 Sinkiang hed 130,000 Party members of whom 62,000 or 
47.7 per cent ~ere from among the minorities. 46 In Kazakhstan the 
Kazakhs constituted 36 per cent of the 1926 KPSS membership, while the 
47 Russians accounted for 44 per cent. These large proportions of Han 
and Russian members indicated the degree to which the local Party orga-
nisations depended on leadership from outside the respective region. 
Although the proportion of the Kazakh membership fluctuated conside-
rably during the purges, this was due largely to the effect of the 
reduced Russian membership. By 1960 the Kazakhs again constituted 36 
48 and the Russians 43 per cent of Kazakhstan's Party membership. This 
represented ~ relatively high degree of conSistency. The Chinese gene-
! ' 
rally appeared mor~ s~ccessful in recruiting Party members from among 
their nationalities. 
Years 
1949-1950 
1954-1956 
1957-1959 
Recruitment of Party members in 
Sinkiang and the CPR49 
Sinkiang 
6,000 
56,000 
25,000 
89,000a 
CPR 
3,546,721 
4,122,130 
3,225,616 
Notes: aThe total Party membership in Sinkiang was 130,000 in 
1959 with 62,000 minority members. 
The minority population of Sinkiang in 1959--calculated on the 
basis of the average rate of increase from 1953 to 1957 and deducting 
50, 
the percentage of Han-Chinese-- was approximately 5,660,000. On the 
basis of this there were 10.95 minority Party members for every 1000 
I 
minority people. In Kazakhstan there were only 2.9 Kazakh PaDty mem-
51 bers per 1000 Kazakhs in December 1926. Comparing the size of the 
local membership to that of the parties as a whole produced quite dif-
ferent results. The CCP had 13,960,000 members in 1959,52 of which 
Sinkiang's indigenous people accounted for .44 per cent, while the 
Kazakhs of Kazakhstan represented 1.69 per cent of the 639,652 KPSS 
members of 1926.53 Thus, while the Chinese were more successful in 
recruiting Party members among their Turkic minorities they lagged 
behind the Russians in the proportion these constituted of the total 
Party membership in the first ten years of communist rule. This of 
course may be accounted for by the differences in the populations of 
the two countries. While the Soviet population was mixed ethnically 
. , 
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that of China was overwhelmingly Han-Chinese. In addition the popula-
tion of China was much larger than that of Russia. As a result of 
these factors the Party membership in China was bound to be both over-
whelmingly Chinese and larger. 
I:4;ifi The elective process 
, 
~part from increfsing the local Party membership there was the 
added difficulty of ensuring that Party members, candidates and suppor-
ters were elected to the various levels of government. Until 1936 only 
the lowest level of government was elected directly in the Soviet 
Union. The CPR adopted this system in 1953-54. This meant that each 
higher level in the administration was elected by that immediately 
below. 
Following the 1953-54 election in Sinkiang it was reported that 
the CCP members were lIardently supported by the people" and that many 
elite cadres who had been trained for administrative work were rs-slsc-
ted. In fact in 312 hsiang (villages) out of a total of 7,088 candi-
54 dates 5,248 had been re-elected. Furthermore, 63 per cent of the new 
Party members had been elected as "deputies to the ~ £i.ountiJ and 
hsiang congresses and a number of them were elected members of hsiang 
people's government councils and hSiang chiefs.,,~5 By the end of 1953 
. - - 56 
Sinkiang had 6,400 minority Party members. Therefore, a total of 
4,032 or 56.9 per cent of the noted number of elected candidates should 
have been Party members. Yet even by 1959 the Patty members recruited 
in the province represented only approximately 1.5 per cent of its 
population (excluding immigrants). The proportion of Party members was 
not reflected in the election results. For the whole of the CPR the 
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CCP membership in 1959 was approximately 2.2 per cent of the popula-
tion. 57 This proportion was unlikely also to be reflected in the pro-
portion of CCP me~bers elected throughout China. 
The nature of Sinkiang's popUlation made recruiting Party members 
even more difficult. It has been estimated that 89.2 per cent of its 
1953 popUlation was rural. 58 To complicate the matter even more a 
large proportion was nomadic or semi-nomadic. This combined with the 
difficulties of language made giving the Turkic people political 
instruction and recruiting Party members difficult. In Kazakhstan the 
situation among the rural" nomadic Kazakhs was much the same. To com-
, 
pensa~e for these difficulties and the resultant lack of Party members 
the election of Comm~nists had to be ensured by other means. 
Obviously the most convenient method of ensuring an election 
result was by limiting the number of candidates and controlling the 
nominations. In the Soviet Union this practice, while officially frow-
ned upon, was encouraged nevertheless. In 1925 the Party beceme con-
cerned that an insufficient number of non-Party candidates were nomi-
nated by local election meetings. To rectify the situation Party wor-
kers were admonished to ensure that non-Party candidates did appear on 
59 the voting list. From this it was obvious that the Party could and 
did control the proportion of Party and non-Party candidates that was 
elected. Until 1936 when the constitution legalised it this sort of 
manipulation was conducted behind the scenes. The 1936 constitution's 
Article 126 permitted Soviet citizens to Join various "social organi-
sations" and the KPSS, while Article 141 limited'the nominatiqn of can-
didates standing for election to public organisations and workers' 
societies, Communist Party organisations, trade unions, co-operatives, 
. i 60 youth organisations and cultural soc~et es. In order to nominate 
candidates the nominator had to belong to a political organisation. 
China's election law of 1953 was not concerned with controlling 
the local nominations. Instead Article 49 permitted candidates who 
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had not been elected to a particular local people's congress to be 
nominated and elected to higher levels of government. 51 This nomina-
tion procedure for elections to higher levels of government allowed 
undesirable candidates tc be 'weeded out I and only Party supporters 
and favourable non-Party candidates to be elected. In the Soviet case 
statistics illustrated this point. 
Percentages of Party members on elected 
bodies for the entire Soviet Union52 
Year Village soviets Congress of Central execu-
soviets tive committee 
1925 6% 78.1% 84.1% 
1929 10% 72.0% 71.8% 
1931 15% 75.3% nd 
The number of Party members elected to the lowest level of govern-
ment were not comparable to the number elected to the highest levels. 
Another way to control the elective process was through increased 
representation from the more easily penetrated urban areas. Article 11 
of China's election law made allowances for this. 
Population 
up to 2,000 
2,000-5,000 
over 6,000 
The number of candidates to be elected 
from Chinese villages and cities63 
Number of d!3pu- Number of deputies 
ties from hsiang from cities, mining 
(villages) or districts and indus-
towns trial areas 
1 1/500 people = 4 
2 1/500 people = 4-12 
3 1/500 people = 12 
Ratio of 
hsiang and 
towns to 
cities 
1:4 
1:2 to 1:6 
1:4 
This system was applied throughout China. At the level of the 
I 
National People's Congress the ~ ratip of deputies from the prov.inces to 
those from industrial cities was 1:8.
64 
Many aspects of the. Chinese election law were refined adaptations 
of the 1918 constitutilim of the RSFSR. It too had provided for direct 
elections to only the urban and rural soviets of deputies. In cities 
each deputy was to represent 1,000 people and no city was to have fawer 
than 50 deputies. Villages and all rural settlements with less than 
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10,000 people were to elect one deputy for each 100 people, but no 
few·er than 3 and no more than 50 from anyone village. 65 On the basis 
66 
of the 1926 census, the number of representatives elected in Kazakh-
stan's urban and rural soviets should have approximated the following. 
City population 
up to 50,000 
over 50,000 
Totals 
Settlement 
population 
Less than 500 
500 - 999 
1,000 1,999 
2,000 - 4,999 
5,000 - 9,999 
10,000 and over 
Totals 
The number of deputies elected 
to city' soviets in 1926 
Number of cities Total population Number of deputies 
26 395,055 
1 56,871 
27 451,926 
the number of de~uties elected 
to ~rban soviets in 1926 
Number of Total popula-' Average 
SO/city = 1;300 
57 
1,357 
Total number 
settlements tions in them popUlation of delegates 
449 142,186 317 1,436.8 
977 744,858 762 7,425.2 
1,307 1,888,330 1,445 18,951.5 
924 2,659,324 2,878 26,611.2 
86 525,502 6,111 5,254,6 
7 79 1 486 11,355 795.2 
3,750 6,039,686 60,474.5 
While the ratio of rural to urban candidates may have given urban-
ised regions more candidates the advantages that could be gained from 
this in Kazakhstan in 1926 were minimal. The predominatly rural popu-
lation elected 97.8 per cent of the candidates. Only as the population 
became increasingly urbanised could the full effect of this system be 
realised. This was an overrepresentation of urban areas, while rural 
areas were underrepresented. As a consequence the mainly rural indi-
genous population would be und~rrepresented. 
In largely rural 5inkiang the effect was unlikely also to be of 
significance. But the described conditions made local elections 
meaningless in the political sense. And, since all local people's 
67 
councils and autonomous governments were subject to the control and 
guidance68 of the higher levels of government, the local and autono-
mous governments existed in name only. However, they were useful 
35 
bodies through which policies could be implemented at the local level. 
But to use them for this purpose the Party had to control them. If 
they ever succeeded in freeing themselves from this control, the local 
organs could be turned into dangerous national governments. Although 
the elective process and Par~y domination were intended to prevent this 
there appeared to be one additional safeguard in Sinkiang, the autono-
mous areas. 
According to the election law each nationality of each autonomous 
area had to be represented in the local people's congresses by at least 
one representative. ~onsequently, small numbers of people had a dis-
propottionate voice ihthe local governments and the elections to the 
higher levels. In Ining ~ a total of 113 deputies had been elected 
, 
in 1954. Of these 65 were Uighur, 17 Kazekh, 8 Hui and 1 Bach from the 
Kolkoz, Uzbek, Mongol~ Sibo, Tatar and Manchu nationalities. Each of 
these last five deputies represented fewer than 300 people, while the 
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average for each deputy was 700. In this particular instance the 
Uighurs had a sufficiently large majority not to be disadvantaged, 
however in many of the larger autonomous districts the result could be 
quite different as the following statistics indicated. 
The major population group and percentage of the total 
population of some of Sinkiang's autonomous areas 70 
Autonomous area 
Ili chou 
Mulei district 
Barkul district 
Changchi chou 
Karashar district 
Yuutsyun'ven region 
Ushshaktal region 
Dunbazar district 
8orotala chou 
8aingalen chou 
Kobuksaur 
Kyzyl Su chou 
Koktirk district 
Chokmuzat district 
Tashkurgan district 
Zeravshan district 
Total 
population 
775,000 
21,058 
24,180 
98,306 
2B,B30 
B,013 
1,736 
BOO 
41,109 
57,16B 
135,000 
5,172 
1,401 
10,238 
1,328 
Major nationality 
percentage of the 
popUlation 
Kazakhs 
" II, 
Hui (Dungan) 
" " 
" " 
II 
" 
" 
II 
MongQls 
II 
II 
Kirghiz (Kolkoz) 
II 
" 
" 
II 
Tadjiks 
" 
and its 
total 
53.0% 
33.0% 
31.0% 
:.>7.2% 
32.7% 
33.0% 
70.9% 
24.6% 
35.0% 
5B.0% 
35.0% 
BB.O% 
70.2% 
38.1% 
56.3% 
36 
Table continued 
AutonomouB area Total Major nationality and its population percentage of the total 
population 
Novabad district 512 Tadjiks 93.8% Chapchal district 35,433 Sibo 28.0% Sinkiang Autonomous area Uighur 75.0% 
It was significant that the nationality for ~hom the area had bean 
named was seldom a significant majority. In areas with total popula-
tions of over 10,000 they often constituted less than one-third of the 
total. This could have ha~ a decisive influence on the election 
results. for example~ the Hui Ushshakt,l national region's population 
consisted of 1,234 Hui (70.9%); 453 Uighurs (26.73%); and a total of 39 
people of Ch'inesB, Mongol and Kazakh nationality, in all 1,736 
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people. Assuming that the delegates to the local people's congress 
were elected on the basis of the regulations applying to hsian9 and 
towns having populations under 2,000 the election of 15-20 deputies was 
called for. If 15 deputies wore to be elected each would have repra-
sented 116 or fewer people. The break-down of delegates would have 
been; Hui 11, Uighurs 4, Chinese, Mongols and. Kazakhs 1 each. As a 
result 29.1 per cent of the people would have elected 38.9 per cent of 
the delegates giving them an undue influence in the local government. 
This disproportionate influence was also evident in the ethnic compo-
sit ion of the delegates to the provincial congress. 
A comparison of the proportion of Sinkiang's nationalities of 
1953 to their number and proportion of delegates elected to 
the provincial people's congress in 1953-5472 
Nationality Percentage of the Number of Percentage of the 
total population delegates total number of 
delegates 
Uighur 7'1.7 231 61.5 
Kazakh 9.8 48 12.8 
Han-Chinese 5.2 45 12.0 
Hui (Dungan) 4.1 14 3.7 
Mongol 2.5 9 2.4 
Kirghiz (Kolkoz) 1.4 9 2.4 
Tatar 0.1 5 1.3 
Uzbek 0.3 4 1.1 
Nationality 
Tadjik 
Sibo 
Daur » 
Manchu) 
Russian 
Totals 
Table continued 
Percentage of the Number of 
total population delegates 
0.3 3 
0.4 5 
0.3 
---1. 
100.1 375 
37 
Percentage of the 
total number of 
delegates 
0.8 
1.3 
0.5 
99.9 
The small minorities--Kirghiz, Tatars, Uzbeks, TadJiks, Sibos, 
Daurs, Manc~us and Russians--constituted 2.8 per cent of Sinkiang's 
total population. Th~y were represented by 7.4 per cent of the provin-
I 
cial delegates, or ov~r 2.5 times the number to which their size entit-
led them to. While the Hui and Uighurs were underrepresented, the 
I 
Kazakhs and Han were overrepresented also. The Han-Chinese almost had 
double the number of delegates that their relative proportion of the 
population entitled them to. To some extent the demographic differen-
ces such as the differing numbers of children in each of the groups 
accounted for some of the discrepancy. However, as the disproportion 
was evident also among the Turkic groups where demographic trends tan-
ded to be similar it must be suspected that it resulted primarily from 
the division of Sinkiang into autonomous areas and the system of repre-
sentation. It does not follow necessarily that the disproportion was 
due to the manipulation of the population, although the system certain-
ly could be manipUlated. 
Politically Sinkiang's divisions were advantageous for the Chinese 
I 
I 
rulers. On the local level the loy_a1 ty of the small groups of. nation-
alities and a relatively small portion of the larger groups could 
ensure that Party supporters dominated the government. Very small 
numbers of different national groups also could be moved into anyone 
autonomous area to manipUlate the election results. In addition the 
system made it less important to reach those groups that were nomadic 
and therefore difficult to indoctrinate politically. Instead, the 
Party could concentrate on the accessable portion of the area's popu-
lation and still be sure of retaining political control. 
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Finally, the traditional Chinese divide and rule tactics also came 
into play in the divisions. During the Rectification Campaign the 
antagonism between the different nationalities emerged. The Mongols 
had advocated partitioning areas into" 'a purely Mongolian' " and a 
" 'purely Hah area,' " while other groups wanted industrial and mining 
establishmen~s to be set up on the basis of " 'single nationalities,' " 
still others opposed learning the Chinese and other minorities' lan-
guages as well as cultural exchanges between: the minorities. 73 These 
antagonisms between the minority groups left the local government 
bodies even more prone to Party domination. If the Party candidates 
from all the nationalities voted as a single block while the remaining 
deputies were split along national lines, the Party did not require a 
majority to dominate. But, and likely most important, the national 
differences ensured that the minorities would not unite in anyone 
autonomous area and thereby become a threat to Party rule. As a conse-
quence of the divisions of the various ethnic groups the only signifi-
cant area which had a indigenous majority was the Ili~. There the 
Kazakhs constituted 53.0 per cent of the population (see p. 35). 
Therefore, if the minorities wanted to pass legislation through the 
governing bodies that was or could have been interpreted as hostile to 
the Party they had to co-operate among themselves. 
1:5 Migration 
I . 
When the Communists came to power both Kaza~hstan and Si~kiang 
were overwhelmingly ruralo The migrants who had come to the regions 
before the revolutions consisted primarily of settlers searching for 
cultivable lando Land shortages in their native regions had forced 
them to either subsist or emigrate. In Kazakhstan and Sinkiang this 
resulted in a substantial inFlux of people. 
Following the revolutions this migration did not cease. It 
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increased significantly in Kazakhstan, effectively reducing the Kazakhs 
to a minority in their own republic by 1959. But the composition of 
the migrants had changed. They no longer were predominantly rural. 
Although agrarian workers continued to come to both regions they gene-
rally came as more land became available. Thus, Kazakhstan's rural 
influx durin~ the Virgin Lands Campaign of 1954 was the first large 
scale immigration of Russian agricultural workers after the revo-
1 t ' 74 u lone Lesser numbers, the victims of the purges, had been settled 
there at various times during Stalin's reign. 
In 1958 Peking r~port~d that most of the 60,000 people who had 
migrated to 5inkiang had "been placed on well-equipped mechanised 
i 
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farms." This indicated that they had been settled on wasteland 
reclaimed by the People's Liberation Army. 
A large proportion of the migrants to both regions was made up 
also of political and administrative cadres. Their task was to 
administer and train local personnel. In Sinkiang of the total 1959 
Party membership only 89,000 had been recruited in the province (se9 
p. 30). This indicated 41,000 had Joined the Party elsewhere, but not 
necessarily that they all belonged to other than the indigenous nation-
alities. People from the province were sent to be trained in training 
institutions outside and may have joined the Party while in another 
province. Nonetheless, it was entirely plausible that the pre-1955 
migrants were largely Party members. 
Some of these were appointed directly to high administrative posts 
in both the 5inkiang provincia~ anq Tihua (Urumchi) municipal.adminis-
trations. The appointments to both were made by Peking until the 1953-
54 elections. In 1952 the mayor of Urumchi, one of the three deputy 
mayors and nine of the nineteen council members were natives of other 
provinces.76 In the North-west Military Administrative Committee there 
was only one person, An-ni-wa-erh-chia-ku-lia (Anwar-chia Kulya), who 
was readily identifiable as belonging to one of the indigenous Turkic 
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groups. The provincial government also had several First Field Army 
-the PLA unit stationed in Sinkiang-representatives. One of these 
held one of the vice-chairman posts, while others including Wang En-mao 
-the commander of the First Field Army--were members. 78 
Traoes of this dominati?n of the top positions by outsiders may 
be observed also in the leadership positions of the KPSS in Kazakhstan. 
The number of Kazakhs on leading Party 
committees in Kazakhstan in 192679 
Committee 
Central dommittee of the terri-
torial (krai) and region~l 
(~) ~ittees I 
Provincial (9uberniya) 
committees 
District (okrug) committees 
Totals 
Totals as percentages 
Total number 
of oadres 
4 
21 
3 
28 
100% 
The number of 
Kazakh cadres 
2 
9 
1 
12 
42.9% 
Those posts that were not filled by Kazakhs were likely to have 
been occupied by Party members who had been sent to Kazakhstan. As 
dependable local members were recruited and trained they were given 
administrative tasks. But this did not mean that the outside cadres 
were withdrawn generally as local cadres were trained. As in Sinkiang 
Party personnel from other regions continued to dominate top positions 
80 in Kazakhstan. 
The last group of immigrants, the industrial workers, likely 
brought the greatest change to both regions. They came as a direct 
result of the natural resource~ suspected to be or actually located in 
the areas. Sinkiang's provincial government programme envisaged buil-
ding up agriculture, animal husbandry and handicrafts, while gradually 
developing the mining, oil, metal, leather and cotton spinning and 
weaving industries. The latter were intended to assist the development 
of both foreign and internal trade. 81 By 1956 this development was 
well underway and various light and heavy industrial plants had been 
set up throughout the province. 82 But th' d 1 1S eve opment required 
skilled industrial workers. Before th t k e a eover it was claimed there 
were only 500 industrial workers among the minorities. By 1957 their 
number had increased to 125,000 or approx~mately 2.4 per cent of the 
indigenous population (exclu?ing the Han-Chinese).83 Although these 
figures represented a substantial increase the skilled Han-Chinese 
workers were still required in large numbers to fill some jobs and 
train local personnel. 
The influx of industrial workers in Kazakhstan was reflected to 
some extent in the growth of the urban popUlation between 1926-59. 
Kazakhstan's urban popUlation 
in 1926 and 195984 
1926 1959 
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Nationality Urban percen- Each nation-
tage of each ality as per-
nationality centage of 
urban popula-
tion 
Urban percen-
tage of each 
nationality 
Each nation-
ality as per-
centage of 
urban popula-
tion 
Russians 
Ukrainians 
8elorussians 
Tatars 
Kazakhs 
Uzbeks 
% of total popu-
lation that was 
urban 
20.4 
01.9 
16.8 
60.4 
02.1 
27.3 
08.3 
57.7 
02.3 
00.2 
08.8 
14.5 
10.8 
59.0 
40.3 
42.2 
65.9 
24.3 
36.3 
43.7 
57.6 
07.6 
01.1 
03.1 
16.7 
01.2 
While the number of urban Kazakhs increased over the 1926-59 
period their share of the total urban population grew by only 2.2 per 
cent. In the same interval the Russian share of the total urban popu-
laUon decreased by only 0.1 p.sr c~nt, indicating either the large 
scale urbanisation of the Russians or an influx. Since a great number 
of industrial plants were moved to Kazakhstan during the Second World 
War a large group of workers undoubtedly were moved along with them. 
In the post-war period increased industrialisation precipitated still 
greater demands for skilled labour. This resulted in the migration of 
Russian workers who in part were responsible for the increase of the 
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Russian population from 23.5 per cent in 1926 to 42.7 per cent in 1959. 
During the same period the Kazakhs decreased from 57.2 to 30.0 per 
85 
cent. It would be erroneous to presume that the Kazakh proportion of 
the population decreased only as a result of the influx of Russians 
and people of other nationalities. According to one estimate the rava-
ges of callectivisation had reduced the Kaza~hs by approximately 1.5 
million by the end of 1939. 86 As a result of this decrease the pro-
portion of the other nationalities .increased. Therefore the net 
numerical increase was not as large as may at first have been sus-
pected. 
At present it is' impossible to determin~ the effect the migrants 
had on the composition of Sinkiang's population with any degree of 
certainty. Until 1955 fewer than 100,000 Han-Chinese were estimated to 
have migrated to the north-west and Inner Mongolia, while the corres-
ponding estimate for 1955-59 was 271,643. 87 On the basis of incomplete 
migration statistics the popUlation of Sinkiang for 1970 has been 
calculated. 
Population of Sinkiang in 1953 and 197088 
1953 1970 
Nationality Number Percentage Number Percentage 
of total of total 
Uighurs 3,640,000 74.7 4,707,000 55.4 
Kazakhs 475,000 09.7 564,000 06.6 
Han-Chinese 300,000 06.2 2,650,000a 31.2 
Hui (Dungans) 200,000 04.1 259,000 03.0 
Mongols 120,000 02.5 155,000 01.8 
Kirghiz (Kolkoz) 70,000 01.4 91,000 01.1 
Others 69,000 ~ 74.000 .Jllk2. 
I 
Totals 4,874,000 100,_0 8,500,000 100.0 
Notes: aincludes 2,262,000 implied Han-Chinese migrants 
If these figures were actually borne aut the indigenous people of 
Sinkiang, like the Kazakhs, were rapidly becoming minorities in their 
own regions. But it was unlikely that migrants were sent to either 
region specifically for this purpose, The skills of the immigrants 
were essential in politics, administration, agriculture and industry. 
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Those nationalities that had been deported to Kazakhstan must be exclu-
ded from this as they were largely rural people. 
While swamping the indigenous people of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang 
with migrants may have been desirable it was unlikely to accelerate the 
process of national assimilation. In both regions the economic limita-
tions restricted the size of the population. Large scale influxes 
without simultaneously developing the agrarian and industrial sectors 
could result only in ha~dship for both the migrants and indigenous 
people. To be successful a programme of mass migration had to be com-
bined with economic development. This in turn required great capital 
outlay. Although both central Governments undoubtedly wished to speed 
up the assimilation process the expense of this particular method 
remained an unsurmountable1 obstacle. This allowed the conclusion that 
the need for industrial and agricultural products led to the influxes 
and not the policy of national assimilation. 
1:6 Conclusions 
It has been said of Lenin that he designed his nationality policy 
t t t th t f ' t' lit' 89 so as a a trac e suppor a varlOUS na lana les. This conclu-
sion raised 'some difficulties. Lenin, like the Marxist theory on which 
he based himself resolved the dialectic from below. If the theory was 
applied correctly the starting point had to be adapted to the level of 
social €onsciousness that had been reached by the nationalities to whom 
it was to be applied. This made the theory flexible. But even more 
important the nationalities were to undergo no social change except for 
that which they themselves desired. No change was to be forced on 
them. Since both Lenin and Mao adopted this theory as their ideologi-
cal bases neither can be accused of opportunism. The theory determined 
their nationality policy and not the politics of the moment. 
The greatest single difficulty that arose in the two countries was 
the degree to which the respective parties were to guide and control 
social change. When the control from the centre was excessive the 
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nationalities accused the Russians And Han-Chinese of great nation 
chauvinism. Too little guidance, on the other hand, effectively slowed 
or even halted the transition. 
In Kazakhstan Stalin's regime resolved the difficulty through the 
legalist means of decrees and absolute control from the centre. Mao's 
policy in Sinkiang was both more subtle and closer to the theories of 
Marx and Lenin. But at the same time Mao drew on the traditions of 
Chinese government. The succeesive Chinese central Governmants Meuer 
had·succeeded in imposing their rule on the local population in any 
other than the ideological sense. gO The Chinese Communists continued 
in this tradition by contrplling the local people's congresses through 
the Party rather than decrees issued by the central Government. At the 
I 
same time the traditional 'divide and rule' tactics were applied in an 
effort to keep the nationalities politically disunited and weak. 
On the basis of this it may be suggested that the differences in 
the policies of the two countries were not to be found in differing 
interpretations of Marx's theory, but in the union of the theory with 
the Russian and Chinese traditions. In the Soviet Union the conse-
quence was direct local rule from the centre. By contrast, the Chinese 
ruled their regional areas through the communist ideology which the 
central Government had formulated with great care. 
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11:1 Introduction 
CHAPTER II 
The Islamic Religious and 
Cultural Influence 
The populations of both. the Soviet Union and People's Republic of 
China contain a large number of Muslims. In Kazakhstan and Sinkiang 
almost all the indigenous people were Islamicised to some extent, but 
there were great variations from one group to another in the degree to 
which the Islamic religious and cultural infiuence had penetrated. 
Despite these variations the Turkic people professed to be Muslims. 
Marx had condemned religion as a phase in the development of soci-
ety, a feudal phenomenon inte~ded to permit the bourgeoisie to exploit 
the masses. This view left the communist regimes little choice but to 
work for the abolition of all religions, making the attack on Islam in 
both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang inevitable. It was only in the form that 
the struggle against Islam was to take that the Governments had a 
choice. They could embark on a policy of outright religious prohibi-
tion--religion had been condemned asa bourgeois element of Capitalism 
--or they could treat it as a cultural maniFestation of alienated man. 
In the latter case it would have been possible to treat religion as a 
cultural phenomenon that was destined to disappear as the social con-
sciousness of man rose. 
With some variations each of the two Governments applied both 
these methods in the course of their respective search for a permanent 
I 
religious policy. But in the case gf developing this policy various 
other internal and external factors also had to be taken into conside-
ration. At times the Muslims were important allies in both internal 
and external matters. This factor made it expedient politically to 
gain their trust rather than to alienate them by the incautious appli-
cation of religious constraints. To meet these needs the policy had to 
51 
This flexibility was important also from a purely religious point 
of view. To deal with the great religious and cultural differences 
occurring among the various ethnic groups of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang 
effectively it was essenti~l. A successful religious policy simply 
could not be based on an Islamic orthodoxy that existed in neither 
Kazakhstan, Sinkiang nor the Middle East. If a policy was to be 
applied it required sufficient flexibility to permit its adaptation so 
that it could cope with the religious and cultural peculiarities that 
arose. The application of such a flexible policy required also a basic 
understanding of both the people end culture that it was to be applied 
to. In fact the combination of flexibility and understanding were 
indispensible if the approach to the religious question was to be rele-
! 
vant to Islam and not to offend ths Muslims. 
It would have been unrealistic to expect a policy meeting all 
these criteria to be developed over a short period of time. Following 
their takeovers neither the Bolsheviks nor the Chinese had a tried and 
\ 
ready method for dealing with their respective Muslim populations. The 
Bolsheviks could not fall back on even a traditional policy. Under tha 
Tsars the Muslims had been ruled through the Russian military, while 
Christian missionaries attempted to convert them to Christianity. In 
China the Communists fared much better. Their Confucian heritage pro-
vided them with a basis on which a communist policy could be construc-
ted. Nonetheless, both Governments faced a similar problem. They each 
had to formulate a religious policy that embodied their Marxist ideals. 
11:2 The formulation of 
a reli.gious policy 
Marx's attitude towards religion affected the religious policies 
of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China differently. Accor-
ding to him the religious question, like the political and social, 
would be resolved along with the dialectic. In his opinion religion 
was the self-consciousness (SelbetgefUhl) of that man who had either 
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not yet found himself or of him who had found but lost himself again. 1 
Man, then was not sufficiently self-conscious to recognise his true 
self. Only after he had acquired sufficient self-consciousness would 
man be able to recognise his true self in the superior being which he 
ht · h 2 soug ~n eaven. After man had recognised himself as that superior 
being which he worshipped his need for all religions would disappear. 
Despite this more tolerant attitude towards the religious beliefs of 
individuals, Marx was less conciliatory towards the religious institu-
tion itself. He condemned both it and its principles. 
The social principles of Christianity Justified slavery 
in antiquity, glorified mediaeval serfdom and could, if need 
be, although witn a some~hat unhappy mien, defend the oppres-
sion of the p~ol~tariat. 
The social prinCiples of Christianity preach the need 
for both a rulin~ snd oppres8~d class and, for the latter, 
they have only the pious wish .that the former may be 
beneficent. 3 
It was Engels who applied these views to Islam. The advent of 
Islam he described as a religious revolution that, "like all religious 
movements was formally a reaction, a intended return to the old and 
uncomplicated. 1I4 
Lenin too accepted these view and through him they eventually 
became a part of the official Soviet policy. In 1905 Lenin had 
described religion as, "a sort of spiritual brandy in which the slaves 
of capital drown their own human image and their demands for any ade-
quate form of human life.,,5 In his opinion and later in that of the 
Bolsheviks, religion was no more than a reactionary influence that was 
used to subdue the masses. The task of the revo~utionaries was to rid 
their respective countries of this influence. After the revolution the 
difficulty lay in achieving this aim. 
From the decrees affecting the Muslims that were issued immediate-
ly after the October revolution it appeared that the Bolsheviks inten-
ded to gain their support. The 1917 decree to the workers and Muslims 
of Russia and the East proclaimed their beliefs, customs and cultural 
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institutions "free and inviolable" and at the same time asked them to 
support the revolution and its Government. 6 Although this decree made 
various concessions to Islam the conciliatory attitude was not to last. 
A second decree, in february 1918, formalised the separation of the 
church and state and the chu~ch and schools, nationalised church pro~ 
party and allowed churches to make use of only such property as was 
required for the continuation of their religious functions.? While 
this second decree did not attempt to legislate religion out of exis-
tence it did indicate that the basib position of the Bolsheviks had not 
changed. Even if the regulations were not strictly enforced, a future 
anti-religious policy was foreshadowed. 
In Kazakhstan the question regarding strategy vis-~-vis the Mus-
i 
lims remained academic until the Civil War had ended. Only then were 
the Bolsheviks able to apply their religious policy in that region. 
This policy by then had been made somewhat less offensive to the Mus-
lims than it had been during the intervening period (1918-20). Between 
1918-20 anti-religious excesses by the Bolsheviks-the profaning of 
mosques and shooting of Mullahs--resulted in resistance in Tatarstan, 
8ashkiriya, the Caucasus, the Crimea and especially in Turkestan. 8 
From 1921-25 the attitude was more tolerant, tending towards a gradual 
transformation. 8y then Lenin had returned to his intention to trans-
form the Muslims into Communists and rid them of their religiouB insti-
tutions by means of increased social consciousness. At the VIII Party 
Congress he counseled caution in dealing with the people who were domi-
nated by Islam because they ~"e!-,8 "e.ntirely subservient to their 
Mullahs. 1I In his opinion the correct policy was to await the devolop-
ment of the nations and the "differentiation of the proletariat from 
the bourgeois elements," a process Lenin considered lIinevitable."9 
This represented Lenin's pre-War Communism ideological approach for 
dealing with Islam. 
Tn 10?n ~~alin ~lQn h~~ n;Qnl~vRrl nreater flexibility in his atti-
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tude towards Islamic customs. He advised that if either the requisi-
tioning of unused living accommodation in Azerbaidjan or the combating 
of religion in Oageston by the direct moans aroused opposition, a round 
about way should be found to achieve the same end. 10 Unlike Lenin, 
Stalin did not seek to resolve the issue through the dialectic. His 
solution lay in the application of greater diplomatic skill. 
In China the religious policy also developed over a loqg period of 
time. This policy was not rooted only in Marxism, as was that of the 
Soviet Union, but consisted of a mixture of Confucianism and Marxism. 
Traditionally· the Chinese had relied on a policy of gradually convin-
cing the non-Chinese that the Chinese culture was superior. Through 
this method of Sinici~ation they had been able to extend their empire 
and conquer the alien Mongol and Manchu dynesties aFter these had both 
conquered Chine. These traditional means of cultural change were com-
bined with the key Marxist principle for cultural conversion-trans-
formation through increased eocial consciousness. To some extent the 
Confucian and Marxist ideals were complementary. Both envisaged cultu-
ral change through the recognition of a superior culture which would 
then be exchanged for the inferior. Undoubtedly this similarity sim-
plified the combining of the two doctrines, a combination that produced 
a uniquely Chinese religious policy. 
The Chinese Communists held that Marxism-Leninism considered reli-
gion a "social problem of historical nature" and was "always against 
the erroneous views and wrong actions in trying to solve the problem of 
religion by administrative d~c:.ee o_r any other simPle drastic .step." 11 
Like the confucian scholars, the Communists by 1950 did not wish to 
change alien cultures by means of decrees. However, this attitude did 
not evolve simply From a combination of Confucius and Marx. 
During the war against Japan the need for an alliance with the Hui 
led the Communists to abandon their attempts to create Muslim soviets. 
T __ ~oa~ in 1Q~~ thav RrlnntRrl thR united front policy which permitted 
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concessions to be made to the religious beliefs of the Muslims of Kansu 
and Ningsia.These affected both the civilian and military Muslim 
population. In the barracks the Hui soldiers of the Red Army were pro-
vided with special baths and permitted food that did not violate their 
religious belief. The Han soldiers were admonished to show due respect 
for the Muslim population and their religion. 12 The new policy was 
flexible and adaptable, features that gave it permanence because they 
enabled it to cope with changing political conditions. After it had 
been introduced changes in the MusLim's culture were to be made from 
within rather than without. In 1936 it was the position of ths Party 
I 
that the Muslims in Kansu ~ad to carry out their own "land revolution," 
led by their own revolutiohary organisations. 13 This attitude pre-
, 
vailed and following the takeover it was embodied in the laws of the 
People's Republic. Articles 5 and 53 of the Common Programme and 
Article 3 and 88 of the 1954 constitution granted to the minorities 
alone the right to change their customs and religions and guaranteed 
14 
religious freedom for all. 
By allowing the minorities to change their own culture and reli-
"gion the Chinese were able to avoid some of the difficulties that the 
Bolsheviks had encountered as a direct consequence of their attitude 
towards religion. In China there was no ideological need to attack the 
various religions directly in order to destroy them. In the case of 
the Cnristian religion the foreign missionaries were accused of working 
for or being open to the influence of imperialism. To combat this in-
fluence the Christian churches of C~ina were encouraged to sevar their 
ties with the "imperialist influence and financial support, to the end 
that they may become self-governing, self-supporting and doing indepen-
dent preaching.,,15 This particular form of attack was not directly 
aimed at the religious institution, but at what were considered nega-
tiv8 influences within it. furthermore the Chinese did not distinguish 
between the raliaious and cultural influence of Islam. This allowed 
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them to escape the need to define an Islamic orthodoxy and culture for 
their Muslim populatio~. The Soviet position under Lenin and Stulin 
was precisely the opposite. Throughout Europe religion had played an 
16 important part in government in the past. To some extent the Marxist 
anti-religious attitude may ?e accounted for by the close links between 
the church and state. In China no such link existed. This in turn may 
have resulted in the different attitudes towards religion on the part 
of the Russian and Chinese Communists. By accepting the Marxist defi-
nition of religion the latter was condemned by Lenin and Stalin as an 
alien element in the culture of the Turkic people. This forced the 
Soviet Government to define a pure, non-Islamic culture for the Muslims 
and to mount a direct attack on Islam and religions in general. The 
last aspect made matters worse still. To mount a direct attack the 
target had to be defined, but in the case of Islam there was neither a 
single nor a general definition that applied to the faith of the Turkic 
people or, for that matter, to Islam as a whole. 
11:3 Islam in Kazakhstan 
and Sinkiang 
The religious belief and culture of the indigenous population of 
both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang differed from those of the Middle East. 
While such differences may be expected between two distant geographic 
regions, geographic separation cannot be responsible for the re~igious 
and cultural variations that appeared among the different Turkic groups 
of people inhabiting Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. These differences 
reflected the extent to which Islam had influenced the native cultures. 
Generally it seems correct t~~ssert that the culture of the most 
sedentary people also was the most Islamicised. Hence, whereas the 
almost totally sedentary TadJiks were the most Islamicised, the nomadic 
Kazakhs had been influenced hardly at all. In 1917 their culture was 
still a mixture of nomadism, Shamanism and Islam. 
Islam had been brought to the Kazakhs through the efforts of 
Catherine II. During the eighteenth century she had mosques built in 
the steppes and sent Tatar Mullahs to preach and teach among the 
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Kazakhs. Despite these efforts their conversion had never been com-
plete. Their culturalcand religious traditions--nomadism and Shama-
nism--intermingled freely with Islam. To some extent this cultural and 
religious synthesis may have been the direct result of common charac-
teristics inherent in each influence. 
II:3;i The cultural and 
religious synthesis 
In both Islam and Shamanism there are heavenly deities and a belief 
in life after death. 18 Although there were various other spirits that 
influenced different aspects of the peop}e's lives in Shamanism, it was 
the heavenly god, 8ai Yulgan, who ~as the most important. The rever-
, 
ence in which he was held by the Kazakhs may have been reflected in the 
nature of their sacrifices. These consisted of horses. Among the 
Kazakhs the horse was the "prestige-animal, the gauge of values and the 
19 
symbol of beauty." Its sacrifice signified a rite of great impor-
tance and may have indicated that the appeal was being made to what was 
considered the most powerful deity. While this did not mean that with 
the coming of Islam 8ai Yulgan simply could be called Allah, the 
heavenly deity did give Shamanism and Islam a basic similarity. In 
some parts of tropical Africa an analogous condition prevailed between 
the pagan religion of the natives and Islam. This was believed to have 
assisted in the Islamicisation of the region. 20 In Kasakhstan and 
Sinkiang the religious similarities of Shamanism and Islam may have 
played a similar role. However, there the common features were con-
fined not only to religion. Some aspects of nomadism made it and Islam 
culturally compat~ble. 
One of these features, the raising of pigs, was not a clear cut 
case of Islamic prohibition. Not only the Turkic but also the non-
Islamic Mongolian nomads refused to raise the animals. This led to the 
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gious scruples, but to its incompatibility with nomadism. 21 Although 
the twentieth century attitude well may be based on Islam the objection 
to the pig nonetheless could be rooted in nomadism. The fact that 
Islam originated in a nomadic society suggested that the nomadic prac-
tice was made a religious practice. In the course of time the lines of 
origin became blurred and the pig was opposed on religious grounds • 
. Another practice with a similarly blurred line of origin concerned 
the headdress of Kaza~h women. It appeared on the steppes after tra-
ders had introduced taxtiles to the Kazakhs and closely resembled that 
i 
. 22 
worn by the oases women. Perhaps it was adopted as a substitute for 
the veil. 
daily work. 
The latter cert~inly.would have hindered the women in their 
But at the same time its turban-like shape could have i 
served a functional purpose. The duties of the women were not confined 
to the yurt alone, but also took them outside. Thus they were exposed 
to the full range of climatic conditions and the headdress may have 
been adopted to protect them from the elements. 
Similar adaptations were made in religious matters. The Muslim 
religious festivals that were combined with celebrations found ready 
acceptance among the Kazakhs, whose love for festivities was well-
known. Other religious rites, such as the commemorative ceremony, 
although not a celebration, were transformed effectively into such by 
the Kazakhs. However, the more sombre religious practices; the five 
pillars of the faith--~ (prayer), ~ (fasting), ~ (giving of 
alms), Ha.i~ (pilgrimage) and ~ (holy war)--were seldom observed or 
t · I' d 23 en ~re y ~gnore • 
The culture of the Kazakhs in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang was 
therefore neither Islamic, nomadic nor Shamanistic. It was a combina-
tion of the three. In this combination Islam was the least influen-
tial. In 1921 it was noted that Islam had failed to affect even the 
status of Kazakh women, while it had succeeded in doing so in the other 
• FR' 24 Islam~c areas 0 USB~B. 
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Although there were religious and cultural differences among the 
different Turkic groups within the two regions they were all united by 
the common bond of Islam. In the case of the Kazakhs this seemed con-
tradictory. They were hardly Islamicised. Nonetheless, they and all 
other Muslims were members of the Muslim Community, the ~. 
II:3;ii The Muslim 
Community 
It would be wrong to assume that the Muslim Community was founded 
on the basis of religious and cultural conformity. Neither of these 
existed either within the Community or in Islamic civilisation. The 
latter has been described as "a sort o~iseries of levels, a gradation 
I 
going1from a hard cenhral historicogeographical core toward the more 
moderate forms, and from these to the peripheral regions subject to 
25 frank copartnership of cultures." This diversity became an accepted 
feature of the Muslim Community. 
Perhaps the most remarkable and necessary aspect of Sunni Islam 
was its flexibility. Its lack of rigidity almost invited diversity in 
the religious and cultural pattern of the various groups of Muslims by 
legitimising various interpretations of Koranic teaching. While this 
flexibility was not necessarily inherent in Muhammad's teaching it 
became the basis for Sunnism, the school that sought to prevent a 
splintering of the Muslims after Muhammad's death. At that time unity 
was thratened by the differing interpretations of the Koran which the 
religious leaders of various regions gave and the lack of a link 
between the Islamic and Arabic cultures and traditions. In order to 
maintain and strengthen Muslim· uni ty the Sunni school develope'd a par-
ticular ~ethod for interpreting the teachings of the Prophet. Their 
concern became not to define what was acceptable, but to reject that 
which was opposed to Islam. 26 This approach allowed them considerable 
breadth in deciding whether or not the actions of individuals or groups 
were Islamic. still greater flexibility was introduced into this pro-
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It was claimed that these traditions originated from the teaching 
of Muhammad. His followers observed tho Prophet giving decisions on 
various issues and reported these decisions to others who reported them 
to others still and so on. These decisions became the basis of Sunni 
tradition. On Qccasion it was necessary to invent traditions to enable 
the Community to meet changing conditions and to rea sure Muslims that 
their practices were in accord with the Prophet's teaching. 27 As a 
direct consequence of these methods Sunni Islam became flexible and 
adaptable, constantly able to meet .the demands of a changing Islamic 
World~ By no means should it be assumed that this need was met by con-
tinuously fabricating new traditions. On the contrary, great efforts 
were made to verify that reported traditions were in fact based on 
M b d t t h' 28 uamma s ,esc ~ng. The lack of rigidity only allowed for the 
introduction of new traditions if they could be substantiated on the 
basis of accepted teaching. 
Among the Sunni Muslims, the group to which the Turkic people 
generally belong, the flexibility was sufficient to accommodate all the 
differing farms of Islam and accept these as part of the Community. No 
preconditions were made for membership in the ~ beyond the general 
claim to be a Muslim. This requirement was unlikely to bar anyone, but 
it also was no carte blanche. 
While a good Muslim was not one whose belief conformed to an 
accepted statement of foith it nevertheless had to conform to an accep-
ted code. 29 And although there was no universally accepted definition 
for a Muslim for purposes of Community membership, the accept~ble code 
of behavious became more defined on the local and individual levels. 
If it is assumed that the Muslim's religious life occurred on three 
levels. that of the individual's commitment to Allah, his commitment to , 
his local Muslim community and his commitment to the ~, all but the 
last required his adhering to a definite code. 
On the individual level each Muslim made a bargain with Allah. 
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This was a personal bargain insofar as it was struck between the indi-
vidual and Allah, but it committed the believer to meeting the require-
ments of his faith. for if the bargain truly was one of the heart it 
t 'tl d hi t 1 ' . 30 en ~ e m 0 a p ace ~n Paradise. But to be entitled to this re-
ward it was necessary to lead a life that pleased Allah, a requirement 
that the individual fulfilled in his personal life and within the life 
of the local Muslim community. In the case of the local community this 
meant that the individual conFormed to that behaviour pattern which his 
local community considered acceptable. 
The local behavious pattern likely was derived from the Islamic 
traditions of the local areas, legalised by virtue of having been based 
on the judgements of Muhammad. Thus, according to the claims of 
Chinese Muslims, Muhammad's maternal uncle ceme to Canton in 633, built 
the first mosque there and lies buried in the city.31 No doubt many of 
the traditions of the Chinese Muslims are based on his authority as a 
carrier of traditions. Over the years these traditions were added to 
and modernised by those who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca and 
Medina. It has been noted that returning pilgrims introduced new ideas 
t th K M l ' 32 and founded new sec s among e ansu us ~ms. These new sects may 
not have been long-lived or even very popular, but they illustrated the 
degree to which returning pilgrims could influence the life of the 
local community. By being able to add to existing traditions in this 
manner local communities were able to modernise continuously. 
As a member of the local community of believers the individual was 
required therefore to adhere to the local Muslim traditions. .These in 
turn were accepted as Islamic by the ~ of which the local community 
and the individual were a part. This made the claim to be a Muslim a 
great deal more than a simple expression of faith. As well as a state-
ment of faith it was a commitment to a wny of life and an expression of 
loyalty to the Muslim Community. 
lI:3;iii Muslims, nationalists 
and communists 
In both the Soviet Union and China the Muslims were committed to 
the Community of believers. At the same time they had been divided 
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into national groups, given national republics, counties, districts and 
regions and generally encouraged to adopt the communist way of life. 
The evidence suggested that some accepted the communist way of life, 
joined the Party and continued to be Muslims. 
The building of the Chiiliish~i irrigation canal in Kazakhstan 
entailed the destruction of the shrine of Es-Abyz. Not only were the 
local Mullahs successful in having the shrine rebuilt, they also 
managed to recruit the assistance of the local Party organisation for 
the task. In the course of these efforts on behalf of Islam the local 
Party neglected the harvest work. As a result three Kazakh Party mem-
bers were expelled from the Party and two others were given severe 
. d 33 repr~man s. This particulnr incident highlighted the problem the two 
parties had to come to grips with. By virtue of having joined the 
Party Muslims did not cease necessarily being Muslims. To some degree 
this duality may be explained by the emphasis an the heart in Islam and 
the flexibility of the faith. 
According to one Turkic believer it was the emphasis on the purity 
of the heart that had attracted him to Islam. 34 This was hardly con-
elusive evidence, but it suggested that the Muslims differentiated 
between an inner and outer commitment. As long as the commitment to 
Islam--the inner commitment--was maintained in the heart and the local 
community did not object, the~~ was nothing to prevent Muslims from 
joining the Party. Whether they were Muslims or Communists first was 
revealed by their actions in matters related directly to Islam. In the 
case described above the faith was placed before the Party and the work 
in the fields. 
A similar duality appearod in connection with the national identi-
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ty of the Muslims. The Turkic nomads had lacked all conception of a 
nation or national identity. Even after they settled in a single area 
they remained Muslims first and only secondarily idehtified themselves 
as residents of a town or district. As such they lacked all sense of 
belonging to a particular stock of people. 35 In Sinkiang the Turkic 
people who had settled permanently identified themselves according to 
the names of their oases cities. The residents of Kashgar were Kash-
garliks, those of Turfan, Turfanliks and so on. 36 . To some extent this 
may have been due to the nomadic heritage rather than the'influence of 
Islam. Their lack of permanent settlements did not allow the nomads to 
be identified with a single place. Furthermore, the extended family 
made up their basic social unit, the~. In Kazakh society there were 
larger social units; several ~ formed a sub-clan, these joined into 
clans, which formed tribes and they united into hordes. But apart 
from a general consciousness of belonging to a larger group there was 
no close or permanent bonding force other than Islam. Those unions 
that were entered into were based on a common cause and after this had 
been achieved the bond no longer held. 
It was only Islam and the membership in the Muslim Community that 
gave all Turkic people a common bond. This was based on the spiritual 
union of the whole Muslim World rather than national sentiments. It 
may have been for this re8son that the Soviet propagandists attempted 
to dispel the Turkic people's belief that Islam was a part of the cul-
tural tradition of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. 3? Given the Soviet 
ideological position on religion t~is argument followed logic&lly. At 
the same time it forced the Government into the position of having had 
to both create cultural traditions for the Turkic people and instil the 
latter with national sentiments for these newly created traditions. In 
this light the Central Asian republics and the national areas of Sin-
kiang may have been created especially for the purpose of raising the 
national consciousness of the indigenous people. 
Although the Turkic people apparently accepted this new national 
identity it also became a part of their Muslim identity. A Kirghiz 
anti-Islamic propagandist in responding to a Kirghiz youth who had 
asked him whether he was a Muslim replied that he did not believe in 
God. Therupon the youth scolded, " 'How dare you say that! You·too 
are a Kirghlz!' "38 To the youth being a Kirghiz and Muslim were one 
and the sams. This suggested that the dynamics of modern Turkic 
nationalism were similar to those of the Middle East. 
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The nationalism that has a~isen in the Middle East was based on a 
consciousness of belonging to a region whose peo~le had common linguis-
tic, historical, cultural and religious ties and shared important 
inter~sts. It was not based on racial similarities. 39 Arab national-
ism therefore may be looked upon as the local Muslim community extended 
to include those people tied to it by non-racial bonds. This concept 
allowed the Kazakhs to identify themselves as Kazakhs but, as in the 
case of the Kirghiz youth, the term Kazakh and Muslim were interchange-
able. Taken in this sense the national identity was little more than 
the local community of believers expanded to include a r~gion. 
Nasser's concept of national unity also appeared to have taken this 
general direction. He envisaged a union of Muslims that was based on 
three units; the single Arab state, the union of Arab states and the 
union of all Muslims. The last he believed possible on the basis of 
the common faith. 40 
The concept of nationalism in the Muslim World therefore was not a 
means for racial identificatio~, b~t an acknowledgement of a shared 
interest or common cultural bond. Furthermore, nationalism, like all 
aspects of Muslim life, became a part of the Community and was subordi-
nated to the interests of the whole. To be a Uighur, Kazakh, Uzbek 
etc., was no more than for an Arab to be Egyptian, Jordanian or Pales-
tinian. In the final reckoning all were Muslims. 
II:3;iv Islamic-
socialism 
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It hardly can be denied that Confucianism, Christianity, Islam and 
various other doctrines share some ideals with Communism. They all 
were based on a concern for humanity. This influence gave each a 
socialist leaning insofar as'the emphasis of the concern was on social 
justice and the common good. The differences appeared in the role and 
rights of the individual. Only in Communism were the rights of the 
individual subordinated to the rights of the society as a whole. In 
the other doctrines it was from the rights of the individual and that 
individual's concern for humanity as a ~hole that a socially more just 
society was to emerge. In the ~iddle East this concept gave birth to 
Islamic-socialism.: 
Arab-socialism was based on the concept of mutual responsibility. 
It was intended to foster a society in which both the individual and 
the society had a responsibility towards each other and neither sought 
to dominate the other. 41 This was not at all alien to the Marxist con-
cept of the relationship between the individual and society--the dedi-
cation to end the exploitation of individuals and the establishment of 
a social order that was free from oppression. But there the similarity 
between Islamic-socialism and Communism ended. The Muslim ideal of 
mutual responsibility, unlike the ideals of Marxism, was not based on 
42 
manls but God's word. This made Islam basic to Arab-socialism and it 
was religion that dominated and defined the social order. Consequently 
Islamic-socialism did not and could not oppose institutions that had 
been sanctioned by Koranic law: One of these was private property. To 
attack private property or a similar institution would not have been an 
attack on a single institution, but an attack on the whole concept of 
Islamic law. This would have made any socialist doctrine supporting 
such an attack unacceptable to the Muslims. 
The basic need to respect Islam and its institutions has been con-
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sidered a great drawback for Arab Communists attempting to gain a foot-
hold in the Middle East. Although their radicalism may hava stood them 
in good stead, their atheism and anti-Islamic policies left them 
lacking in popular support. But as one author noted, not necessarily 
without the possibility of greater success in future. 
For an independent radical party of the left thera are 
good prospects in the Middle East, but the communists are 
nat yet an independent party and they would have to pay more 
than lip-service to Islam, to disavow dialectical material-
ism and to give up any idea of nationalizing the land. In 
ather words, it would involve their ceasing to be communists 
and turning into a national-socialist party. This is by no 
means impossible; they have already gone a. long way towards 
it. Perhaps thi~ is the road ~n which they may one day suc-
ceed, provided, of course, that they prevail over the many 
competitors who have already staked their claims in this 
promising field. 43 Ii 
I 11 
Even radical Middle Eastern politicians had to reckon with the 
force of Islam if they hoped to gain wide-spread support. This ap- , 
peared equally true of other Muslim states. In Pakistan where Islamic-
socialism also has become a means for social justice Pakistani Muslims 
held that social justice and the common good were not to be achieved at 
the expense of the rights that had been granted by Islamic-law. It was 
through the latter that Islam was deemed able to strike "a balance 
between individualism and collectivism."44 
The acceptance of the God given law as just also endowed Islamic-
socialism with a non-revolutionary character. There was no call for a 
revolutionary overthrow of the social order. The call was for the 
application of Islamic-law in order to restore the egalitarian state 
d · I 1 45 that was roote ~n sam. The solution to theisocial problems lay 
not without but within the Isiamic social order. 
11:4 The application of the 
religious policies 
Considering the great religious and cultural variations manifes-
ting themselves in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang a direct attack on Islam was 
bound to be difficult. The differences that occurred among the Turkic 
~~au~s ~f oeoole had to be taken into account. These differences also 
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made it necessary to launch separate attacks on the individual groups. 
In addition national traditions had to be defined to replace those of 
the Islamic societies. The Soviet Government, as has been noted, was 
in precisely this position after the Civii War. It was determined to 
destroy the religious influence. The Chinese, on the other hand, had a 
more flexible attitude and adopted what has been termed a "gradualist 
policy" for dealing with the (YIuslims. 46 
The Soviet Government had been warned as early as 1921 that its 
policy towards the Muslims should be one of caution. Sultan-Galiev, 
the.Bolshevik's Tatar fellow-traveller, had warned that a separate 
religious policy was recBssary for Bach group of Muslims and Islam as 
a whole if the Mus~ims were not to be alienated. He noted that Islam 
contained a "civil-political element," whereas in other religions "only 
the spiritual-ethical motif" prevailed. In addition the communist pro-
pagandists had to give due consideration to religious and cultural dif-
ferences amidst the verious Muslims and refrain from attacking Islam. 
Such an attack, Sultan-Galiev claimed, would cause the Muslims to look 
upon the Communists as they had upon the Christian missionaries of the 
Tsarist period. Of the various Muslim groups he considered the Kazakhs 
the least Isl~micised and likely to be the most receptive to anti-reli-
. d 47 g~ous propagan a. 
Neither Lenin nor Stalin heeded this advice when it was given. 
Even after he had returned to the dialectic approach to deal with reli-
gion, Lenin continued to look upon all religions purely as religions. 
Stalin never concerned himself with ohanging the people's rel~gious 
attitudes from below. His method was to use laws, decrees and repres-
sion to force change from above. As his powers increased hig inability 
to apply Marxist-Leninist theory forced him to rely on the legal machi-
nery of the state. The tragedy of Stalin's rule was not that he con-
trolled the legal machinery, but that he was able to make arbitrary 
decisions about that which was legal and illegal. 
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After Lenin had ceased participating actively in the Soviet 
Government Stalin's powers increased. The' . 1ncrease 1n his powers was 
reflected in the policy towards Islam. As Stalin's powers grew the 
attacks on Islamic institutions intensified. In 1923 the powers of the 
Islamic courts were restrict?d and in 1927 they were abolished. The 
land holdings of mosques--these were private endowments to mosques 
called wagfs which supported the religious and educational institu-
tions--were liquidated between 1925-30. In 1926 the direct attack on 
the religious institutibn itself b~gan. Mullahs were charged with 
various crimes and, in 1928, mosques were transformed into cultural 
centres. 
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customs. 
At the samBi time a resolute struggle was waged against Muslim 
1 i 
This intehsifled onslaught on Islam was hardly unique. 
stalin dealt with all persons, religions and institutions suspected of 
opposing his rule in the same way. 
The Chinese policy towards Islam, with the exception of the Cultu-
ral Revolution, stood in direct contrast to that of Stalin. As ~he Red 
Army was about to enter the Muslim regions of the north-west the sol-
diers were instructed about the various Islamic religious and cultural 
customs and specifically prohibited from acting in any manner that was 
offensive to the Muslims. 49 With some Justification it could be argued 
that these policies, like those of the Bolsheviks in 1917, were the 
policies of the moment, designed to win the Muslims over to the side of 
Communism. There can be little question that both the Russian and 
Chinese Communists were concerned about alienating the Muslims. But 
unlike the Bolsheviks the Chinese were able to t~anslate thei~ concern 
into a policy that was relatively consistent. In China the concern 
also did not end after the takeover. Following it Mao was as intent as 
ever to avoid a direct confrontation. Generally whenever Peking became 
directly involved with Sinkiang's Muslims its policy had the appearance 
of having been designed for this particular purpose. The regulations 
that were passed exempted the mosques from property taxes and the 
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animals slaughtered for ~uslim festivals from slaughtering taxes. They 
declared the three great ~uslim festivals public holid~ys for all Mus-
lims and stipulated that ~uslims were to be given a five per cent tra-
ding discount on these holidays.50 This indicated that since 1936 
Peking had been intent on gaining the trust of the ~uslims rather than 
arousing their suspicion. Accordingly the policy for dealing with 
Islam was designed to maintain the unity that had been achieved. In 
Sinkiang the provinciel government also actively pursued a union 
b t th 1 d I " i 51 e ween e peop e an re ~g on. This policy was in tune with the 
attem~ts in Peking to "align the interests of both the Muslims and the 
Communists and to convince the former that the latter represented their 
interests. 
A similar linking of interests did not occur in the Soviet Union 
until the outbreak of hostilities with Germany in 1941. This event 
transformed the Muslims into useful intermediaries. Through them 
Stalin intended to gain Arab support for the Soviet cause. In order to 
make the internal Communist-Muslim alliance appear more than a politi-
cal expedient, the persecution of the ~uslims had to cease. A similar 
strategy was employed to gain the support of various other groups with-
in the USSR. 
In both the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic the 
need for an alliance with the ~uslims continued well after the Second 
World War had ended. After 1949 both states sought support in the 
~iddle East. Their respective Muslim people provided them with useful 
links to the Arab countries. As a ~esult a policy that foste~d inter-
nal unity was important to both Moscow and Peking. The Muslims in the 
Middle East only had to be convinced that this unity actually existed. 
At the same time this policy was useful to both regimes in another way. 
Through it they could achieve their ultimate aims, the complete aboli-
tion of Islam. 
Il:4;i The uneasy 
alliance 
70 
The Chinese made great efforts to convince the Muslims that Islam 
and Communism were not mutually exclusive and that the interests of the 
Muslims coincided with those of the Government. The frireword of the 
1952 translation of the Koran into Chinese attempted to reconcile the 
52 Islamic and communist teachings. It was unlikely that the believers 
could have been reached simply by means of this translation. In the 
past the Muslims had not sanctioned such translations for fear of 
destroying the sanctity of the Book of the Prophet. The translation 
that had been made in ~hB 1920's had apparently never reached the 
53 Muslim regions of the north-west. This was some indication that the 
1952 translation was u~likely also to be widely accepted and therefore 
i 
an ineffective means through which the two doctrines could be 
reconciled. 
The Chinese Islamic Association was used also for reconciliation 
purposes. But it appeared more effective for spreading propaganda 
outside the country than within. It was founded in 1953 with Burhan, 
the Chairman of Sinkiang's provincial government, as its chairman. At 
its first meeting the association sent three messages. These left 
little doubt that the association was a political rather than a reli-
gious body. 
The message to Chairman Mao Tse-tung expresses grati-
tude for his policies on nationalities and religion. The 
message to the Chinese People's Liberation Army calls the 
armymen "the defenders of the interests of all nationali-
ties" in China. 
Hailing the brilliant vietories of the Chinese People's 
Volunteers against the American aggressors, the message 
declared that the Moslems "will support you and strive for 
the complete victory of the 'resist American aggression aid 
Korea' struggle and a just and reasonable settlement of the 
Korean question.,,54 
In the Soviet Union similar support for the Government1s policies 
55 had been expressed by the Muslims since 1941. It was difficult to 
assess the degree to which these statements were representative of the 
opinions of the Muslims in both countr'es. G 11 ~ enera y they were offi-
cial statements made on their behalf. This did not make them neces-
sarily a true expression of their opinions. 
, I 
Although the Governments were able to control the official organi-
sations of Islam, this did not give them the means for affecting 
changes in the lives of individual Muslims. A Chinese Government 
spokesman had noted that the abolition of Islam could be undertaken 
without opposition after the Muslims had accepted the communist way of 
1 0f 56 ~ e. The key difficulty lay in getting the Muslims to accept Commu-
nism without the application of direct pressure. Cadres attempted to 
influence the lives of individuals by convincing them that the Muslim 
"feudal society" and religion were relics from the past and should be 
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replaced by the moral principles of the new society. These attacks 
on individuals and families were direct and presented a certain amount 
of danger. They could have aroused the indignation of those whose 
beliefs and culture were criticised. In one such incident Peking's 
Muslim community threatened to destroy the Kwang Ming Jih Pao, when the 
newspaper described Muhammad as a thief. Although the Government war-
ned against such action a Muslim member of the CPPCC, Ma Chien, wrote 
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an article to right the wrong. To avoid such confrontations another 
means had to be found for influencing the Muslims. 80th Governments 
discovered this to lie within the religion itself. 
Through the Chinese Islamic Association and the four regional 
directorates of Muslim religious affairs in the Soviet Union--the 
Kazakhs came under the Directorate for Sunni Muslims of Centr~l Asia 
and Kazakhstan--both regimes effectively controlled the officially 
sanctioned religious leaders and the official Islamic institution., To 
gain this control even the Chinese had not been adverse to launching a 
direct attack. In Hsi-ning the land of the largest mosque in China was 
confiscated in 1949. As this lend had supported both the mosque and 
advanced students of the Koran, the mosque's teaching function could 
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not continue. But there was no question of leaving Islam without 
Imams or Mullahs. In 1955 the Chinese Islamic Association established 
the Institute of Islamic Scriptures in Peking to train religious le8-
60 
ders for Islam. However, through their control of the religious 
training facilities and their programmes,61 bath Governments effec-
tively controlled the future of official Islam. At the same time the 
two states were able to influence the beliefs of individuals through 
the new trainees. 
In the Soviet Union the official clergy attempted to establish a 
spiritual link between Islam and Communism. They claimed that the 
building of Communism was the realisation of Gad's plan for a just 
society and that this fallowed after prayer in those matters pleasing 
52 to Allah. This was an attempt to create new traditions and make 
these acceptable to the Muslims. The Islamic practices of fasting and 
not working on religious holidays were no doubt disrupting field work, 
especially during the critical sowing and harvesting periods. Although 
both Governments had declared the Islamic religious holidays official 
holidays they undoubtedly were keen to change this. During the Great 
Leap it was reported in China that the Uighur and Hui peasants of Tur-
fan had turned out for work an the Ramadan holiday.53 It was not sta-
ted whether they had done so an their own initiative or with the encou-
ragement of the local religious leaders. In the Soviet union the offi-
cial clergy was the initiator of such changes. One Imam instructed the 
believers that they did not have to be absent from work during the 
Kurban-Bairam festival. 54 If the-twa Governments were successful in 
influencing Muslim traditions in this manner Islam could be used to 
sow the seeds of its awn destruction. By continuously introducing new 
traditions the Islamic religion could be gradually secularised. One 
. 
difficulty in pursuing this course was the lo¥alty of the religious 
leadership to the two regimes. 
After the takeover the Chinese, like the Bolsheviks after theirs, 
73 
recruited fully trained Imams to make the Government's policy known 
th M 1" 65 among e nUS ~ms. In the Soviet Union these religious leaders like-
ly fell victim to Stalin's terror, but if the Chinese experience was 
any indication, Stalin's suspicions would have been well-founded. 
Peking was un8ble to control. the message that its recruits preached. 
In the case of one Imam this was hard core religion rather than the 
I " f S "1" 66 po ~cy 0 oc~a ~sm. This, of course, was only one case, but a simi-
lar practice was noted among Chinese Buddhist monks. 57 These activi-
ties therefore may have been wide-spread. 
While these attempts were mad~ to influence Islam from within the 
Soviet Union also mounted a vast propaganda campaign to encourage 
change from without. 
II:4;li Anti-Islamic 
propaganda 
In its propaganda campaign the Soviet Government faced endless 
difficulty in making the propaganda effective. As early as 1922 its 
lack of effectiveness was noted. At the XII Party Congress the pre-
viously published anti-religious literature was condemned generally as 
unsatisfactory. In future such literature was to address itself to 
questions concerning the origin of the World, life and human relations, 
the counterrevolutionary activities of the religions and churches, 
"especially the Russian Church, its origin, evolution, position in 
relationship to class society and the liberation activiti~s of the pro-
letariat and peasants at the decisive moment." It was decided also 
that "forms and methods" had to be developed to deal with the "reli-
gion connected mediaeval pre}~dice~" of the Muslims, with due conside-
ration to be given each " 68 Th " ethn~c group. , e pr~mary concern of anti-
religious propaganda in the 1920's was the reactionary nature of reli-
gion. This cheracterisation also found its way into anti-Islamic pro-
paganda. According to one of the first anti-Islamic propagandists, 
"In the final analysis, in national affairs, the mosque always has 
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played a treacherous, reactionary role in collusion with the enemies of 
genuinely independent countries.,,69 This became the framework within 
which Soviet anti-Islamic propaganda was written. Much of it was devo-
ted to proving again and again that Islam, like all religions, was a 
sham and existed only to assist the exploiters and not, as it claimed, 
70 for the benefit of the people. 
Much of the dullness of anti-Islamic literature can be attributed 
to the frame of reference within which it had to be written. To a les-
ser extent it was due to the failure of the writers to understand the 
religion. The frame of reference was forced upon the authors by the 
ideological position of the State. According to this all religions 
were tools for exploihati~n. The only departure from this framework 
was the addition of the scientific aspect after the Second World War. 
Henceforth Islam was described as reactionary and unscientific and the 
struggle against it was one of the "materialist scientific world out.., 
71 look against that of unscientific religion." Neither of these charac-
terisations was able to deal with the basic problem in the struggle, 
the faith that did not give way to either repression or the scientific 
or unscientific nature of Islam. In addition there still remained the 
problem of the content of the propaganda. 
In 1956 the quality of anti-Islamic propaganda was assailed as 
being "not only mistaken but also harmful." The critic ventured even 
so far as to suggest that the works of great pre-revolution islamists 
like Barthold, Goldziher and others be reprinted and that the works of 
; 
foreign scholars be translated beca~ge of their value for social-scien-
t Or O k 72 ~ ~c wor • This concern was well-founded. As a consequence of the 
framework the propagandists were not able to consider the special fea-
tures of Islam among the Turkic people. While their work tended to 
criticise Islam generally this did not make it applicable to the parti-
cular regional conditions of Kazakhstan. 
Much was made of the apparent inequality between the sexes and the 
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lack af legal rights for women, particularly with reference to the 
chaice af a second husband if they were widowed. 73 In Kazakh society 
women did have few rights until they were married and even the marriage 
was pre-arranged. But the young Kazakh male also was not abie to 
h h · t 74 1 i c oose 1S par ner, eav ng him and the young woman in similar posi-
tions. following her marriage the legal status of the woman changed 
dramatically. The dowry belonged to her and could be seized only if 
her husband committed a crime and was unable to pay the fine. After 
she had borne a son her rights became even greater; if her husband was 
sufficiently wealthy she could demand a yurt of her own, refuse to 
marry her husband's brother if she was widowed, hold her husband's 
estate in trust until her san came of age and remarry at her pleasure 
choosing her mate from among a wide range of kin. On the other hand, 
until she had borne a son she could easily be divorced and the dowry 
did not have to be repaid. After the birth of a son divorce was diffi-
cult as the extended, family had a direct interest in the child and the 
75 dowry had to be repaid. These practical difficulties made divorce a 
far more complicated matter than the legal simplicity of the proceedings 
suggested. The freedom of the male depended largely on his wealth and 
the influence of his family. If a man could afford to pay back the 
dowry and the scorn of his family left him unmoved, divorce was a simp-
le matter even after the woman had borne a son. But the closely knit 
family unit of Kazakh society suggested that among even those who had 
the economic means few would have gone against the wishes of their 
I 
families. 
There may be some justification for arguing that women and men 
were treated differently under the laws pertaining to promiscuity. A 
woman who had lost her virginity and was able to keep this a secret 
until after her marriage could be sent away by her husband. The latter 
could retain her dowry and demand a sister in her place without paying 
a second bride-price, while the scorned woman could then be married off 
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at the bride-price of a widow. Adultery was considered an even more 
serious offence. Women found guilty of it were put to death. 76 Thess 
laws appeated to place the onus on the women, while the men were al-, 
lowed to escape. 
The social, legal and e~onomic factors of Kazakh society may be 
said therefore to have protected the women against the legally superior 
status of men. While the Soviet ptopagandist was not entirely wrong to 
assert that the status of men and women was unequal, the generality of 
the statement misrepresented and oversimplified a very complex social 
structure. In purely religious matters the propagandist emerged in a 
worse light still. 
In Uzbekistan an interviewer asked Muslims, "Why do you believe in 
God?" Most of the replies were to the effect of because I am a Muslim 
or, if I do not believe I will no longer be considered a Muslim. From 
these the interviewer concluded that many Muslims believed simply 
77 because of their traditions. Although this conclusion had some 
merit, it was hardly satisfactory. The answers which the Muslims gave 
were the best s~mple answer that could be given to the question. They 
also indicated a strong identification with Islam in that being a 
Muslim and balieving were considered inseparable. To be a Muslim was 
to believe and to believe was to be a Muslim. There was no evidence of 
a lack of conviction, on the contrary, the answers effectively demon-
strated that those who responded were convinced believers. 
In China the absence of a direct offensive against Islam precluded 
I 
a wide-spread propaganda campafgn. _ Inst~ad, as has baen noted~ cadres 
undertook a more diract attack on families and individuals. In these 
Islam was attacked also as reactionary and unscientific and the cadres 
proved tactless and ill-informed. 78 Thus, the propaganda attacks of 
both countries were limited by at least one common factor, the lack of 
factual knowledge. This factor was lass significant in the Chinase 
case because the attack on Islam was not as systematic as that of the 
77 
Soviet Union. It was carried out also at the individual rather than 
the country-wide level. for the Chinese this attitude proved benefi-
cial in dealing with the cultural aspects related directly to Islam. 
II:4;iii Internal 
factors 
The Chinese Government passed three decrees in the early 1950's. 
They were the land reform, marriage and burial laws. Had these been 
enforced strictly in Sinkiang--and indeed throughout China--they could 
have led to a great deal of social and economic disruption. 
The land reform law was intended to socialise agriculture. In ths 
north-west this law was to be applied in 195~, but by the middle of 
that year only a rent-reduction and anti-despot campaign had been car-
ried through in Sinkiang. The agriculture of the province was to be 
socialised nonetheless, but by the more gradual means of educating the 
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masses. Only after the education campaign had been carried through 
was the status quo in pastoral areas to be disturbed. There were a 
number of sound reasons for this course of action. According to Peking 
they included a concern for the cultural and relig!ous customs of the 
BO 
minorities and the protection of the livestock industry. Considering 
the ravages that collectivisation had brought to the Kazakh steppes, 
the last was particularly sensible. 
The application of the marriage and burial laws was deferred also 
in the minority areas on the grounds that the minorities had their own 
religions and customs. B1 It must be noted that the burial law--which 
made cremation mandatory in an effort to increas~ the arable land--also 
. 
was not applied rigidly in tne remainder of China. Burial was also a 
deeply rooted Chinese tradition. According to traditional beliefs the 
soul and body were rejoined after death. If the latter was destroyed 
the soul wandered eternally in search of the body and could not rest. 
In deferrance to these customs the Government deemed it a~propriate not 
to apply the law until the people had been educated properly_ 
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In Sinkiang the marriage law--it was intended to end feudal mar-
riage practlces--had a spacial supplement. Thi ti 1 t s s pu a ed that Turkic 
people could marry two years before the minimum age stated in the law 
and that they were not bound by the clauses pertaining to divorce and 
inheritance. It was not until 1959 that Saifudin suggested the supple-
ment should be abolished. 82 There could be little doubt that these 
considerations were concessions to Islam. All the legal provisions of 
the three laws contravened well-defined Koranic laws pertaining to pro-
perty, divorce, marriage and inheritance. 83 But it must not be ignored 
that the Chinese were equally prepared to make concessions to Chinese 
customs. This suggested that the policy was to avoid unrest rather 
than a real concern for the old cultures. 
II:4;iv External 
factors 
Some of the policies towards Islam which both Governments pursued 
were intended also to improve their images in the Muslim World, parti-
cularly~the Middle East. One means for achieving this aim was through 
the annual pilgrimages to Mecca end Medina. 80th regimes had permitted 
and supported these since the mid-1950's. Although the number permit-
ted to make the Journey were few in comparison to the total number of 
Muslims in each country, this could hardly have troubled the Muslim 
communities. 
While each Muslim was to undertake one pilgrimage to Mecca or 
Medina during his life-time few in Sinkiang and Kazakhstan were in pos-
session of the financial means to allow them to do so. As a substitute 
. 
Muslims in both regions had found accessable alternatives., These were 
the tombs of local Muslims who were considered great religious men. If 
the visits to some of these shrines were repeated or made to a particu-
lar shrine, such as the tomb of 8aha-ed-din Naqshbandi near Bukhara, 
they were considered the equivalent of the pilgrimage to Mecca or 
d " 84 Me ~na. In this way the Muslims of both regions were able to fulfill 
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the requirements of their religion. For this reason the reinstitution 
of the right to undertake pilgrimages to the Holy Land had little 
direct impact on the lives of the Muslims. Indirectly, however, it 
benefitted the Muslim community and certainly the two Governments. 
The Soviet Union was determined to limit the influence of the West 
in the Middle East. To achieve this Moscow had turned a blind eye even 
to the persecution of Communists by the Arab regimes that had been 
responsive to the Soviet attempts to establish closer ties. 85 
Since the early 1950's the Chinese too sought to extend their 
pblitical influence in the Third World. Their motives were not only 
political but also economic. Until the lata 1950's the United Nations' 
blockade limited C~inese trade to the communist countries and the Third 
World. This made the natural resources from the latter, especially 
Egyptian cotton, useful for relieving domestic shortages. The Sino-
Egyptian trade protocol of August 1955 allowed China to purchase raw 
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cotton in Egypt, while Egypt bought Chinese rolled staal. As both 
countries had participated in the 1955 8andung conference the diploma-
tic contacts that led to the agreement well may have bsen made there. 
These negotiations would have made the Chinese all the more aware of 
the influence that could be gained through various channels. Conse-
quently they may have encouraged pilgrimages to the Middle East even 
more. 
By their presence the pilgrims demonstrated the religious freedoms 
which their own Governments upheld. They also emphasised this point in 
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conversations with the Arabs. 
, 
8l1t while the pilgrims were able to 
make contacts with Arabs on the basis of a common bond and while this 
may have proved helpful in diplomatic and other dealings between the 
The countries, the pilgrimages also were useful for another reason. 
returning pilgrims acquired a great deal of prestige among their fellow 
Muslims. This additional prestige and religious authority may have 
provided official Mullahs and Imams with greater influence in changing 
60 
local Muslim traditions. 
The Muslims of each country also were able to benefit from the 
renewed contact with the Middle East. Muslim visitors from the latter 
came to both the Soviet Union and China. During China's negotiations 
with Egypt in 1955 some Egyp~ian delegates and the World Peace Assembly 
delegates from Arab countries vistited Sinkiang. And in 1958 President 
Nasser visited Tashkent. B6 These renewed contacts forced both Govern-
ments to keep at least those mosques in good repair that were likely to 
be visited. Although neither or the two Governments contributed to 
these mosques on a regular basis they helped pay for repairs neverthe-
89 less. But at the same time in China those mosques not likely to be 
90 visited by foreigners were permitted to decay and wash away. No 
doubt the situation in the Soviet Union was similar. 
It was beneficial for the Muslim communities of both cmuntries 
that at least some mosques were kept in repair. But the contacts also 
forced the Governments to be still more tolerant towards the Muslims 
although the basic anti-Islamic policy of neither regime had changed. 
Nonetheless, both appeared to have become reconciled to a temporary, 
but lengthy period of co-existence with Islam. 
II:4;v Islam and Communism the 
co-existing ideals 
As has been noted some of the ideals of Communism and Islamic-
socialism were quite similar. In principle the two should have had 
little difficulty in co-existing,.but neither communist regime was pre-
pared to accept Islamic-socialism~ In the Chinese case this may be 
only assumed on the basis of their unchanged belief that religions 
would eventually disappear. Without Islam, Islamic-socialism simply 
would be transformed into Socialism. In the Soviet Union propagandists 
have baen more outspoken on this issue. 
They contended that the two ideals were irreconciliable. Commu-
nism had freed mankind from religious oppression, including that of 
Islam. It was a secular and not a religious ideal. 91 According to 
this point of view religion and Communism simply were not compatible. 
This view was applied not only to the Soviet Union, but also to the 
Muslims of other countries. Pakistan's Islamic-socialist Maududi and 
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his ideas were attacked bitterly and condemned. "The reactionary es-
sence of Pakistan's variant of the theory of 'Islamic-socialism' man i-
fests itself most fully in the interpretations of feudal ideologues like 
A. A. Maududi."92 These attacks made it difficult to justify the more 
tolerant policy towards Islam that Moscow had displayed since 1941. 
Unlike the Chinese, whose attitude was tolerant from before their take-
over, the position of Moscow became contradictory. This the Soviet 
propagandists dealt with by claiming that it was not the ideological 
position of the Soviet state, but that of Islam which had changed. 
The victory of the October socialist revolution, the 
liquidation of the exploitation of classes, the success of 
socialist construction and the active part in this construc-
tion of the overwhelming majority of the masses compelled 
the Muslim clergy to introduce corrections in their prea-
ching of Islam's social principles to adapt them to the new 
social-economic conditions. 93 
On the basis of these changes and the continued adaptation of of-
flcial Islam it was possible to tolerate the latter. But in the past 
such changes had not been as one-sided as the propagandists would have 
had their readers believe. 
11:5 The-historical 
perspective 
The traditional method for dealing with Islam in the Soviet Union 
has been to break the 1917-60 period down according to the great histo-
rical events that followed th-e- revolution. with some variations in 
dates, this produced five time-spans; the revolution and Civil War 
1917-20, the post-Civil War to the beginning of outright OPPOSition 
1921-28(29), the terror 1928-38(41), the Second World War and immediate 
• d 94 post-war 1939-47.and the post-1947 per~o • Although these divisions 
were useful for analysing the influence of each period on the religious 
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policy, for the purposes of this discussion it may be more appropriate 
to consider the period a unit, a single period of continuous policy 
development. 
Following the Civil War the Bolsheviks were faced with running a 
multi-national state. To cope with this a policy had to be developed 
that could satisfy the needs arising from the ideals of the Bolsheviks 
and the needs of the people. Lenin's vacillation well may have been 
the result of his search for policies that could deal with the various 
issues as they arose. When he did return to his pre-revolution politi-
cal framework in 1922, his illness and death prevented it from becoming 
the basis for the development of future policies. From this it did not 
follow necessarily that Lenin's ideals were simply rejected. There was 
surely some doubt that Stalin could understand much less apply the pre-
1917 and post-1922 Leninist theories. 
As the leader of the Soviet state Stalin therefore faced an ardu-
ous task. He had to follow what little Marxist-Leninist tradition had 
been established. In addition he had to develop a policy to meet those 
needs which he had been unable to fit into the Marxist-Leninist frame-
work. The result was a totalitarianism based on both Leninism and 
Stalinism. As Stalin's dictatorial powers increased his own ideas be-
gan to dominate more and more. The various external factors also added 
to the difficulties of developing a consistent policy. During the 
Second World War the need for closer "ties with the Muslims.of the 
Middle East effectively reversed the religious policy. It was trans-
i 
formed into a policy of tolerance r.ather than outright repression. How 
Stalin would have dealt with the Muslims after the War is difficult to 
assess. Although the attitude towards them in the 1945-53 period was 
more tolerant it was not until after Stalin's death that pilgrimages 
became annual events. 
The changes under Khrushchev and those who followed him occurred 
within the Marxist-leninist-Stalinist framework. Those who followed 
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Stalin undoubtedly had no stomach for his extreme religious policies. 
On the other hand, the growing Soviet sensitivity to external public 
opinion also demanded policy changes. However, the anti-religious 
ideals were not repudiated. The result was a repositioning of the 
policy in response to the ne~ imputs. This shifted it towards modera-
tion, a position that placed the post-Stalin leaders somewhere between 
the policies of Stalin and Lenin. 
In the development of China's religious policy the pattern also 
ranged from forcing communist institutions on the Hui to the more tole-
rant ~ttitude of the united front. With the exception of the Cultural 
Revolution the tolerant attitude generally appeared to prevail. Per-
haps the Chinese policy was the direct consequence of the confucian 
tradition. Unlike the Bolsheviks, the Chinese had a tradition that 
they could draw on in dealing with the religious and cultural customs 
of the Muslims. The confucian tradition was said to have influenced 
Mao considerably.95 On the basis of these long-standing practices and 
the need for tolerance a religious policy could have been formulated. 
The religious policies that were developed in each country were 
evolved independently. Until 1949 the Chinese Communists had no need 
of a Soviet type policy. After 1949 it was too late for the Chinese to 
adopt the Soviet policy. By then they had formulated their own and 
this was unlikely to change. But the Soviet experience i~ applying 
their policy to the Muslims, particularly the collectivisation, was 
useful for the Chinese. The Chinese also did adapt Soviet poli~ies in 
those areas in which they lack~d political experience--the development 
of a political system and of a educational policy. But even in these 
cases they adapted these Soviet policies to the Chinese situation. 
In future the religious policies of the twa countries, but espe-
cially that of the Soviet Union, are likely to undergo further changes. 
This will be the result of the rapidly increasing Muslim papulation, 
affecting primarily the Soviet Union. Following the 1959 census it 
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could hardly escape the notice of Soviet demographers that the Turkic 
people of Central Asia and Kazakhstan were increasing far more rapidly 
than the Russian population of the USSR. 
Nation-
ality 
Russians 
Uzbeks 
Kazkhs 
Kirgtl1z 
Tadjiks 
Turkmen 
Population increas~g between 
1959 - 1979 
1959 1970 increase 
census census over 1959 
in per 
cent 
114,113,579 129,015,140 13.06 
6,015,416 9,195,093 52.86 
3,621,610 5,298,818 46.31 
958,659 1,452,222 49.92 
1,396,939 2,135,883 52.90 
1,001,585 1,525,284 52.29 
1979 increase 
census over 1970 
in per 
cent 
137,397,000 06.5 
12,456,000 35.5 
6,556,000 23.7 
1,906,000 31.3 
2,898,000 35.7 
2,028,000 33.0 
Due to the rapid increase of the Turkic people and other Muslims 
of the USSR, it was estimated that by the end of this century the total 
Muslim population will reach 100 million as opposed to 150 million Rus-
sians. 97 Although a direct challenge to Russian authority is unlikely 
to occur, the sheer number of Muslims in future again may give the 
Soviet Government the impetus for altering its policy towards Islam. 
In China a similar problem is unlikely to arise. But increases in 
the Muslim population of Sinkiang may make already scarce land for 
agriculture even more so. This could lead to dissatisfaction and pos-
sibly local rebellion against the Han-Chinese in the province, but as 
in the case of the Soviet Union, wide-spread unrest appears unlikely. 
For both regimes the most desirable solution appears to be a fur-
ther move towards co-existence with Islam. In the past political 
necessity was able to bring vast changes to anti-Islamic poliaies and 
it is very likely that it will do so in the future. The alternative, 
of course, is for both Governments to adopt policies of outright 
repression. 
II:6 Conclusions 
It seems fair to conclude that neither the Russians nor the Chi-
nese had a clsar understanding of Islam and that this was the root of 
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the difficulties that arose. The lack of understanding was not the 
only source of difficulty, but the others--the division of Islam into 
religious and cultural influencBs--had a multiplier rather than a 
causal effect. For the Chinese the difficulties were less serious 
because they avoided direct ~onfrontations with the Muslims. Their 
combination of this policy with greater religious tolerance made under-
standing Islam less important until the cadres attempted to re-educate 
the Muslims. At that Juncture the lack of understanding on the part of 
cadres could easily be interpreted as Han-chauvinism, especially when 
Han cadres encouraged Muslims to change their way of life. Thus, while 
the Chinese may have avoided a direct confrontation on the political 
plane it was likely tp occur on the educational. 
There could be little doubt that the Chinese benefitted from their 
more tolerant attitude. It helped them avoid the wide-spread unrest 
that the repressive methods of Stalin had resulted in. Another bene~ 
fit, perhaps less direct, was that the Muslims in China may have been 
more inclined to show good-will towards the Communists than their co~n­
terparts were willing to show towards the Soviet Government. This may 
have been of little real significance in political terms. Any rebel-
lions in either Kazakhstan or Sinkiang in any case would have been 
limited in scale. Consequently they could be crushed easily. Nonethe-
less, retaining the good-will of the Turkic people would have made 
their cultural transformation a less difficult task. 
It must be noted also that the transformation of the Muslims was 
not a simple matter of exchan~ing one culture for the other. ·The im-
portance and merits of each came into play. In China the superiority 
of Confucianism had allowed it to dominate other cultures. Although 
Islam had been influenced by Confucianism it was in no danger of being 
dominated. There were several reasons for the survival of Islam. It 
was itself a highly developed culture, the Muslims were well represen-
ted in China's popUlation and they were united hy their faith. But 
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there may have been an even more significant factor, the teaching of 
Islam itself. According to this Islam was the highest religion and 
culture. furthermore, Islam made the believers aware that the Chinese 
was not the only advanced culture in the World. As a result Confucian-
ism had few attractions for the Muslims. 
The Muslims' attitude towards Communism was likely similar. Each 
doctrine claimed superiority over the other and was secure in this 
belief. In addition each embodied a complete political, social and 
cultural system. To some extent it even could be argued that both were 
religious systems--Communism in its wor~hip of Marxism-Leninism. As a 
result of these factors the cultural transformation was unlikely to be 
either easy or a task that could be accomplished over a short period of 
time. Over this long period the small, seemingly insignificant factors 
that resulted in the alienation of the Muslims would loom even larger. 
But the communist ideology was not equipped to deal with other cultures 
from any but a position of strength. To the Communists their own ideo-
logical superiority and purity were as unquestionable as the inferior 
status and reactionary nature of Islam. 
The need for unity forced the leaders of both countries to re-as-
sess their respective positions and move towards greater tolerance. 
How far this will go in future is difficult to estimate. Among the 
Muslims of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang there was little indication that 
either their religion or culture had undergone marked changes. This 
and t~e future increase in their numbers could result in new conces-
sions from both Governments, PQssibly even acceptance and co-existence. 
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CHAPTER III 
The Role of Education 
111:1 Introduction 
The greatest challenge facing any government from the day it at-
. 
tains power is to ensure that it creates a long-lasting impression an 
the masses. In this way governments are able to ensure that their 
policies will be continued. To create this impression bath popularly 
elected and nan-elected governments must introduce policies that bene-
fit the population as a whole. But the benefits of these policies are 
nat always immediately apparent. This makes it necessary to convince 
the general population that lang-term benefits will indeed materialise 
in the future. 
To convince the masses of these long-term benefits the educational 
system may be used. For this work the educational system utilises two 
broad channels, one informal and the ather formal. The informal chan-
nel consists of the newsmedia and various ather reported and printed 
outlets that may be used by a political group to publicise itself and 
its policies. The formal educational system, consisting of all state 
controlled bodies ranging from schools to communes, may be used as a 
means for political education. 
In both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China the 
regimes relied an the educational system to popularise their rule. 
Among the Russian and Chinese people proper educetion had became the 
widely accepted means for social mobility. This attitude made bath 
groups mare willing to enroll their children in schools. In Kazakhstan 
and Sinkiang the situation differed markedly from this. Among the 
Turkic people bath the function and content of the educational system 
had been different. It became necessary therefore, to introduce a sys-
tem for educating the Turkic people in the European philosophical tra-
ditions so that they could understsnd the values of the new society. 
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But even before this system could succeed the traditional Turkic 
attitude towards educ~tion had to be changed. This sort of dilemma 
brought the two central Governments face to face with the difficulties 
that transforming the Turkic people entailed. These were added to by 
practical problems. The different Turkic languages made the transla-
tion of various teaching materials and the fostering of teaching cadres 
knowledgeable in these languages essential. In addition provisions had 
to be made to make it possible for nomads and their children to attend 
the schools. These difficulties were added to further by the low lite-
racy rates. They prevented all but verbal contacts between the cadres 
conversant in the local languages and the indigenous people. To popu-
larise a new regime under these conditions was no doubt a difficult and 
exceedingly slow process. To educate the Turkic people for the 'new 
society even slower. 
The difficulties were made even more complex by the time factor. 
Neither the Soviet nor the Chinese regime was able to grant their 
respective Turkic people a lengthy period of adjustment. The demand a 
of industrialisation and modernisation made a speedy transformation 
essential, particularly within the educational system. But speeding up 
the process was likely to cause even greater difficulty. Among the 
problems arising was that of training aufficient numbers of cadres with 
the required technical qualifications. On the whole the Turkic people 
lacked the formal educational prerequisites that allowed entrance to 
the programmes training cadres in highly specialised fields. This 
placed both the Russians and Chine~e in awkward positions. They domi-
nated the leadership role in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang respectively. At 
the same time they were the carriers of the new social ideals. From 
these two factors arose the greatest challenge for both Moscow and 
Peking. Both had to convince the Turkic people that the Russian and 
Han people had not come to the two regions to dominate, but to help 
build the new society. This too had to be achieved through education. 
111:2 The conflicting 
educational ideals 
95 
Following the communist takeovers in Russia and China it was only 
a question of time before the existing educational system in Kazakhstan 
and Sinkiang was altered. The new regimes were pledged to changing the 
social values of the people under their rule. This pledge only could 
be honoured if the masses were convinced that the new culture was 
superior to the old. In order to convince the masses re-education was 
necessary. However, the traditional Muslim schools were not suited for 
this task. These schpols also could not train the specialised person-
! 
nel that a industrial: society reqired. This did not mean that the 
I 
schools were unable to meet the educational requirements of their soci-
eties generally. They had met these without undue difficulties in the 
past, suggesting that the problems that did arise resulted from a shift 
in the educational ideals. As the two regions became increasingly 
dominated by elien social values the Muslim schools were less and less 
able to play a significant role. 
III:2;i Education in the 
Islamic tradition 
Throughout the Islamic World education was closely tied to the 
mosque. It was not necessarily the case that Islam actively sought to 
dominate and control the lives of people through the educational sys~ " 
tem. The grip that the religion had on the people made this unneces-
sary. The entire state was ruled on the basis of Islamic social and 
political ideals. from this also sprang social obligations. Like the 
mediaeval church in Europe, Islam too was the only body that felt an 
obligation and possessed the necessary resources to educate the people 
it ruled. 
The funds that supported the Muslim schools did not come directly 
from the religious institution, but from a wagf. These funds had been 
established from bequests that the mosque was to administer. The 
L t t" k pleasing to God,"1 and uequest generally was made 0 suppor a wor 
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consisted of land that provided 8 continuous source of income. This 
income was used for the upkeep and support of the school, the upkeep of 
the mosque to which the sohool was attached and for the salary of the 
teacher. Since the endowment wes of a religious nature and administra-
ted by the mosque the schools were attached directly to the religious 
institutions. At the same time the mosque was the only viable sourca 
of teachers. The only person sufficiently literate to teach was the 
local Mullah. This tied the religious and educational institutions 
even more closely. 
The pri~ary schools or mektebs, were attended by boys up to the 
ages of eleven end thirteen and girls to the age of eleven. Their cur-
riculum was designed to acquaint the stUdents with the Islamic way of 
life. The children learned to read and write some Koranic verses. 
This generally consisted of copying and memorising the verses and not 
in the acquisition of the ability to read and write, leaving the prima-
ry education few visible benefits. The Arabic that had been learned 
bore little relation to the daily life of most students and tended to 
2 be forgotten after the student left the mekteb. In the mekteb the 
student also was not taught his native language, leaving most of the 
people completely illiterate. On the whole the education consisted of 
the forced memorisation of an elementary primer containing several 
prayers and religious social mores written in Arabic. It was these 
prayers and religious social mores that gave the education its real 
significance. They provided the bases on which the childrens' future 
lives were conducted. It was to t~is teaching that the good qonduct 
3 
and dignity of the Turkic people have been ascribed to. 
Such practical knowledge as was required for dealing with the af-
fairs of the family's household was acquired from the father when the 
son entered the family business. During the 1920's Turkic people in 
Sinkiang who had never attended school nonetheless were found to be 
capable of adding sums. 4 No doubt the basic skills had been handed 
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down from father to son. While the education at the primary level was 
concerned with the sobial aspects of Islamic s·ociety th ra er than speci-
fic skills, the secondary institutions or medressehs, were to foster 
specific academic skills. 
The attendance at the medressehs was limited. These schools gene-
rally were located in the cities of Central Asia which meant the stu-
dents had to be able to pay for their lodgings and food. This limited 
the attendance to those boys whose fathers had the financial means to 
allow their sons to study either in one of the Central Asian cities or 
even in Constantinople. At the medressehs the students learned to read 
and write and were schooled in Arabic, philosophy, theology, the 
shariat, Persian, Turkish, logic, some basic arithmetic, history end 
geography. Those who completed the course were eligible to become 
teachers at medressehs or hold religious offices. The latter automati-
cally involved the graduate in the administrative work of the Islamic 
state. 
With rare exception girls were not schooled beyond memorising the 
elementary primer and remained completely illiterate. Those who had 
been educated beyond this were members of a few upper-class familias. 
They had attended one of the ~mall number of girls' schools located in 
larger cities such as Tashkent and Bukhara. In latter life these women 
were found to be exceedingly well informed about a wide range of sub-
jects, primarily because their reading had not been confined to the 
curriculum of the medresaehs. Many of them were able also to write. 5 
Within the confines of theirh9mes _the women of the upper-class Turkic 
society had greater opportunity to pursue an education than did the 
men. Their seclusion afforded them the necessary leisure and their 
wealth and status well may have given them greater access to books than 
even some of the men who had been educated enjoyed. In terms of lite-
racy and general knowledge therefore, the educated women well may have 
been better edUcated than the medresseh educated male. 
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In Kazakh society neither the mekteb nor the medresseh were parti-
cularly significant. At the bidding of Catherine II Muslim schools had 
been established in the steppes. These had Tatar Mullahs as teachers. 
As a result Tatar became the language of education and the official 
administrative language in tre relations between the Kazakhs and the 
Russian Government. The Kazakhs resented this Tatar domination and 
petitioned Nicholas I in 1830, requesting that no more clerics were 
appointed to and no more mosque schools established in the Kazakh 
6 
steppes. By the middle of the nineteenth century the Russians began 
to consider ~he Tatar influence a ~hreat to their awn hegemony in the 
steppes. To increase the Russian influence a school system was intro-
duced that was based in part on .the ideas of the Russian orientalist 
N. 1. Il1minsky. from this there eventually emerged a "Russian-native 
school" that was intended to teach Kazakh children the Russian language 
and generally familiarise them with the Russian culture. In an effort 
to reach the children of the Kazakh nomads ~-sohools were estab-
lished. They relied on Mullahs or Kazakh teachers and moved about with 
the nomads. Between 1895 and 1913 the number of Russian-native and 
aul-schools increased at an impressive rate. 
Russian-native and aul-schools 
in Kazakhstan7 
Year Russian-native Schools- .8!:!l-schools 
1895 
1905 
1913 
Number 
38 
128 
157 
Increase as 
percentage 
276.3 
22.7 
Number Increase as 
percentage 
31 
135 335.5 
267 97.8 
These figures indicated the growing attention that the education 
of the Kazakhs was accorded in st. Petersburg. Only the Kazakhe were no 
mare prepared to accept the Russian-native and aul-schools than they 
h 1 They S ~mply refused to send had the Tatar dominated religious sc 00 s. ~ 
their children to them. In those regions where attendance was made 
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compulsory, wealthy Kazakhs hired the children of the poor. These they 
then sent to the Russian schools in place of their own children. 8 Even 
by the early twentieth century this resistance had not been broken. In 
1913 the proportion of Kazakh students in the total of 2,011 schools in 
Kazakhstan accounted for only 7.5 per cent of all students. 9 While 
this hardly could be assessed as a total failure, it was only a quali-
fied success. These figures also indicated that the resistance of the 
Kazakhs towards the Tatar dominated religious schools had arisen not 
only from the fear of being cultur~lly dominated. A good deal of the 
resistance encountered by ~oth the .Tatars and Russians in their efforts 
to educate the Kazakh~ was the natJral resentment that any group of 
people was likely to 6emonstrate tqwards strange institutions. Its 
primary ingredient was not so much the fear of being dominated but 
suspicion. Only the small intellectual group of Kazakhs even could be 
aware of the dsngers that the dominance of an alien educational system 
held for the Kazakh culture. But they, particularly Valikhanou, Abai 
and Altynsaryn, also considered the Russian educstional system the only 
hope for maintaining the Kazakh cultural traditions. Their concern was 
not to exclude the Russian type of education from Kazakhstan, but to 
ensure that it was utilised to modernise Kazakh society thereby streng-
thening the Kazakh culture. 
In Sinkiang the situation was largely similar to that of Kazakh-
stan. There the education of the Turkic people was almost enti~ely in 
the hands of the mosque. A small number of Turkic children were accep-
ted into the Chinese Government schools which educated the children of 
the Chinese administrators living in the province. These schools pro-
vided the Turkic children with a Chinese education. The graduates from 
them were employed in post and telegraph offices, as tutors for the 
children of Chinese officials or as interpreters for magistrates. In 
the latter position they acted as intermediaries between the Chinese 
magistrates, who on the whole were unable to speak the local languages, 
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and the Turkic people. 
These students were essential for the political administration. 
To encourage them to enroll in the Chinese schools the Turkic students 
were provided with free school uniforms and paid one ~ per month. 10 
In Kazakhstan the Russians too had established schools to train Kazakhs 
. t t 11 h as ~n erpre ers, and ere also the costs were no doubt borne by the 
State. The fact that the Chinese even paid Turkic children to attend 
the Government schools suggested that they, like the Russians in 
Kazakhstan encountered difficulties in attracting the desired number of 
s~udents from among the Turkic pop~lation. 
While the attitude of the Turkic people in both regions to a la~ge 
extent may be explained by mistrust and suspicion, their general atti-
tude towards education must be considered also. A formal education 
simply did not have the same value to them as it did to the European 
and Chinese societies of the day. The life of the Turkic people tended 
to be practical rather than academic, while their cultural traditions 
were oral rather than written. In Kazakh society the mores, beliefs, 
emotions and ideals all were expressed in the folk literature and 
epos.12 This continued to be oral until the late nineteenth century. 
The need for a written language or even the ability to read or write 
was very limited. To base an assessment of the level of the education 
attained by the Turkic people on their level of literacy therefore was 
erroneous. Such an assessment only could indicate the degree to which 
the Chinese, Middle Eastern and Russian educational ideals had penetra-
ted the Turkic regions. Conversely, in terms of the socialist trans-
formation, the lack 0 f 11 teracy in'dicated that the degree of penetra-
tion had been limited and that the greatest part of the work remained 
to be done after the Communists came to power. 
In the new policies advocated by the Communists universal educa-
tion played a prominent role. This education emphasised literacy and 
socialist values, all of which demanded a different attitude towards 
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education on the part of the indigenous people. It fell to the new 
regimes to convince the local people that the new educational policies 
and values should be adopted. That their traditional ideals should be 
exchanged for the Marxist educational and social maxims. 
111:2;ii Marx on 
education 
The educational policies of the new regimes were basad on the 
views of Marx. The latter did not consider nineteenth century European 
education a means for achieving enlightenment through study and discus-
sion, but the tool for the enslavem~nt of mankind. He argued that man 
originally had been ffee to be either a hunt~r, fisherman, shepherd or 
critic, just as it sutted him and without th~ necessity of being any of 
13 I 
these. This naturat state had been destroyed by the rise of the 
bourgeois class which had become the ruling class. As the ruling class 
the bourgeoisie ruled society not according to the concept of philo so-
phy, but in accordance with its own conception of philosophy. 
In each epoch the thoughts of the ruling classes are 
the ruling thoughts, thus, the class which is the ruling 
material power of society is at the same time its LSociety'!7 
ruling ideological power. 14 
Like the ideologues of all other ruling classes so too the ideo-
logues of the bourgeoisie ceme to dominate. But unlike previous doml-
na~ing ideologies the bourgeois ideals were intended to safeguard the 
continued existence of the bourgeoisie. To achieve this end it was 
necessary to enslave the remainder of mahkind and to ensure the contln-
ued existence of Capitalism on which the existence of the bourgeoisie 
depended. Only by gaining wide-spread acceptance for its ideals could 
the bourgeoieie maintain its own position. To achieve this end it 
transformed lithe doctDr, the lawyer, the preacher, the poet, the man of 
15 
science into its paid workers." Through them the bourgeois ideals 
were spread among the people, turning the latter into beings whose 
entire existence was devoted to strengthening Capitalism and the bour-
geoisie. for the vast majority of the people this education was no 
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more than the "training for a machine-like eXistence."16 In fact it 
was the means by whioh man had been separated from his natural state of 
existence. 
It was the task of the Communists to free man from the bourgeois 
ideological domination ,so th~t he was once again free to follow his own 
human instincts without external guidance. Marx did not however intend 
to replace the bourgeois ideology with that of Communism. He did not 
consider Communism an ideology, but a movement. 
For us Communism is nat a condition that must be pro-
duced, an ~ according to which reality will have to 
adjust itself. We term the actual movement which dissolves 
the present condition Communism. 1? 
According to this definition Communism was not a state that could 
be achieved, but a movement that wes necessary to destroy Capitalism. 
Having accomplished this tssk it too was destined to disappear. This 
was to leave the new workers' state without any external ideologies. 
It was to be guided increasingly by the social consciousness of man as 
this consciousness itself increased. The task of the educational sys-
tem lay in ensuring that the social consciousness of the new society 
grew rapidly. 
Although Marx was unable to foretell what form the educational 
system was to take after the advent of the Communists' rule, he did 
make suggestions for reforming the education of workers in bourgeois 
society. He understood education to consist of three elements; mental 
training, physical training and a polytechnic education. The latter 
was to, 
impart the general principles of all production processes 
and, at the same time, familiarise the young person with 
the practical purpose and handling of the elementary instru-
ments of all branches of production. 18 
This was an indication that the aims of the education were not to 
train specialists, but to familiarise young people generally with the 
production process. Marx also believed that education should be com-
bined with productive labour so long as the labour was educational and 
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not exploitive. He divided the students into different age groups and 
assigned each a limited period of time that was to be spent in daily 
productive work. The 9-12 year olda were to spend two hours in daily 
labour, the 13-15 year olds four hours and the 16-17 year olds six 
19 hours. As a result of thi~ combination of training, education and 
work, Marx believed the working class would be raised "far above the 
niveau of the aristooracy and bourgeoisie.,,20 Their education would 
have made the working class children more class conscious and brought 
them closer to revolution and freedom. Meanwhile, the children of the 
aristocracy and bourgeoisie were being trained still in their own ideo-
logical tradition, leaving them unprepared for the new society. 
i 
Marx stipulated that in the immedi~te post-revolution period edu-
! i 
21 
cation should be cbmbiined with material production. This suggested 
that he, at his own level of class consciousness, considered his educa-
tional programme the best means for rapidly raising the class consci~· 
ousness of the workers during the first stage of the transitional 
period. 
Lenin's attitude towards education was based on the ideas of Marx. 
The combination of education with labour and the theoretical with the 
practical in polytechnics appealed to Lenin. It was included in the 
bolshevik party programme of May 1917. In this Lenin proposed; 
Free and compulsory general and polytechnic (acquain-
tance with both the theory and practice of all main branches 
of production) education for all children of both sexes up 
to 16 years; closely connecting the training of children 
with socially productive labour.22 
This set the general pattern for Soviet education, although the 
emphasis was placed increasingly on specialised education. In the 
polytechnics the classroom training was combined simply with some prac-
tical work in the field in which the student had specialised. 
In China Mao too emphasised that practical experience combined 
with theoretical training were the fundamentals of socialist education. 
In 1937 he had outlined the position of the Communists as favouring 
104 
"the concrete and historical unity of the subjective and the objective, 
of theory and practice, and of knowledge and action •••• "23 
Although the views of Lenin and Mao seemed similar, there were 
great differences in the application of their basic principles. Lenin 
interpreted Marx as having p~oposed that students should gain limited 
experience in productive labour. Their theoretical education in poly-
technics was to be co~bined with practioal training in the general 
field of study to provide the students with a broader outlook. Mao, on 
the other hand, held that studenta should have to engage in manual 
labour for a time, do~ng Jpbs not related necessarily to their ~tudies. 
i 
I 
Hence, while the Soviet vi~w was that practical experience was to help 
! 
produce a better specialist, the Chinese considered practical work a 
means for maral training. This attitude may have been the cause for 
the different points of emphasis in the educational systems of the two 
countries. While the emphasis in the Soviet Union was on the poly tech-
nic education, it lay on the combination of education with productive 
labour in China. 24 However, this explanation was hardly complete. 
There were economic and demographic differences that also must be con-
sidered in explaining the different attitudes. 
111:2;iii The economic and demographic 
influences on education 
The Russian and Chinese Communists had differing attitudes towards 
industrial development. To some extent this influenced their educa-
tional policies. Whereas the Bolsheviks were familiar with the modern 
industry of 1917 Europe and emphasised the modernisation and develop-
ment of Russian industry, the experience of Mao, until 1949, had been 
limited to the backward industry of China. After 1949 the Chinese too 
emphasised modernisation and industrial development just as the Bolshe-
viks had. Nonetheless, the Chinese were lagging in their appreciation 
of the role that the specialist played in modern industry_ The problem 
was complicated further by the lack in China of the educational faoili-
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ties to train the required number of specialists. 25 In fostering 
specialised personnel practical training became the most important 
aspect, while theoretical training was provided on a limited scale. In 
the Soviet Union this problem was not as acute. Some training institu-
tions for industrial Bpecial~sts had been set up in the years prior to 
the revolution. These and the existing specialists provided a greater 
base for training new personnel. 
The attitude towards specialists also differed in the two coun-
tries. Mao was more inclined to r~ly on practical on-the-job training 
than the Bolsheviks had been. This was less critical in the more for-
I 1'1 
I ! 
giving agricultural s~ctor, where the penalty for the lack of knowledge 
I 
was a lower yield rather than absolute failure. In the industrial S8C-
tor, however, the case was quite different. During the Great Leap vast 
quantitie~ of steel were produced in communal foundaries, the quality 
of much of which was too poor to allow it to be used. Although the 
Chinese Government had encouraged the increased training of special-
26 ists, particularly in engineering, health and education, by 1958 
their numbers undoubtedly were insufficient still. It was unlikely 
also that this situation had been changed even by the time of the 
Cultural Revolution. During that turmoil the training of specialists 
and education in general was accorded once again very little priority. 
It has been noted already that the levels of industrial develop-
ment played a role in the attitude towards education. Another point 
arising from this concerned the pUrpose for which people were being 
trained. The Russia of 1917 was a-reasonably developed, albeft back-
ward, industrial nation. By comparison China in 1949 was overwhelming-
ly agricultural. In China this not only reduced the need for indus-
trial specialists, but also shifted the purpose of education. 
Mao emphasised sending the young people into the country-side to 
work and gain practical experience. This theme was echoed throughout 
China. WU Yu-chang, the chairman of the National Committee of the 
trade union of educational workers noted that. , 
labor education should permeate the whole educational 
process in the middle and primary scbools. The students 
should, on the one hand, be taught to love labor and be good 
at labor. • •• 
In the cenduct of labor education, attention should 
also be directed to training the stUdents to conscientiously 
observe discipline. Th!s is essential not only to the suc-
cessful conduct of education but, what is more important to 
cultivating in the students the thought and habit of strict 
observance of discipline and obedience to collective inte-
rests, thus preparing them well for future participation in 
labor. All this should be closely linked with the education 
on patriotism. 27 
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from this it emerged that the emphasis was not so much on practi-
! 
cal labour itself, but on the ideal of labour. It was considered im-
I 
port ant that students learned to work hard in all their endeavours and 
especially for the conetruc~ion of Socialism and for their socialist 
fatherland. They wer~ to acquire also a willingness to go to any part 
of China if this was required by the Government. This fitted in well 
with the advice given to students in 1955 by the vice-minister of edu-
cation Yeh Sheng-tlao. He counselled junior middle school graduates who 
could not pass the entrance examinations of any schools to work in the 
country-side. "In future, we shall develop correspondence schools and 
night universities like those of the Soviet Union, and will have many 
28 chances to study." This alao suggested labour education had another 
purpose. The size of the Chinese population obviously added a demogra-
phic dimension to the educational policy. By sending young people into 
the country-side to work the overcrowding of the limited number of 
higher educational institutions could be prevented. 
In the Soviet Union this danger did not arise. The popUlation was 
much smaller than that of China and scholarship not as universally 
revered as it was in the Chinese tradition. As a result the Soviet 
educational authorities were under little if any pressure to limit the 
number of applicants to Soviet higher educational establishments. 
III:2;iv Education as the ~eans 
for tranSfo~iing society 
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From the above it may be concluded that education was not intended 
only to train people to fulfill specific functions in society. It was 
to influence also the social attitude of the trainees by indoctrinating 
them in the social values of ' the new society. In their respective con-
stitutions both regimes had pledged themselves to the total transfor-
mation of their societies. 29 This task they could achieve only by 
teaching the masses new mo~al values. Through this teaching the indi-
vidual was to be~tran~form8d into a collective person and a society of 
! 
individuals into a coilective society. In this respect the trans for-
! 
mation of the Turkic ~eopl~ in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang was no different 
from the transformation that the Russian and Han-Chinese societies had 
to undergo. 
Traditionally education was a device for social mobility by means 
of which the individual could gain greater social status and better his 
daily life. In the new societies, however, education was to serve 
society as a ~,ole and not the desires of the individual. The st~dent 
had to learn that the state made the final decision about the studies 
he was to pursue. In China this not only prevented the overcrowding of 
the educational institutions but also ensured that students opted for 
those courses that:we~e most necessary for the work of the initial 
re-construction period. This permitted the state to enroll students in 
institutions where there was room and in courses essential for the 
re-construction effort. 30 The students simply had to accept that their 
duty was to society as a whole and not to themselves. 
The social aims of education were similar in both the Soviet Union 
and the People's Republic of China. This applied especially to their 
respective Turkic regions. In 1923 the Bolsheviks had pledged them-
selves to step up the socialist educational work among the people in 
the national republics so as to wipe out local nationalism and great 
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Russian chauvinism. After this work had been completed the inter-
action and intermingling of the various races and the solidarity within 
the socialist state shoUld have been enhanced greatly. The Chinese 
modeled their social education on that of the Soviet Union and pursued 
a similar policy.32 It was out of this policy that the greatest edu-
cational problems arose. 80th the Russians and Han-Chinese advocated 
the complete transformation of tha Turkic society. It was through the 
educational system that both Governments sought to convince the Turkic 
people that neither the Russians nor the Chinese were promoting these 
I 
radical changes for cpauvinistic reasons. 
It may be justified to conclu~e that the basic purpose of the 
governmental educational systems in both regions remained the same 
before and after the revolutions. Throughout the aim was'to teach the 
moral values of the dominating social system. But the task after the 
revolutions had been complicated by what had gone before. A system 
that had placed little value on the skills required by an industrial 
society was suddenly replaced by one that insisted on modernisation 
and needed the skills that had previously been rejected. For the popu-
latian of the two regions this meant both a social and economic change 
from a non-industrial Islamic society to a industrial socialist 
society. To deal with the new tasks that emerged a well-educated group 
of Turkic people was essential. 
111:3 Fostering cadres,for 
the Turkic regions 
Both central Governments actively recruited ,cadres to work' among 
the people as a whole. The cadres were not simply propagandists, but 
experts in various fields of endeavour. They were to lead the people 
in building the new society and to stand out as model people of that 
new society. They were to be emulated by the remainder of the popula-
tion. This made it essential that the cadres were well-suited for 
these tasks and carefully chosen. 
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The Chinese issued specific requirements for those wishing to 
train as teaching cadres. Except for cadres requiring specific techni-
cal edUcations, they were to have an above primary school education be 
I ' 
i 
willing to join the a~med forces and be "politically pure. n33 In the 
Soviet Union the national commission for education, Narkompros, applied 
similar standards. In 1924 one of its leading members, A. V. Luna-
charskii, outlined what was expected of Soviet teachers. 
Above all, it is necessary that the teacher was really 
imbued with the precise consciousness of character and the 
importance of that ro~e which he was called upon to play in 
the cultural history of the world's first socialist repub-
lic. We do not deman~, of course, that each teacher was a 
~arty Cbmmunist ~ut, as much acquaintance as is possible 
with the basic i~eals of our party, with the ideals of the 
great Lenin, with the course and aims of our revolution, is 
indispensible fo~ every teBcher. 34 
Essentially, both Governments required their cadres to be sympa~ 
thetic towards their political and social aims. If the cadres were to 
work effectively for the social transormation this was a necessary pre-
requisite. It was the formal educational requirement of the Chinese 
that must have caused difficulties. While this may have been reason-
able in the Han-Chinese areas, it was unlikely that in 1949 many Turkic 
people in Sinkiang could have met them. 
III:3;i Cadre training and the 
effect of illiteracy 
In 1959 the Chinese claimed that, nAt the beginning of liberation 
the~e was a 90 per cent illiteracy rate among the workers and peasants 
of the self-governi~g_region, ten years later there were 100 illite-
rates per 10,000 people.,,35 This considerable reduction in the illi-
teracy rate suggested that the-nation-wide campaign begun in 1951 to 
wipe it out,36 had been quite successful. Nevertheless, in Sinkiang 
the task was not completed even by 1959. In Kaehen, a city in the 
Kashgar district, 249 illiteracy liquidation classes were organised in 
1958,37 while of the total 1.5 million young and middle aged illite-
rates in the entire province 85 per cent were learning to read and 
write at the end of 1958. 38 
The Soviet Government had been confronted by a similar task in 
Kazakhstan during the 1920's. 
Nationality 
Kazakhs 
Kirghiz 
Turkmen 
TadJiks 
Literacy rates for Kazakhstan 
and Central Asia39 
Per cent Republic Per cent 
literate literate 
before 1917 in 1926 
1.0 Kazakh SSR 22.8 
0.6 Kirghiz SSR 15.1 
0.7 Turkmen SSR 12.5 
3.0 Tadjik SSR 03.7 
Uzbek SSR 10.6 
USSR. 51.1 
Per cent 
literate 
in 1939 
76.3 
70.0 
67.2 
71.7 
67.8 
81.2 
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The basic problem concerning the definition of literacy among the 
Turkic people has been dealt with already. But even in terms of the 
commonly accepted definition--some ability to read and write--the pre-
1917 figures appeared excessi~ely low. One late eighteenth century 
traveller among the Kazakhs indicated that the businessmen were able to 
write receipts and that in some ~ one-third and in others all the 
40 people could read and write their own language. This presumably 
meant the Arabic script. In the eerly twentieth century a Russien of-
ficial had received a letter from a Kazakh family, written in the 
Arabic script but translated into Russian. 41 The translation indicated 
that the letter may have been written by someone other than the family 
in question. Nonetheless, although these accounts may have been some-
what optimistic, they did indicate that literacy among the Kazakhs was 
not as rare a phenomenon as tha Soviet statistics made it out-to be. 
In comparing the figures for the pre-1917 period with those of 
1926 and 1939 it must be borne in mind also that both the latter repre-
sentied the literacy rates for the whole republic. The figures may have 
been inflated by the European settlers who were far more likely to be 
literate thon the Turkic people. But on the whole the 1939 figures 
appear inflated by comparison to those of 1926. 
111 
The figures for both Kazakhstan and 5inkiang did provide Some 
indication of the problem that illiteracy represented. They also indi-
cated that its eradication would require several decades. During this 
time written communication with the Turkic people was severely restic-
ted and the extent of verbal· communication depended on the ability of 
the cadres to use the indigenous languages. In the recruitment of 
cadres the ability to use the Turkic languages became increasingly im-
portant. 50 much so that both Governments emphasised the recruitment 
of cadres from among ~he indigenou~ people despite their lack of the 
, I' 
formal educational p~~requtSite6. /! 
In 195d Burhan a8voca~ed that ,interpretbrs be trained from among 
the T4rkic people and: even suggested that native cadres should teach 
each other their own language. At the same time he noted that although 
a large number of people had come forward for training, there had been 
42 
a decline in the quality of the cadres. This suggested that the 
educational requirements expected by the Chinese from those training 8S 
cadres were waived in 5inkiang. In Kazakhstan the Bolsheviks had likely 
done the same. The conditions in the region simply did not permit any 
other course of action. 80th Governments required the cadres imme .. '. 
diately after their respective takeovers. Consequently the emphasis 
had to be placed on recruitment and not on the level of education 
attained by the prospective recruits. In Kazakhstan the problem was 
demonstrated by the campaign to wipe out illiteracy. The campaign wee 
undertaken in the native language. This demanded that large numbers of 
. 43 
native teach1ng cadres were trained. To wait until these recruits 
had improved their general level of education would have held up the 
campaign. 
III:3;ii The training of 
native cadres 
One problem both regimes were faced with was the lack of educa-
tional institutions to teech the new social values. While in 1949 
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5inkiang had one higher educational institution there were nine in 1960 
~ith a total of over 6,000 stUdents. B f th e ore e revolution the gymna-
sium in Orenburg had ~erved the higher educational needs of the 
Kazakhs. By 1960-61 the number of institutions in Kazakhstan was 28 
with a total of 77,135 studepts. 44 These figures reflected some of the 
educational developmerts that had occurred in the region. However, 
they failed to reveal the difficulties that had to be overcome in the 
course of establishing the·institutions. 
The immediate ne~d after the respective takeovers was for teaching 
cadres able to use the Turkic languages. These could have been recrui-
ted from among the non-Turkic people. After training them for three or 
four years they should have been able to teach in the Turkic languages. 
On the other hand the training period could be shortened by recruiting 
native cadres and training them over a short period of time, primarily 
in the political and practical matters related to their tasks. Peking 
developed two programmes besed on a combination of these options. The 
first was divided into two parts consisting of "regular and shorb 
courses." In the regular courses cadres and intellectuals who had mas-
tered both "their native tongue and the Chinese language" were to be 
trained over two or three years, while in the short courses administra-
tive and military cadres were to be prepared over a short period of 
45 time. The second programme consisted of a four year course in the 
Uighur language and political science that was given by the Central 
Institute for Nationalities in Peking. In addition to the fou~ years 
spent in course-work the students of the first class to graduate also 
had spent one year and one-half doing field-work in Sinkiang. This 
effectively stretched the course to.8 period of five and one-half years 
and it was not until August 1955 that the first class graduated. With 
. 46 
the exception of two Hui students the graduates were all Han-Ch~nese. 
The various courses provided three levels of cadre training facilities, 
preparing cadres for work on one of three levels within the political 
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hierarchy. On the lowest of these were administretive cadres trained 
for general work, on the next level the specialists for translating 
and work in special branches and on the highest level the top level 
political administrators. 
Under the circumstances.it was unlikely that Peking could have in-
troduced a different policy from the one that was followed. Among the 
Turkic trainee cadres few, if any, could have met the entrance require-
ments for the higher educational institutions and middle schools. To 
admit them at all "special standards" were applied and those who had 
been admitted were toitak~ "make-up courses." After passing this 
hurdle there remained,the i~nguage difficulty. Since the instruction 
at the training institution was generally given in Chinese by Han in-
structors the lessons had to be translated in the classrooms. In ef~ 
fect this slowed the teaching process by as much as one_half. 47 As a 
result it became necessary to either lengthen the training period or 
reduce the content of the courses. 
In Kazakhstan similar difficulties were encountered. The senior 
teachers in, schools were frequently Russians and their lessons had to 
be interpreted. 48 At the higher educational institutions the instruc-
tors too were likely to have been Russian. The lengthening of the 
courses that the translating of the lessons caused in some instances 
could be overcome by the introduction of highly specialised fields of 
study. In these the subject matter was reduced to the bare essentials 
of a single area within a specialised field. One example of this may 
have been the University of the Workers of the East which was estab-' 
lished in 1921 to train Central Asians as "lecturers to organise Party 
1 ,,49 Th d t schools and soviet construction in the loca area. e gra ua es 
were given limited training and used for political work and basic ad-
ministrative tasks. In the 1930's the emphasis shifted to the collec-
tivisation and industrialisation. This created a demand for agricultu-
~al specialists. The higher communist agricultural schools were set up 
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in 1932 to train thes~. By 1935 the six schools that ware located in 
Kazakhstan had a tota~ enrollment of 2,188 students of whom 1,546 or 73 
per cent were Kazakhs.
50 
Although some doubt may be expressed about 
the agricultural specialists and their qualifications--it was not 
entirely clear whether they ~8re charged with propaganda work or agri-
cultural tasks--the concept of specialists became well established in 
Soviet education. 
The Chinese adopted the specialised training programme in 1953. 
, 
In addition to the Central Nationalities Institute in Peking the 
I 
Sinkiang Nationalitie~ College in Tihua, the Cadres School of the CCP 
Sinkiang Sub-Bureau and the Cadres School of the Sinkiang Provincial 
People's Government ail had been established to train political and 
administrative cadres for Sinkiang. Throughout 1949-59 nine institutes 
specialising in particular fields were set up also. But the Chinese 
went a step fUrther than had the Russians. They not only treined 
cadres in narrowly specialised arees, but also shortened the period of 
time allowed for each course. By 1955 there were complaints that this 
51 had overburdened the students,and reduced the quality of the cadres. 
While these complaints were general in that they applied to the whole 
of China, the problem may have been even more pronounced in Sinkiang. 
At the same time it may be expected also that similar difficulties were 
encountered in Kazakhstan. 
In the higher educational institutions the Turkic people faced 
several disedvantages. They lacked the besic training for the special-
ist courses and the linguisti~ difficulties prolonged their programmes 
or reduced them to the barest essentials. These problems made it 
dubious that upon graduating the native cadres had either comprehended 
what they were taught or been adequately prepared for their tasks. 
Until native cadres could be recruited from among the students who had 
passed through the entire educational process, training vast numbers of 
highly qualified native cadres remained a difficult if not a nearly 
impossible task. 
III:3;iii Meeting the de-
mand for cadres 
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In addition to the qualitative problem there was one of quantity. 
As the various governmental activities in the two regions increased the 
demand for cadres grew. Thi~ made the task of recruiting qualified 
cadres even more difficult. For the Bolsheviks there was little alter-
native but to train the required personnel in the best available man~ 
nero In 1949 the Chinese, on the other hand, had a distinct advantage 
over the Bolsheviks. Unlike the Bolsheviks in 1917 the Chinese were 
able to send people abroad for training, particularly to the Soviet 
Union. 
As early as 1950 Bur han advocated that people of promise from 
Sinkiang be sent away for training. While 11 students were s~nt to the 
Soviet Union in 1954, 568 went to institutions in the interior regions 
of China. 52 These students were not to be trained only as specialists 
for industry and agriculture. In 1959 it was noted that, "higher edu-
cational institutions sent 27 people to the Soviet Union and 167 to the 
interior to train as teachers, some have already returned to take up 
teaching duties.,,53 Some of those sent to the training institutions in 
the Soviet Union and interior regions of China were trained as teachers 
in specialised fields. When they returned to Sinkiang they were to 
train others. Among these students there must have been a large pro-
portion of natives. 8y 1959 the indigenous people were said to account 
for 69 per cent of the teaching staff in the higher educational insti-
54 tutions of the province. . 
. 
rna fact that people were sent outside of 
the province for their training once again indicated how limited were 
the educational facilities within Sinkiang. This situation had not 
changed by 1959. There also was a large influx of cadres from other 
provinces. This may have been an indication that the Chinese were 
encountering difficulties in recruiting suitable Turkic cadres. Either 
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they were not available or they were not coming forward for the cadre 
training programme. This became parti 1 1 cu ar y evident in a comparison 
between the number of cadres working in Sinkiang and the number that 
could have graduated from training institutions there. 
Cadres working in Sinkiang 
in 1~52 and 195455 
Year Total number of 
cadres 
The proportion of the total that 
were native 
As a number As a percentage 
1952 
1954 
. (44,721) 30,500 
40,000· 25,6BO 
(Num~er ih btackets has been calculated) 
I! I' i . {A_L 
Incomple~e statistics for the number of 
cad~es graduated :from training 
institutions in 5inkiang 
. i by 195356 
Name of institution 
Cadre institution of 5inkiang 
Sub-Bureau 
Two unnamed specialist 
institutions 
Tihua Nationalities 
College 
Total 
Date first 
class gra-
duated 
1950/51 
1950/51 
1950/51 
Number of 
students 
1,044 
nd 
nd 
(Number in brackets has been calculated) 
6B.2 
64.2 
Number of 
graduates 
by 1953 
(3,132) 
2,000 
5,020 
10,152 
While these statistics were incomplete they did provide a general 
impression. According to this of the more than 40,000 cadres that 
worked in Sinkiang in 1953 only one-quarter (one-third of the native 
cadres) were trained in the local training institutions. The remainder 
had received their training in either the Red Army, the institutions of 
the interioF or abroad. In addition there was the considerable influx 
of Han-Chinese cadres from other regions. 
Han and non-Han cadres 
in 5inkiang57 
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Year Total number Han cadres Non-Han cadres 
of cadres Number Per cent Number Per cent 
1950-51 
1952 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1958-59 
23,000 
44,721 
40,000 
(56,000) 
(96,004 ). 
(125,500 ) 
(8,500) 
14,221 
14,320 
18,000 
40,902 
(53,500) 
37.0 (14,471) 62.9 
31.8 30,500 68.2 
35.8 25,680 64.2 
32.1 (37,830) 67.6 
42.6 (57,521) 59.9 
42.6 (67,000) 53.4 
(The figures in brackets are means that were calculated 
whenever two numbers were given in the sources. As a 
result the percentages did not add up to 100.) 
These figures indicated a dramatic increase in the number of Han 
cadres after 1955. Tris was no doubt a direct consequence of the lack 
I I ' 
of technical specialists among the native cadres. following the disso-
lution of the Sino-Soviet poirib-stdck companies in 1954 and increasing 
efforts to develop the industrial sector, the demand for technioal 
cadres must have grown considerably. The lack of native specialists 
made it inevitable that the number of Han cadres would increase and 
that in Sinkiang they would become a majority in the specialised tech-
nical fields. 
A similar development may be traced in Kazakhstan. There the 
Russian domination of the ranks of cadres having higher and middle 
specialist educations was evident still in 1966. In part this could be 
attributed to Soviet policy, but it was possible also to argue that the 
imbalance resulted primarily from the lack of qualiFied Kazakhs. 
Year 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1964 
1966 
Kazakh and Russian cadres with higher 
and middle specialist educations58 
Higher education Middle specialist ed~cation 
Kazakhs Russians Kazakhs Russians % of Number % of Number % of Number % of Number 
total total total total 
27,000 23.7 61,100 53.7 31,200 16.0 124,900 63.9 
30,200 24.2 67,100 53.8 35,100 16.3 135,100 62.7 
33,500 23.6 77 ,400 54.5 38,500 16.4 146,500 62.4 
42,600 23.9 97,100 54.4 47,300 16.4 181,000 62.7 
54,300 25.8 111,000 52.6 58,900 17.7 204,000 61.2 
The lack of native people who could be trained as specialists was 
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apparent in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. During the collectivisation 
drive industrial development and industrial relocation of the 1930ls 
and the post-war developments the demands for technical specialists was 
far greater than the··humber that could be provided locally. Of the 
32,000 specialists that were. required in 1933 only 5,500 could be re-
cruited in the educational institutions of Kazakhstan. 59 This trend 
continued. While the absolute number of Kazakh specialists nearly 
doubled between 1959-66, that of the Russian specialists also nearly 
doubled in the sarna period. This indicated that there had been a con-
sider"ble influx to meet the increased demands of particular programmes 
II . 
such ~s the Virgin La'nds scheme and increased industrialisation. 
the influx of cadres into the two regions did not indicate B 
reluctance on the part of either the Russians or Chinese to train local 
people. It was unlikely that over a short period of time an adequate 
supply of native cadres could be trained in either region. To train 
indigenous people was in the interest of both Governments from the 
point of view of goods socialist government and the Marxist ideals. 
These concepts demanded racial equality_ In addition the native cadres 
were essential for overcoming the language difficulties and the cultu-
ral barriers. The difficulty was the educational base of the indige-
nous people. This had not prepared them for the demands being made by 
the new regimes. Only those who had entered the new socialist educa-
tional system after the takeovers would have been at all able to meat 
the required standards. The training at the primary and secondary 
levels therefore became crucial in fostering the cadres of the future. 
111:4 The education 
of children 
The success of the Soviet and Chinese regimes did not depend on 
replacing the old order with communist governments, but on passing on 
the revolutionary ideals to the next generation. Only if these ideals 
continued to guide the Governments of the two states after the old 
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revolutionaries had expired could the revolution be termed a SUccess. 
The task of inspiring the children of the two countries with the spirit 
of Socialism fell largely to the primary and secondary schools. Since 
both Lenin end Mao accepted that the course of the revolution depended 
60 
entirely on the young people, the formal education of youth played a 
dual role. While eqUipping stUdents with basic skills which would al-
low them to function in the new society and preparing them for further 
study, it also made them the carriers of the socialist ideals. 
To achieve these aims a balanded curriculum that fostered desir-
able qualities in the students had to be developed. In both states the 
, II 
result was a balance between core subjects consisting of language, 
mathematics, science,' history and geography and secondary subjects that 
were intended to develop specific o~ general skills such as art, music 
61 
and labour among others. The core subjects were emphasised to a 
greater extent than the secondary subjects. This was an indication 
that education was intended to foster those subjects considered essen-
tial to industrial society. At the same time it was to develop social 
attitudes that were consistant with the ideals of Socialism. 
Ill:4ji The primary and 
secondary schools 
Although the basic educational system of the two countries dif-
fered in form the purpose was the aame. Until the reform of 1966 the 
Chinese model was similar to the American. It consisted of six years 
elementary, three years Junior middle and three years senior middle 
school. These were followed by further studies at specialised or 
higher educational institutions. 62 - The Soviet system, until the reform 
of 1958. was composed of a four year primary, a seven year incomplete 
secondary and a ten year or complete secondary school, after which the 
student could attend either special. vocational or higher educational 
institutions. Since 1958 the first three primary and secondary schools 
have been replaced by a eight year school which was broken down into 
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the elementary first four grades and the secondary last four.63 
It was the educational ~ystem that provided the most suitable 
means for shaping the social attitudes of children. Although the tra-
ditional religious schools and a number of non-religious institutions 
had existed in Kazakhstan an~ Sinkiang before the revolutions their 
number had been insufficient to allow for the introduction of universal 
primary education. This made it essential to build and equip new 
schools. In Kazakhstan there were between 9,423 and 9,594 elementary 
and secondary schools,by 1$60_61,64 while Sinkiang had some 4,800 pri-
mary schools in 1959 and 250 middle and secondary schools in 1960. 65 
These figures revealed that a large number of schools had been opened. 
Some questions may be,1raised about how extensive an education they were 
,. 
able to provide. In 1953 the Chinese launched a campaign to discourage 
elementary school graduates from expecting to go on to middle school. 
Instead they were encouraged to enter the workforce upon graduating. 
In 1954 only one-third of the elementary school graduates entered mid-
66 dIe schools. Besides attempting to prevent overcrowding these mea-
sures also suggested that the Chinese lacked the financial resources to 
allow all children to be educated beyond the primary level. In 5in-
kiang the situation was even worse. Even by the end of 1958 only "tIllO-
i t · 67 thirds of the counties" provided a universal pr mary educa ~on. 
was certainly an indication of financial difficulties. In addition 
other problems, particularly that of language, must be considered. 
III:4;ii Linguistic difficulties 
in elementary education 
• The linguistic difficulties alio made themselves felt in the 
This 
teaching of children. Those cadres who had been assigned to teach in 
the Turkic areas had either to be able to speak the local languages or 
have their lessons translated. But until sufficient numbers of Turkic 
teaching cadres had been trained there were bound to be difficulties in 
staffing schools. 
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In Kazakhstan teaching in Kazakh was limited to the first two 
lars in primary schools immediately after the founding of the Kazakh 
iSR. The remaining grades were taught in Russian. In addition there 
was a lack of textbooks in Kazakh. It was claimed that only at the end 
of the first five year plan,_ in 1932, did it become possible to teach 
all grades in almost every school in Kazakh. 68 Because of these diffi-
culties the education that Kazakh children received until the end of 
the first five year plan likely did not go beyond teaching them basic 
literacy in their own language. A marked change occurred in August 
1948. I In that year Russian was introduced as the teaching language 
from the second half of the first year in all Kazakh schools. 69 Al-
though every Kazakh child had until then had the right to be instructed 
in the native language this was no longer to be the case. Henceforth 
Kazakh was to be learned as an additional subject in the native-lan-
guage schools. This placed an additional burden on native children. 
In effect they had to learn Russian, Kazakh and a foreign language, 
while Russian children learned only Russian and Kazakh as a foreign 
language. It has been suggested that this was one reason why the 
Kazakh children attended the Russian rather than the native language 
schools. 70 
In Sinkiang the Turkic children also were taught in their native 
languages. One report in 1957 noted that because written languages had 
been coined for 25 nationalities "many national minorities" could use 
their own languages to learn "cultural and scientific knowledge." 
71 . th S· . t Among these were Uighur, Kazakh and- Uzbek. But, as 1n e OV1e 
Union, so in China the attitude towards the indigenous peoples in 
Sinkiang underwent some change. Following the Rectification Campaign 
the study of Chinese became obligatory in higher educational institu-
tions, "and the teaching of specialised courses [J.n higher educational 
nstitutioni! has come gradually to be conducted in LthiT Han lan-
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72 guage." Chinesa was taught intensively aleo in the first and second 
grades, i and erh nien~chi, as it was claimed children in these grades 
had learned approximetely 2,000 Chinese vocals within three months. 73 
Hence, both regimes had resorted to drastic measures to overcome the 
difficulties that emerged in. the teaching process itself and in the 
production of teaching materials. 
The early problems that the Soviet Union faced in producing Kazakh 
textbooks have been noted already. For the Chinese the Soviet printing 
facilities for the Turkic languages proved a great advantage. By 1951 
various books had been pri~ted on Soviet presses for the Chinese. 
i 
Among these were 1,284,000 elementary school textbooks in Russian, 
Chinese, Uighur and Kazakh. 74 In this manner the Chinese were able to 
avoid the shortages of texbooks tha~ had plagued the Soviet Union in 
its infancy. But the Chinese had no intention of becoming dependent on 
Soviet books. In 1951 the Sinkiang People's Publishing House was 
established, "to edit, translate and publish books and periodicals 
mainly for the Sinkiang minority peoples." By mid-1952 it had pub~ 
lished over 680,000 copies of textbooks in Uighur, Kazakh and Mongo-
1 . 75 ~an. For the Chinese it made good sense to establish their own 
printing facilities. The Soviet textbooks were based on Soviet experi-
ences, while the Chinese required books that were relevant to their own 
history. Although the Soviet books were of great value no doubt as 
models and basic schemas, they had to be supplemented with Chinese 
materials if Chinese children were not to become more familiar with 
Soviet events than those of th~ir own country. 
I11:4;iii Mobile and boar-
ding schools 
Another problem that had to be resolved in both regions was that 
of making physical contact with the children of the nomads and drawing 
them into the schools. In 1958 the school attendance in Kaehen was 
. d 76 
reported to have reached 99 per cent of all school age ch~l reno 
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Whether a similar claim could be made among the nomads of the two 
regions was difficult to establish. 80th Governments did make efforts 
to reach the children of nomads through mobile schools. 77 These tra-
velled along with the nomads to overcome the problem of reaching the 
children and adults alike. Little was known about the actual educati-
onal work that was done in the mobile classrooms, but the introduction 
of the boarding schools suggested that the ,mobile schools were con5i-
dered a novel rather than a practical solution to the problem. 
In Kazakhstan the efforts to ~stablish boarding schools began in 
1921. At least one boarding schoo~ was to be set up in each Kirghiz 
79 ' (Kazakh) volost. The intention was to keep the children of 'the 
nomads in boarding schools while the adults were away on the cattle 
drives. More "special schools for the children of live-stock herders" 
were established on the basis of the regulations that had been intro-
duced in 1953 and 1960. As a result of these 379 boarding schools were 
established with, presumably in 1960, some 17,000 children. 79 
From Sinkiang reports indicated that elementary sbhools received 
80 food and lodging, shih-su, paid for by the Government. From this it 
appeared that the boarding schools were used also among the nomads of 
the province. On the whole the boarding schools in both regions were 
likely better equipped than the mobile schools and therefore able to 
provide better educational facilities for the children. 
The problems that the two Governments encountered in both the 
primary and secondary schools of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were diverse 
and plentiful. To solve them ~equired more than building schdols and 
training teachers. Perhaps the most important requirement was time. 
The practical difficulties related to the cultures and customs of the 
Turkic people were unlikely to be overcome in a few years. Furthermore 
for as long as any part of the Turkic cultural identity remained intact 
the adherence to the old customs was likely to continue. This aspect 
made it especially important to re-educate the adult population. 
lII:5 Adult 
education 
....... 
Except for those who ~ntered cadre training institutions or one of 
the various other educatiohal facilities, the two regions were left 
with a group of people that had to be educated through other means. 
Their education took both a formal and imformal form. The formal edu-
cation took place in either spare-time, winter or correspondence 
schools, or through the various other programmes that were offered to 
adults. On the informal level it oonsisted of that which was provided 
to all members of the new society. It was acquired in the course of 
interacting with other people on a social, professional or political 
level. 80th the formal and informal edcations were highly organised 
and served a dual function. On the one hand they were useful means 
through which the social transformation could be fostered, while on the 
other, they could be used as a means for spreading specialised, practi-
cal knowledge. 
l1I:5;i formal educa-
tion for adults 
The greatest cultural resistance that the two regimes encountered 
in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang was that coming from the adult popUlation. 
All cultural traditions were most strongly rooted in this segment of 
the popUlation. To complicate things even more they also represented 
the proportion of the population that was most difficult to influence 
because they were removed from the educational process. In order to 
acquaint them with the policia_.s of.Socialism courses catering .speci fi-
cally to adults had to be developed. The first opportunity for such 
courses was the campaign to wipe out illiteracy. 
Almost from the outset both regimes launched campaigns against 
illiteracy. These were easily combined with propaganda work and both 
Governments utilised teaching materials in these courses that propagan-
dised Socialism. S1 These attempts to popularise the political regimes 
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in no way detracted from the benefits of the courses. Since the Turkic 
people were living in larger societies that were intent on industrial-
isation, literacy could but assist them by raising their standard of 
social life. It also had to be borne in mind that the adult educati-
onal programma went beyond te~ching literacy. 
Adult education provided a unique opportunity for reaching the 
nomads. To some extent it was carried on in the same mobile classrooms 
82 in which the children of the nomads were taught. These schools and 
adult education in general provided a channel through which both 
Governments were able to pass on factual information about agriculture 
and live-stock breeding. In Sinkiang the winter schools were used to 
train peasants in methods for improving their farming techniques. 83 
The depth of the training that could be provided in adult educa-
tion classes was limited by the level of education that those taking 
the courses had attained. As this level of education among the adult 
population of the two regions rose more academically oriented spare-
time educational programmes could be developed. The additions that the 
Governments made to the spare-time courses in later years allowed stu-
dents to use these to both acquire and upgrade their academic qualifi-
t ' 84 ca ~ons. This effectively transformed spare-time education into a 
subsidiary trainiAg institution for skilled workers. In this capacity 
it functioned like a formal educational establishment, except that it 
was intended to serve those who no longer had or never had been given 
the opportunity to attend full-time institutions. 
111:5;ii Society as 
educator 
The new society was based on the theory of collectivism as opposed 
to that of individualism. In order to transform a capitalist society 
into a socialist society the people had to be convinced that collecti-
vism was more desirable for them than individualism. To accomplish 
this all aspects of the socialist society had to stand out as models 
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worthy of emulation. Two ~uch modele, Lenin and Mao, continued to be 
presented as members pf a ~ociety that everyone wished to belong to. 
But it was not intended that anly the leaders should stand out as so-
cialists. The Party, its various organisations, the army, the worker 
and peasant organisations ~nd all organisations of the socialist socie-
ty in general played a role in gaining the support of the masses for 
Socialism. It was their task to win the individual over to the col18c-
tive at his place of work and in both his private and social life. In 
this way the individu~l wes to be transformed into a socialist. 
Perhaps the best: ill~~tration of tha concept was the transforma-
tion of agriculture tpat Lani~ and Mao envisaged. In 1923 Lenin had 
advocated establishing pro~ucer co-operatives supported by state 
I . 
funds. 85 He believed that i the co-operatives would act as models and 
lure the rural masses to pool their resourcess in similar co-opera-
tives. The forced collectivisation under Stalin did not permit the ex-
periment to be completed and made further appeals to the rural popula-
tion unnecessary. Mao's programme for transforming agriculture was 
similar to that of Lenin. In 1953 he stated, "Make a succesa of the 
agricultural producers' co-operatives and a big expansion of the 
66 
mutual-aid teams will follow." Mao too believed that if the co-ope-
ratives were shown to be successful individual peasants would join in 
mutual-aid teams eo that they aleo could benefit from co-operation. 
Th~re followed the admonition to strive for "quantit~, quality and 
economy" in setting up co-Operatives. By economy Mao meant, "np 
failures; failures are a waste-of the peasants' energy, with the bad 
end-result of losses both politically and in the production of 
. ,,87 gra~n. In the political sense the failure of the co-operatives 
would have slowed the socialisation of agriculture by driving the pea-
sants away rather than attracting them to the co-operatives. To avoid 
failure the Chinese did as Lenin had done, they established model co-
operatives and state farms at the expense of the state. 
1~ 
In Sinkiang the People's Liberation Army units had reclaimed vast 
reas of wasteland. On this they set up mechanised collective farms. 
hese were to serve as models "for agricultural prodUction in Sinkiang 
. "88 It b t prov~Ace. was su sequen ly claimed that these farms had yielded 
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record harvests. In setting these records the modern equipment and 
techniques available to the state and PLA farms no doubt helped. But 
the claims made the collective effort appear all the more convincing. 
The forced communalisation of the Great Leap, like the collectivisation 
in the USSR, large~y ended the exp~riment to attract the peasants in 
this manner. 
All other asp~cts of soc~alist life were to serve as similar 
models. The young people and their organisations were widely used in 
this way. Lenin's wife, Krupskeya, one of the leading Soviet Commis-
sars of education, envisaged the role of Komsomol members and pioneers 
lias links connecting the broad masses of students with their youth and 
children's movements."90 They were to advertise the movements and 
bring others into them. In Sinkiang the youth movements organised 
activities that were especially attractivs to young people. While the 
New Democratic youth League of China organised a summer camp for the 
minority children, the pioneers were able to go to their own summer 
camp.91 These organisations too were to transform the individual into 
a collective socialist person through education. 
111:6 Conclusions 
The functions of the formal and informal educational processes in 
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic were intended to transform 
the society and individual alike. At the same time they were to be the 
medium for training experts. These were not to be just experts. They 
were to be socialist experts. Their expertise was to be relevant to a 
socialist society and they were to be totally devoted to the building 
of Socialism. It had been noted that Mao desired lito harmonize the two 
conflicting imperativBs of 'conscious action' by individuals and im-
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peccable social discipline.,,92 If this statement was to mean that Mao 
expected individuals to consciously act in accordance with what he con-
sidered to be Socialism, the same could be said of Marx, Lenin, Stalin 
and Khrushchev among others. This is not to say that they wanted the 
system to produce an unthinking person. Rather it was to train people 
to organise themselves and their thoughts within a socialist framework. 
The student was to be trained to think up and apply socialist solutions 
to problems. but under no circumstances was it intended that he should 
cease to think. 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty that arose was the dilemma of 
having to reconcile directly opposed needs. According to socialist 
theory the Turkic people were to undertake their own transition in 
their own time. At the same time the economic requirements put pres-
sure on the Sovi8t and Chinese Governments to recruit increased numbers 
of Turkic cadres and bring more non-Turkic experts into the two 
regions. This in turn exerted ever increasing pressure on the Turkic 
people to speed up their own social transformation. 
But the influx of non-Turkic cadres elsa raised important social 
questions. Whenever Russian or Han~Chinese cadres held top positions 
in the Turkic regions the indigenous people were likely to consider 
this great nation chauvinism. This feeling was enhanced further by tha 
fact that the new social ideals were brought to the regions by the 
Russians and Chinese. As a result the challenge to the educational 
system was very complex. It had to quickly raise the social-conscious-
ness of the Turkic people to the ljvel where they would no lo~ger feel 
they were being dominated culturally. At the same time it had to con-
vince the same people to relinquish their cultural heritage for 
Socialism. 
To a large extent the success of this endeavour depended on how 
the non-Turkic cadres conducted themselves and on the expectations of 
the central Governments. Equally important was the degree to which the 
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indigenous people were permitted to control their own affairs. Given 
~he lew standard of formal education among the natives, the central 
Governments hardly could expect a socialist industrial people to emerge 
in either Kazakhstan or Sinkiang within a few years after the respec-
tive revolutions. But at ~he same time, so long as the social trans-
formation of the indigenous population had not taken place the native 
cadres could not be trusted to take charge of the local affairs. This 
posed the authorities a real dilemma. Neither oentral Government was 
prepared to run the risk of putting local people in complete oontrol 
and yet the native cadres were indispensible in the local work. Burhan 
had noted 1n 1950 that, "Sinkiang is s region of many nationalities, if 
a large number of cadres is not fostered from each nationality to take 
part in the work of each d~partment, the work will not be good work."93 
There was no reluctance to trein native cadree in either region. But 
as the Turkic cadres were trained end beca~e confident in their work 
they also wanted to assume positions of leadership. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Turkic Reaction to the New Ideals 
and to the New Societies 
IV:1 Introduction 
After the central Gover~ments established their respective politi-
cal, religious and educational policies they were faced with a most 
important challenge. They had to convince the Turkic people to parti-
cipate and adopt the new cultural traditions that were part of the new 
society. It was not enough that the Turkic people participated in the 
governmental organisations, abondoned some of their religious practices 
and sent their children to the newly established educational institu-
tions. Such participation indicated only that the anti-religious poli-
cies had affected worshippers and the education of children in state 
schools had been made compulsory. It gave no indication whether the 
traditional culture of the Turkic people hed been replaced by that of 
the new society either in whole or in part. 
The depth of that cultural change which had occurred could not be 
measured in changes that were decreed or enforced by law. These 
included the prohibition of religious services and compulsory educa-
tion. The only accurate reflection of the attitude of the indigenous 
people towards the new social culture was their reaction to those as-
pects of the new culture that could not be enforced by laws or decrees. 
Only this reaction could reflect the extent to which the socialist cul-
ture had replaced the Turkic culture. One cultural change that was 
voluntary was intermarriage •. Tha intermingling and mixing of different 
ethnic groups was a basic aspect of socialist theory. At the same time 
the Turkic people could not be forced to intermarry with non-Turkic 
people. The number of intermarriages between Turkic and non-Turkic 
partners were an indication therefore of the extent to which the Turkic 
people accepted the theory of socialist internationalism. In addition 
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they indicated to what extent the Turkic people were willing to inter-
act with non-Turkic people. 
The two regimes also ran into difficulties in the course of fos-
tering the spirit of internationalism. To a considerable extent these 
may have resulted from the policies that were pursued. According to 
Marxist ideology national differences were to disappear. The people of 
different ethnic groups were to intermingle freely, learn from each 
other and exchange desirable cultural traits. This caused some consi-
derable difficulties. While the national cultures were fostered, each 
national group also had to be prepared to give up its own culture 
either in whale or in part. This philosophy resulted in contradiction 
and confusion. On the one hand the Turkic people were taught to be 
proud of their cultural heritage, arousing a desire to protect the 
local traditions, whileDn the other hand, they were expected to give 
these up for the ideals of Communism. A backlash was bound to result 
as the Turkic people ware first pushed towards their own distinct cul-
tural identity and a new Turkic cultural awakening. Then, secondly, 
they were expected to relinquish their newly found culture for the 
socialist culture of the Soviet and Chinese regimes. 
It might be argued that the Soviet and Chinese Governments could 
have avoided these difficulties by pursuing a policy of direct integra-
tion. Using this policy the Turkic people could have been forced to 
become part of the Russian and Chinese cultures. One obvious objection 
to such a policy was that it was likely to lead to wide-spread opposi-
. 
tion. This would have made implementing it diffibult if not impossi-
ble. But even more important, Marxist ideology categorically opposed 
precisely this sort of expedient. According to it, cultural change was 
to occur because the natives recognised the superiority of Socialism 
and its culture vis-d-vis their own. Consequently, both regimes had to 
pursue a policy of cultural conciliation and mutual cultural respect. 
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furthermore, they were ideologically committed to developing and ad-
vancing what the Communists considered to be underdeveloped cultures. 
They could:not deviate from this policy even if it encouraged local 
cultural protectionism and a movement for political freedom and inde-
pendence. 
If these movements appeared among the indigenous people the 
Governments had to channel them in such a way that they led to the 
development of socialist societies in Kazakhstan and Sinkisng. This 
was the most important task facing both Governments. The whole purpose 
for developing the Turkic cultures had been to raise the social con-
sciousness of the Turkic people. This in turn was to make them more 
inclined towards Socialism. The extent to which the indigenous people 
accepted the ideals and values of Socialism therefore was an indication 
of how far they had advanced towards the socialist society. 
IV:2 The political intentions 
of the central Governments 
In analysing the policies of the Russian and Chinese Governments 
there arose an immediate problem. This was related to their intentimns 
in their respective regions of Turkestan. Politically these appeared 
reasonably clear-cut. In the past both states were primarily concerned 
with securing their borders and safeguarding themselves from attack. 
Aftar the Communists came to power security remained the immediate pro-
blem, as anti-communist forces were active in both Kszakhstan and Sin-
kiang. It was only after the hostile forces had been defeated that the 
Marxist ideals of World-wide revolLll:ion could be invoked to Justify the 
territorial expansion into Turkic territory. 
At the same time there were aspects of tradition that had to be 
considered. The Russians and Chinese had ruled their respective ter-
ritories of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang for considerable lengths of time, 
especially in the case of the Chinese. This may have added to the 
desire to keep the formerly annexed territories within their respective 
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spheres of control. A further consideration of traditional rule were 
the Tsarist and imperial Chinese attempts to Russify and Sinicise the 
Turkic people. Since Communism too advocated cultural uniformity and 
national singularity there may have been reason to suspect that these 
policies contained an element of tradition. Because of these similari-
ties the Russian and Chinese imperial policies to some extent continued 
to exist side by side with the ideological basis of the communist 
states. 
IV:2;i The Turkic people under tradi-
tiondl Russian and Chinese rule 
It has long been maintained by Soviet historians that the Russian 
expansion into Kazakhstan and Central Asia was undertaken to check 
British designs on Central Asia. 1 This made it appear that the occur-
rences in the regions were no more than the colonial rivalry that had 
developed between the two imperialist states in the course of their 
battle over spoils. The Russians undoubtedly had been concerned about 
the British expansion in the Fer East. But it was not entirely correct 
to suggest that this was their only concern in the drive to subjugate 
Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Other considerations included the need to 
protect Russian settlers and traders from attack by unr~ly Kazakhs. 
There also was a general desire to gain control over the Kazakh steppes 
and the hope that control over the region would lead to increased Rua-
2 
sian trade with Turkestan and India. From this it followed that there 
were some very good political and economic motives for the Russian 
drive into Turkestan which began early in the nineteenth century • 
. 
Although these reasons no doubt influenced the Russian decision to con-
quer the region, they themselves were not decisive. 
Apart from the general aim of conquering the region, particularly 
the Kazakh steppes, the Russian Government had no immediate plans for 
Turkestan. 3 It may be argued then, that the immediate concern was to 
gain military control, but not necessarily to dominate. Further evi-
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dencB supporting this view may be found in the fact that after the Rus-
sian conquest the lifestyle of the Kazakhs remained largely unchang~d. 
No attempts were made to Russify the Kazakhs or to force them to adopt 
4 
Russian customs. The primary concern of the Russians was to maintain 
military control over"the region and to ensure that no attack against 
Russia could be launched from it. 
8y no means should the imperialist designs of the Russian Tsars 
be dismissed entirely. The Russian rulers were no less inclined to 
enlarge their domains than the other European rulers. But the thrust 
of Russian imperial expansion was southward, towards the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles and not towards the Far East. In the latter region Russian 
policy, with the exception of maintaining Russian military control, was 
left to the military commanders like General K. P. von Kaufman, the 
first Governor General of Turkestan. One of these policies concerned 
the settlement of the Kazakh steppes. 
The settlers moved into the steppe region after the Russian con-
quest. At first they consisted of Cossacks. These the Russians set-
tIed there as military colonists. In additiDn there were illegal set-
tIers and exiles from European Russia. It was not until 1869 that von 
Kaufman developed his master plan for settling his administrative 
region. Even then it was not until 1884 that the Russian Government 
5 took active steps to bring Russian settlers into Turkestan. Perhaps 
the most important factor in bringing about this shift in Russian 
policy was the economic importance that Central Asia had acquired for 
the Russian textile industry. - As a consequence of the Crimean and 
American Civil Wara, Russia had been left without a source of raw cot-
ton. This forced her to turn to the cotton growing regions of Central 
Asia. 8y 1911 one-half of the Russian cotton needs were met by cotton 
from Central Asia. 6 Becsuse of the economic importance it was only 
natural that the prDtection of the region should bs paid greater stten-
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ticn. It also followed that settlement provided a logical smlution to 
both the problem of protection and increased production. But despite 
the support of the Government the settlement of the steppes proceeded 
slowly. 
Nation-
Population of the .teppe region and Turkestan 
9uberniya by nationality7 
1897 1911 
Total ality Rural Total number Rural number Number Per cent Number Per cant 
Russians 690,432 450,143 65.2 1,950,112 1,490,953 76.5 
Turkic 6,891,989 6,287,440 91.2 8,117,428 nd 
Others 164,297 74,765 45.5 259,493 nd 
By 1897 only 12.4 per cent of the total population of the steppe 
region and Turkestan guberniya was non-indigenous. This represented a 
relatively elow increase from the start of the RUBsian conquest. But 
between 1897-1911 the non-indigenous proportion of the population more 
than doubled, comprising 27.2 per cent of the total. Of the .• non-indi-
genous people the Russians constituted 10.0 per cent in 1897 end 24.0 
per cent in 1911. As the table above indicated, the greatest~propor-
ticn of the Russians were settlers. They settled on the rich farmland 
that had been part of the Kazakh grazing grounds. These were reduced 
further still by the Turkic people who had turnad to agriculture also. 
As a result the land at the disposal of the nomads decreased and they 
were in turn gradually forced to alter their way of life. 
As thepastureland decreased the Kazakhs were forced to red~ce the 
size of their herds and to turn towards a semi-nomadic existence. They 
engaged in both live-stock raising and agriculture and became increas-
ingly sedentary. This development the Russian administration of:the 
steppe region viewed with considerable satisfaction. The settling of 
the nomads reduced their need for land still further. In the opinion 
of the Russian officials this was a positive development. It freed 
~ore land that had not been used efficiently previously for settlement 
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and the growing of wheat. 8 From these developments it followed that 
the change in the nomadic lifestyle of the Kazakhs did not result di-
rectly from Russian policy, but was a by-product of it. The historical 
davelopments rather than the policy brought about the change. As a 
consequence the nomads were not only forced to seek an alternative 
means of earning a living. They also had to become politically active 
in order to defend their culture and traditional rights. The latter 
became even more significant as those Kazakhs who persisted in the 
nomadic traditions were crowded out by settlers and forced to seek out 
the poorest grasslands for their herds. This reduced their live-stock 
9 
even further. For the Kazakhs it was not merely a battle for their 
traditional way of life therefore, but for survival. It was hardly 
surprising then, that they mounted a political campaign in favour of 
10 restricting the colonisation of the steppes. 
The policy of the Chinese in Sinkiang was in some respects similar 
to that of the Russians in Central Asia. By the nineteenth century the 
Chinese state was composed of msny people of di~fering cultural heri-
tagas. Throughout the cOUrse of Chinese history these people had been 
incorporated into the Chinese state and into its culture. It ~as not 
clear in what way those considering themselves Chinese differed from 
those who were not considered Chinese. Generally it was believed that 
in the early periods of Chinese history--the Western Chou, 1122-771 
B.C.--these differences were cultural rather than physical. To be 
Chinese it was not necessary to be ethnically derived from a cartain 
, 
group of people, but to conform to -the Chinese culture and way of 
life. 11 The culture rather than the ethnic origin determined whether 
people were Chinese. 
So long as the people who were to be enveloped by the Chinese way 
of life were dependent on agriculture for their livelihood there was 
little real difficulty. Through their common agricultural pursuits the 
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Chinese and non-Chinese already shared a common culture and thoss phy-
sical differences that did exist were unlikely to be marked. During 
the western Han period, 206 B.C.-8 A.D., m~litary i 
• expans on brought the 
Chinese culture to the agriculturally limited steppe regions. There 
the differences between the C;hinese and the Barbarians were both physi-
cal and occupational. FUrthermore, the life in the steppe regions was 
not easily altered by adopting the Chinese culture. The base there was 
not agriculture but nomadism. The steppes therefore provided a natural 
barrier for Chinese cultural expansion. 
For the Chinese Government it was essential to maintain a balance 
in the region where the Chinese and steppe cultures interacted. It has 
been suggested that the Great Wall may be considered as, "an effort on 
the part of the state to fix this Frontier and to limit the proper 
field of Chinese activity as well as to exclude the peoples of the 
12 
steppe. II According to this view, the intention was not to overlay 
the steppe culture with the Chinese, but to ensure that the Chinese 
fringe areas did not acquire the steppe culture. The extent to which 
the Chinese culture penetrated beyond the Great Wall depended largely 
on the attitude of the rulers of the non-Chinese regions on the other 
side. If the local rulers were closely allied with the Chinese they 
may have encouraged their subjects to adopt Chinese customs. But this 
was certainly not always the case. 
Following the Manchu conquest of China in 1644, the first Manchu 
emperors discouraged the Sinicisation of the Manchu people in order to 
preserve the Manchu cultural heritage. These efforts were foiled by'; 
the political necessities imposed on the rulers. In the first instance 
h o 13 Th i there occurred a mass exodus of Manchus into C ~na proper. e m -
grants tended to adopt the Chinese customs and culture. Second, there 
were underpopulated areas in Manchurie, notably the Liao-tung plain in 
the south. Chinese colonists were encpuraged to settle there. In ad-
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dition political and criminal exiles were sent to the province from 
China proper. They were Joined by illegal Chinese immigrants. Final~ 
ly, in 1880, Chinese soldiers were sent to safeguard the border from 
the Russians. This continuous stream of Chinese immigrants gradually 
swamped the Manchus. By the-latter nineteenth century the population 
of Manchuria was 14 million of which 80 per cent were Chinese. 14 This 
made the tranformation of Manchuria into a totally Chinese province but 
a question of time. 
There were obvious differences between Manchuria and the steppes •. 
In the former there was rich farmland available ~hereas in the latter 
the arable land was severely limited. Without doubt it was the avail-
ability of land that attracted the majority of Chinese colonists. Fur-
thermore, while Manchu immigrants settled inside the Great Wall a simi-
lar development was unlikely to occur emong the Turkic people. The 
latter could only be 5inicised, therefore, by an influx of Chinese set-
tlers. Although such an influx did occur, it was not sufficiently 
large to affect the Turkic culture. Of the 3,729,000 people in 5in-
15 kiang in 1940-41, only 294,000 or 7.9 per cent were Chinese. Under 
these conditions it was more likely that the Chinese would be Turki-
cised rather than the Turkic people 5inicised. 
All these developments added waight to the theory that the Chinese 
were concerned with keeping the steppe culture out of China and confi-
ning their own influence to within the Great Wall. But as the case of 
Manchuria demonstrated, the Chinese also were willing to expand· their 
cultural frontiers beyond the Grea~Wall. Before 1949 they generally 
appeared to have accepted that the cultural differences between the 
settlers of China and the nomads of the steppes were too great to be 
bridged. This may have been due to the limited arable land available 
in the steppes. As B result the traditional means of Sinicisation, the 
envelopment of a people by Chinese farmers and their culture could not 
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be employed and the traditional Chinese cultural expansion Buffered a 
momentary set-back. 
In 5inkiang the Chinese Government had to content itself with the 
role of nominal ruler. The evidence tended to suggest that both the 
Turkic people and Chinese rulers were reasonably satisfied with this 
sort of relationship. At the top of the administrative structure were 
a Chinese Governor and district Magistrates, all appointed by Peking. 
On the local level the Chinese system of gove~nment relied on the 
native bureaucracy to deal with the administrative duties. 16 These 10-
cal native administrators were indispensable for the Chinese adminis-
tration. Generally the Chinese officials were unable to speak the Tur-
kic languages and kept themselves aloof from the native population. 
The Chinese army stationed in Sinkiang towards the end of the nine-
17 teenth century numbered between 7-8,000 troops. These troops were 
hardly a sufficient number to stave off a determined and united Turkic 
attack. From this lack of military strength it may be concluded also 
that the Chinese rule in Sinkiang did not depend on military might, but 
on a harmonious relationship and the co-ordination of the interests of 
both the Turkic and Chinese bureaucracies. At the same time the com-
bined bureaucracies depended on the benevolence of the local people. 
These were gnerally well-disposed towards Chinese rule so long as the 
Turkic way of life was not interfered with and the tax burden kept at a 
18 d reasonable level. It was not until the twentieth century, un er war-
lord rule, that difficulties arose. During the 1911-49 period land was 
appropriated from the nomads and gi~en to both Turkic and Chinese far-
ming colonists. 19 By using this method the ruling warlord kept the 
people divided and fighting among themselves rather than ·facing the 
ruler as a united group. 
There were some similarities between the policies of imperial Rus-
sia and China. Neither regime attempted to force their culture on the 
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Turkic people in their respective sphere of influence. No doubt both 
desired and fostered the Russification and Sinicisstion processes in 
their respective regions, but neither was inclined to force change. 
One explanation for this phenomenon may be that the rulers of both 
countries were confident that their respective cultures were superior 
to those of the Turkic people. 20 As a result they would have been con-
vinced that in due time the Turkic people too would recognise their 
cultural inferiority and adopt the superior cultures. Such a philoso-
phy made coercion unnecessary and prevented large-scale internal 
strife. This permitt~d both Governments to continue their policies of 
maintaining control o~er t~e regions and preventing the formation of 
united political factions that were opposed to their rule. 
IV:2;ii The attitudes of the central 
Governments after the takeovers 
Following the communist takeovers the attitudes towards the vsri-
ous ethnic groups changed. The ideological view towards the nationali-
ties was that they should merge into one group of closely united peo-
pIe, working for their common interests which were embodied in the 
socialis~ state. It was not expected that the revolution would occur 
in every country of the World simultaneously. According to Marx the 
battle against the bourgeoisie first was to assume a national charac-
ter, with the proletariat of each country dealing with its own bour-
i . 21 geo Sloe. 
World. 
Only gradually would the revolution spread throughout the 
It was the duty of the Communists to ensure t/1at the struggle of 
the individual countries was not divorced from the World-wide movement. 
Marx believed the Communists were the socially most conscious element 
in the workers' movement and subsequently charged them with the task of 
keeping the international aims in sight. Their duty was to steer the 
remainder of the proletariat in the direction of international revolu-
tion. 22 Hence, the communist movement was a international movement 
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transcending all national differences. Although the proletariat had to 
establish itself as a single national group in the first instance 
, Marx 
believed the national antagonisms between the proletariats of different 
countries would disappear completely after the class contradictions had 
23 
been resolved. The unifying bond between the World proletariat was 
to be their common belief in Communism. It remained for the leaders of 
the various national revolutionary movements to overcome the national 
interests of their own groups and maintain proletarian unity. They not 
only had to convince the Party members, but also the working masses 
that they all benefitted from such unity. 
This defined the communist policies towards the various nations 
from the outset. The nations were to be Joined into one. Lenin accep-
ted and promoted this aim. According to him its realisation would 
"end not only the existence of a humanity splintered into small states 
and every isolated nation, not only draw nations together, but also 
24 
amalgamate them." It was this policy of amalgamation that gave rise 
to fundamental problems. The culture that the people living in a pro-
letarian state were to adopt had never been defined. In the multi-
national state this question became especially accute. Lenin adamantly 
opposed attempts to have Russian made the national language of the com-
munist movement and bitterly resented Ordzhonikidze's treatment of a 
Georgian Communist. 25 He did not envisage resolving the cultural ques-
tion by forcing the Russian or any other culture on the other national 
groups. This he associated with great Russian chauvinism and all that 
the Communists opposed. It waS in the rise of internationalism and 
increasing social consciousness among the masses that Lenin foresaw the 
solution of the cultural question. In his opinimn there were "elements 
of democratic and socialist culture" in each nationality's culture. 
These had to be adopted and amalgamated into the" 'International cul-
26 
ture of democracy and of the World-wide workers' movement.'" Which 
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cultural aspects from each nationality were to be adopted was to be 
decided by the socially conscious. As the level of social conscious-
ness among the proletariat rose they too, according to Lenin's theory, 
would be able to distinguish the acceptable and non-acceptable cultural 
elements of each nation. Thpir level of consciousness would prevent 
national sentiments from interfering with the choice of those cultural 
aspects that would benefit the new socialist culture. This theory left 
no room for force. The rising level of social consciousness permitted 
for decisions to be reached amicably, making all force superfluous. 
A major departure from the Leninist attitude came with the rise of 
Stalin. By 1929-30 Stalin not only wanted national cultures to merge 
into one general cultUre in both form and content, but there also was 
to be "one general language." Lenin had opposed lifting one language 
above the others, citing the example of Switzerland where three lan-
27 guages were able to co-exist on equal terms. In his 1913 writing on 
"Marxism and the nationality question" Stalin had depreciated the im-
portance of the language question, dismissing the debate on a common 
28 European language as "jargon~" By 1929-30 he had departed consider-
ably from this view. The reasons for the shift remain obscured. As eo 
many of the policies of Stalin it may have been caused by the desire to 
speed up the transition to Socialism. The change then could have been 
brought about simply by his general impatience. On the other hand, 
stalin well could have been a great Russian chauvinist intent on promo-
ting the Russian culture. 
On the question of a general language the Stalinist polic'y has 
proved to be long-lived. In 1977 it was suggested again that RUBsian 
be made lithe language of international intercourse ll within the Soviet 
Union in all matters pertaining to "the processes of building and 
strengthening Socialism. 1I29 In language, at least, the trend was defi-
nitely towards Rusaification and assimilation. The policy change lent 
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the Soviet nationality policy a distinct assimilative character. The 
different national cultures were no longer to blend together as Lenin 
had envisaged. Instead the new cultUre was to be decreed from above. 
As cultural changes were forced on the people ~t became 
• necessary to 
define the culture that they' were to adopt. In general that culture 
was likely to be that most familiar to those having the political power 
to decree the change. 
Mao's thinking on the new Chinese culture tended to be similar to 
that Df Lenin. Like the latter he too believed that a culture, in this 
case the Chinese, would benefit by absorbing useful aspects from other 
cultures. Similarly Mao believed that the new World culture would be 
formed by linking the new-democratic culture of China with the socia1-
ist and new-democratic cultures of all other nations. 
It {the new-democratic culture of Chin!! links up with 
the socialist and new-democratic cultures of all other na-
tions and they are related in such a way that they can ab-
sorb something from each other and help each other to deve-
lop, together forming a new world culture; but as a revolu-
tionary national culture it can never link up with any reac-
tionary imperialist culture of whatever nation. 3D 
The process envisaged by Mao was not simply one of cultural assi~ 
milation, but the merging of cultures. Only the most progressive ele-
ments from each culture were to be incorporated into the new culture. 
This was to make the new culture even more progressive. The attitude 
of Mao towards the different cultures within China was similar. In 
1944 he suggested that the masses in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border 
region be called upon to struggle against "their own illiteracy, super-
stitions and unhygienic habits." The means for convincing the masses 
31 
to conduct this struggle was to be education at all age levels. This 
did not mean that the communist policy was to encourage the national 
groups to break with their own culture and adopt that of the Han commu-
nists. On the contrary, like Lenin, Mao too intended to encourage the 
cultural developments among the nationalities. The Chinese Communists 
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were to assist the various nationalities in the endeavour to free their 
respective cultures from bourgeois domination and aid local cultural 
32 
development. This was hardly a policy intended to allow the Han-
Chinese to become culturally dominant in the minority regions. It lIIas 
intended to raise the cultural and educational niveau of the minorities 
in an effort to raise their level of social consciousness. After this 
had been achieved Mao had no doubt that the minorities 1II0uld choose the 
socialist rather than the capitalist mode of life. 
Neither the policy of Lenin nor that of Mao permitted cultural as-
similation. Both advocated the merging of cultures and the evolution 
of a totally new World culture. They did not propose the replacing of 
a lIIeaker culture by a stronger, as in the assimilative process. For 
similar reasons integration was not a suitable alternative. It too 
entailed the disappearing of the weaker culture into the stronger. 
Under the communist leadership no culture was to disappear. The new 
World culture was to evolve from all cultures by incorporating featUres 
from each of them. This was hardly possible through either assimila-
tion or integration. It was feasible only through the willingness of 
each cultural group to accept those aspects of each others culture that 
would result in the development of a higher cultural form. This requi-
red an alignment of the various groups of people with the ideals of 
Socialism. Hence, it would appear appropriate to term the policies of 
Lenin and Mao those of politically aligning their respective minority 
people lIIith the political and cultural aims of t~e leadership~ 
Although Stalin's policy' became increasingly assimilative' after 
1928, he also had considered assimilation incompatible with Marxism-
Leninism. In 1928 he IIIrote, "You know of course, that the policy of 
assimilation is undoubtedly excluded from the arsenal of Marxism-Leni-
nism as a anti-national policy, counterrevolutionary and as a ruinous 
33 , h d h' t k By 1929 he was convin-policy." After 1928 Sta11n c ange 19 ac. 
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ced that the Russian culture was the basis of the new socialist cul-
ture. Mao, on the other hand, was not over impressed by the Soviet 
nationality policies. In 1956 he noted, "In the Soviet Union the rela-
tionship between the Russian nationality and the minority nationalities 
is very abnormal; we should draw lessons from this.,,34 This indicated 
that Mao had some misgivings about the Soviet policies of the post-
Stalin era, possibly even about those of Stalin himself. 
There were definite differences and similarities between the cul-
tural policies of the imperial and communist rulers of the two coun-
tries. Under imperial rule assimilation, albeit without force, was the 
desired goal. The Communists, on the other hand, were ideologically 
committed to a policy of political alignment and the evolution of a new 
World culture from all national cultures. The basic prersquisites for 
this policy were patience, flexibility and, above all, their absolute 
confidence in their own cultUral superiority. But the Communists had 
not developed a purely proletarian culture and the old Russian and 
Chinese culture had to be transformed. In their work among the Turkic 
minorities the communist cadres of both countries may have lacked the 
culturai confidence that the imperial governors had. Whils the Soviet 
and Chinese communist culture were both relatively new, that of the 
Turkic people was ancient. Thus it may have been the Turkic people who 
believed themselves culturally superior to the Communists. The atti-
tude towards cultural change also was quite different under Communism. 
Under the imperial rul~rs cultural change had certainly been encour-
aged, but it was not a matter of p~licy. Cultural change under Commu-
nism was not only encouraged, but an intrinsic element of communist 
ideology. It was this ideology that governed the communist attituds 
towards all cultures. 
IV:3 Regional 
integration 
In both Kazakhstan and 5inkiang it was not only a matter of ali9-
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ning the Turkic peopl~ politically. Both regions also had to be devel-
oped economically and integrated into the economy of their respective 
country. Until the people of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang felt themselves a 
part of and actually benefitting from an association with their respec-
tive central Governments it was unlikely that they would willingly ac-
cept Socialism as an alternative. At the same time the economic devel-
opment entailed some immediate difficulties. It not only brought eco-
nomic changes to the regions, but also clashed with the local way of 
life. To avoid alienating the Turkic people due attention had to be 
paid their culture and traditions. The failure to do so could easily 
result in confrontation rather than economic and regional integration. 
Another aspect that played a part in the regional integration of the 
two regions was their respective economic importance to the Soviet 
Union and China. A brief analysis of the transportation and industrial 
developments in the areas will provide some insights into this. 
IV:3;i The development 
of transportation 
Following the bolshevik revolution Kazakhstan, like 5inkiang after 
the communist takeover, was an isolated region. In Sinkiang the exis-
ting trade was limited by the lack of transportation. The former con-
sis ted primarily of luxury items not readily available in the region 
and easily transportable by caravans. The situation in Kazakhstan was 
analogous to that of Sinkiang. The Trans-Siberian railway and its 
branch-line to the Fergana valley skirted the outer fringes of Kazakh-
·1 1· k 35 stan, leaving the vast interior with no ra1 1n s. While the Turk-
sib railway, constructed in 1929-31, linked the south-eastern border of 
Kazakhstan to the existing line, the interior region continued to 
depend on caravan tracks. It was not until 1940-53 that the railway 
system was again extended on a large scale. 
Railway and road construction 
in Kazakhstan36 
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-Year Railways Roads 
Kilometers Increase as Kilometers Percentage 
percentage of with hard 
1960 total surface 
1913 2,081 18.1 nd nd 
1928 3,480 12.2 nd nd 
1932 5,186 
-14.9 nd nd 
1937 5,223 00.3 nd nd 
1940 6,581 11.8 106,600 (105,700) 1.4 (1.0) 
1945 8,212 14.2 108,900 1.4 
1950 8,407 01.7 108,700 2.1 
1953 9,449 09.1 108,100 2.6 
1954 9,467 00.2 108,100 2.8 
1955 9,473 00.1 108,100 3.3 
1956 9,580 00.9 108,500 4.2 
1960 11 ,471 
..lli§. 107,400 (107,400) nd (10.1) 
Total 100.0 
(Figures in brackets are from 1968 source.) 
These figures cannot be used as accurate indicators--the discrep-
ancies in the two sources used indicated that there were inaccuracies.· 
Nevertheless, they did indicate a general trend in railway building in 
Kazakhstan. According to this there were three periods of considerable 
activity; 1928-32, the building of the Turksib, 1940-53, the relocation 
and development of industry in Kazakhstan and 1956-60, the Virgin Lands 
Campaign and continued industrial development. There was no great 
increase in road construction. Instead the emphasis was placed on 
improving the existing roads. 
Whereas the Trans-Siberian railway had provided a link between 
Kazakhstan and the heartland since the nineteenth century, there was 
only a caravan track linking China proper with Sinkiang. In 1943 the 
Kuomintang Minister of Communicati~ns, Chang Kia~ngau, planneq to con-
struct a railway from Tienshui to Lanchow and Lanchow to Sinkiang.
37 
But these plans did not come to fruition until after the Communists 
took over. Consequently the region was left to depend entirely on road 
transportation until the Lanchow-Urumchi line reached Sinkiang. 
In the early 1950's the transportation of the region itself was 
dependent on draught animals. 38 This made it less surprising that the 
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Chinese Government paid greater attention to the repair and construc-
tion of roads than to the building of railways. While the entire 
length of the Lanchow-Urumchi railway, had it been completed to the 
Soviet border, would have been approximately 3,470 kilometers,39 some 
10,800 kilometers of highwa~was prepared for motor vehicle traffic. 
In 1949 only approximately 3,000 kilometers of highway had been open to 
motor traffic.
40 
There appeared to have been no allowance for existing 
caravan tracks in the 1949 figure. In view of the dependency on animal 
power these would have been far more important than motor roads. Only 
as motor transport became more important could the motor roads come 
into their own. Nonetheless, their growth did indicate the direction 
of future transportation developments in Sinkiang. 
The development of motor transport in Kazakhstan likely had been 
similar to that of Sinkiang. Initially caravan trecks were transformed 
into motor roads which became less important as the rail network wae 
developed. One important consideration in the building of the major 
railway lines was their strategic significance. Both the Trans-Siberian 
and Lanchow-Urumchi lines facilitated the movement of troops. No doubt 
it was the strategic consideration that determined the route along 
which the two lines were built. They connected major economic and ad-
ministrative centres. Their branch-lines, such as that into the Ferga-
na valley, were built primarily for economic reasons. This indicated 
that the purpose of the main lines was to serve those centres vital for 
strategic, administrative or economic reasons. The internal rail sys-
tem and roads were constructed-as the industrial development in the 
regions themselves or in other regions made them necessary. 
IV:3;ii The development 
of industry 
Initially the internal railway system of Kazakhstan was to facili-
41 
tate the transportation of raw materials to the Urals for processing. 
Thus, the railway building of the inter-war period was not necessarily 
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connected with industrial development in the region itself. To a con-
siderable extent this was reflected in the allocations of investment 
funds to Kazakhstan. 
Investment in three sectors of Kazakhstan 
as percentages of total investment42 
Period All Agriculture Transpor- Totals industry excluding tation 
kolkhozes 
1920-1928 37.5 8.5 13.4 59.4 
1st Five year 
plan 1929-1932 35.1 21.5 20.7 77.3 
2nd Five year 
plan 1933-1937 36.9 13.5 21.6 72.0 
3rd Five year 
plan 1938-1941 36.8 12.2 21.2 70.2 
The war years 
1941-1946 46.3 5.1 15.1 66.5 
4th Five year 
plan 1946-1950 43.6 14.2 11.4 69.2 
5th Five year 
plan 1951-1955 40.4 22.8 10.3 73.5 
1958 37.9 22.8 11.5 72.2 
1959 38.4 22.0 10.3 70.7 
1960 36.3 22.4 8.5 67.2 
1961 34.1 23.9 9.8 67.8 
Until the Second World War the largest proportion of total invest-
ment was allocated to industry arid transportation. The agricultural 
sector remained in the background except in the first five year plan, 
during which there was famine. Throughout the War years and immediate-
ly afterwards the industrial and transportation sectors received more 
than one-half of the total investment. A dramatic change was 'not evi-
dent until the Virgin Lands Campaign beginning with the fifth five year 
plan. From then onward the industrial investme~t declined to the pre-
war level, while agricultural investment increased. Out of this 
investment pattern emerged the general economic development pattern of 
Kazakhstan. Up to the Second World War a considerable proportion of 
investment had been allocated to industry and transportation. During 
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the War the industrial proportion increased aven more, whereas the 
agricultural declined. Although the emphasis on industrial development 
was maintained to the end of Stalin's rule, there was a gradual shift 
towards agriculture from 1946 onward. The investment pattern indicated 
that the economic development of Kazakhstan in anyone of the periods 
was conducted by placing the emphasis on different sectors of the 
economy. 
The primary diffe~ence between the economic development of Kazakh-
stan and 5inkiang was the development of individual sectors in the for-
mer and the whole economy in the latter region. Between 1949-54 the 
economy of China was administered on a regional basis. In the various 
regions--Sinkiang fell within the North-West region along with Kansu, 
Shensi, Tsinghai and Ningsia--the industrial undertakings relied on the 
resources found within each region. 43 Initially Sinkiang w~ cut off 
also from the other four provinces of the north-west. Its economic 
development had to be undertaken independently from China with Whatever 
assistance was available from the Soviet Union. With the introduction 
of the first five year plan in 1954 the regional administration was 
dissolved in favour of central planning. It was not until after 1957 
44 that the control from the centre was relaxed. The lack of efficient 
transport made it dubious that the economy of Sinkiang could have been 
integrated effectively into a centrally planned economy until 1960 when 
the Lanchow-Urumchi railway had been completed. Until then Sinkiang 
had to be largely self-reliant. 
The large population of China made the production of foodstuffs a 
continuous and major concern. Despite the emphasis on industrial 
development after 1949, agricultural development was bound to be of 
primary importance. The initial emphasis on regional development al-
lowed the regional administrators to decide the priorities. In 5in-
kiang these were the food supply for the People's Liberation Army units 
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stationed in the province. By no means did this exclude industrial 
development from the plan of the local administrators. In both 1950 
and 1955 it Was a diversified economy, including the agricultural, 
live-stock raising, heavy and light and oil industries that was to be 
45 developed. This placed th~ emphasis on developing the whole economy 
rather than on individual sectors as in Kazakhstan. To what extent 
this di~ference in the development of the two regions was due to actual 
planning as opposed to differences in the traditional needs of the Rue-
eian and Chinese was difficult to assess. Certainly the Russian empha-
sis on industrial development was a continuation of the imperial poli-
cies, Just as the Chinese emphasis on food supplies was a necessary 
continuation of China's imperial policies. On the basis of this it may 
be argued that the development pattern of both countries had been pre-
ordained, not by the ideological but by the economic and geographic 
conditions. 
The agricultural needs no doubt also had an important effect on 
the policy of reclaiming wasteland. In Sinkiang the PLA units were 
primarily responsible for this work. 
Period 
1949-51 
1949-53 
1949-57 
1949-60 
Wasteland reclaimed by PLA 
Production Corps46 
Total area by 
end of period 
in hectares 
66,667 
133,000 
660,000 
730,000-
Increase in 
hectares 
46,333 
547,000 
70,000 
Increase as 
percentage 
of total in 
1960 
9.1 
6.4 
74.9 
9.6 
.............. 
100.0 
The addition of arable land from 1949-60 was considerable and re-
flected the need for foodstuffs by both the PLA and later the Chinese 
Government. At the same time the reclaimed land could be distributed 
to the landless population. This avoided the need to dispossess the 
the landowners in order to make land available for d" t "b 
re- ~s r~ ution. 
The decrease in land reclamation after 1957 was due to a change in 
Chinese policy. In Sinkiang large-scale reclamation programmes were 
stopped. However the small-scale reclamation that was undertaken by 
individual collectivB farms ~as continued and encouraged. 
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In Kazakhstan the increase in arable land after the Virgin Lands 
Campaign was even greater than in Sinkiang. This development was not 
underteken to make land available for kolkboz or sovkhoz settlements. 
The land was intended to help meet the growing need for foodstuffs in 
the Soviet Union. 
Increases in the sown area of Kazakhstan47 
Year 
1913 
1920 
1940 
1950 
1953 
1955 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
Total sown area 
in hectares 
4,171,600 
3,289,000 
6,808,600 
7,854,300 
9,716,900 
20,628,900 
28,661,500 
27,996,100 
28,561,300 
28,570,400 
Increase/Decrease 
in hectares 
882,600 
3,519,600 
1,045,700 
1,862,600 
10,912,000 
8,032,600 
665,400 
565,200 
9,100 
Increase/Decrease 
as percentage of 
total area in 1951 
14.6 
- 3.1 
12.3 
3.7 
6.5 
38.2 
28.1 
2.3 
2.0 
0.03 
100.03 
The decrease in 1959 indicated that difficulties were encountered 
in keeping newly reclaimed land productive. Such difficulties arose 
for a number of reasons. The failure to fallow the land and poor far-
ming skills resulted in reduced yields and dust-bowls especially after 
1958. 48 These problems were by no,-means confined to Kazakhstan. 80th 
regions were susceptible to dust-bowls. But the Chinese tended to be 
more conscious of the danger. One of the priorities df the provincial 
government of Sinkiang in 1950 was to plant forests and the afforesta-
49 
tion work apparently became an annual task of the PLA. Another dif-
ficulty encountered in both regions was that of alkali soils. The 
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cause of this was the improper irrigation of the land, particularly in-
sufficient drainage as a r~sult of which large quantities of water eva-
porated leaving mineral deposits in the upper layer of the soil. 50 
I 
From 1958 onward efforts w~re made to reverse this trend in Sinkiang. 
One method was to!wash the soil with underground water. In 1960 it was 
claimed that.by means of this process 55,000 hectares of alkali land 
had been.reclaimed. 51 
Despite the drawbacks the large cultivable areas of newly reclai-
med wasteland had definite advantages. Because of the relatively small 
popUlations in the two regions most of the produced foodstuffs could be 
shipped to other regions. : Kazakhstan hardly stood out for its total 
contribution to the Soviet agricultural GNP. Since 1961 the region was 
a consistent third in the USSR, lagging well behind the Ukraine. 
The proportion of agricultural GNP--including 
live-stock--contributed by Kazakhstan and 
the Ukraine and the state purchases of 
wheat from the two regions52 
Years Proportion of GNP as Proportion of total state 
percentage wheat purchases as percentage 
Kazakhstan Ukraine Kazakhstan Ukraine 
1961-65 6.1 23.5 14.9 21.3 
1966-70 6.4 22.7 18.6 16.B 
1971-75 6.5 23.2 18.1 20.7 
It was the amount of wheat that Kazakhstan was able to make avail-
able to the State that made its importance as the second 'bread basket' 
of the USSR more obvious. A similar situation prevailed in the indus-
trial secto~. 
In Sinkiang the situation was similar. The industrial output of 
the province compared to that :of Shanghai province, a major industrial 
region, presented a gloomy picture. 
Gross value of industrial output of Sinkiang 
and Shanghai provinces in millions of 
. 53 yuan in 1952 constant pr1ces 
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1949 1952 1957 1965 1968 1970 1972 
Sinkiang B1 169 446 636 746 1,182 1,701 Shanghai 3,337 6,523 12,969 27,1 B3 33,163 43,493 51,893 
5inkiang as a 
percentage of 
Shanghai 2.4 2.6 3.4 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.3 . 
The industrial output of Sinkiang compared to that of Shanghai was 
hardly impressive. Yet as a producer of same key products its signifi-
cance increased dramatically. In 1961 the north-west accounted for 9.5 
per cent of the Chinese ingot steel output, mast of which apparently 
came from the iron and steel works at Payi and Hami in Sinkiang. 54 
Although this figure represented under one-tenth of the total steel 
output, mast of the steel from the north-west could be shipped to other 
regions. In this way the region contributed substantially to the nati-
anal economy. The industrial contribution of Kazakhstan to the natio-
nal economy was also considerable. 
The contribution of Kazakhstan to the national 
industrial productirin in aelected sectors 
. as percentages of total production55 
Product 1940 1960 1965 1966 1967 
Cast iron 0.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 
Steel 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 
Iran are 5.5 9.2 9.8 9.9 
Coal 4.2 6.4 7.9 8.2 8.5 
Cement 4.8 5.6 5.6 5.5 
Animal fats 5.4 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.8 
Meat 6.5 6.3 7.B 5.6 6.B 
196B 
2.2 
1.3 
10.0 
8.9 
5.5 
4.2 
7.2 
While these contributions to the Soviet economy were SUbstantial 
there were other areas in !whIch Kazakhstan and Central Asia were of 
even greater significance. The entire region accounted for 20 to 100 
per cent of Soviet copper, strontium, antimony, mercury, cadmium, lead 
and tungsten, 48.3 per cent of sodium sulphate, 25.4 per cent of iodine, 
35.8 per cent of bromine, 7.6 per cent of sulphur, 33 per cent of phos-
phorite, 90 per cent of raw cotton, 57 per cent of Karakul, 16 per cent 
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of wool and 12 per cent of fruit. 56 Central Asia and Kazakhstan were 
indispenslble therefore as the suppliers of some raw materials. 
While Kazakhstan was acknowledged as the chief Soviet base for 
57 
non-ferrous metals, the Soviet source gave no indication as to what 
proportion of the total needs were actually met by the region. In the 
production of rolled non-ferrous metals the Soviet figures accorded 
Kazakhstan a very modest role in comparison to the other republics. 
Its proportion of the total production fell from 0.7 per cent in 1952 
to 0.6 per cent in 1958 and remained at that figure until 1962.58 
Although other regions no doubt produced more non-ferrous metal pro-
ducts, Kazakhstan was the primary source of raw materials. Figures for 
this tended to be omitted in the Soviet sources. Perhaps this was an 
attempt to disguise the real economic importance of the repUblic. A 
non-Soviet source indicated that Kazakhstan stood out as the primary 
source for chrome, vanadium and cop~er in addition to other non-ferrous 
59 
metals. The region was also second in the production of raw wool in 
the USSR. Only the RSFSR produced more, but as the figures indicated 
the production of Kazakhstan was increasing steadily. 
USSR 
RSFSR 
Kazakhstan 
Raw wool clipped in thousands of tons and 
as percentage of total for USSR60 
1953 1958 1960 
234.9 321.8 356.8 
121.4 (51 .7) 159.8 (49.7) 178.7 (50.1 ) 
37.2 (15.8) 57.8 (18.0) 65.3 (18.3) 
(Figures in brackets are percentages of total 
1962 
371.4 
185.1 (50.0) 
74.9 (20.2) 
production) 
Many of the mineral resources located in Kazakhstan and central 
Asia were to be found also in Sinkiang. The live-stock industry of the 
province not only provided meat and animal fats, but was also the most 
61 important source of raw wool for the Chinese woollens industry. In 
addition the cotton and textiles of the province supplied the textile 
mills of the southern provinces, while gold and oil too were located in 
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Sinkiang. In 1958 the production of gold was increased to 24,000 oun-
ces per year and 200,000 tons of oil were allocated to other provin-
62 
ces. 
Hence, both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were industrial and agricul-
tural regions from which large proportions of raw and semi-processed 
goods were channeled into the economies of their respective states. 
Their economic development not only fostered the development of the 
primary industry of the two regions, but provided already existing in-
dustrial centres with a new source of raw materials. The economic de-
velopment effectively integrated Kazakhstan and Sinkiang into the cen~ 
tral economies of their respective states. 
These developments were by no means negative. 80th regions bene-
fitted from increased development and modernisation. Furthermore, the 
improved transportation facilities resulted in reduced prices for some 
foodstuffs. Before the Lanchow-Urumchi railway was constructed the 
food price indices for August 1951--using December 1950 as 100--were; 
245.4 in Urumchi, 213.9 in Lanchow, 154.8 in Sinning, 115.7 in Ning-
63 
chuen and 103.1 in Sian. The indices demonstrated that the further 
the city was removed from a railway line the greater the increase was 
in the price of food. The completion of the railway link therefore 
should have substantially reduced the prices of some foods in Sinkiang. 
At the same time there were reasons to be wary of the new develop-
ments in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. The larger agricultural areas 
and large-scale industrial enterprises required greater quantities of 
. 
water, perhaps the most limiteo comodity in the regions. In both the 
run off from the melting snow-caps and, to some extent, rainfall provi-
ded limited supplies of water for agriculture and industry. If the 
requirements were in excess of the run off, they had to be met from the 
ground water supply. This was the case in Soviet central Asia. By the 
mid-1950's the level of the Caspian Sea had fallen to nearly 2.5 meters 
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below its long-term level." One Soviet resp t 1 
• onse 0 appea s to replenish 
the Caspian consisted of an economic comparison weighing the advantages 
of using the same amount of water to irrigate land. Th e argument was 
presented as a choice between "more than 40 million tons of wheat and 
1-1.5 million tons of meat--on the one hand and 0.2 million tons of 
Caspian fish-on the other,."64 In the debate on water the ecology and 
the diminishing ground water table did not seem particularly important. 
Soviet discussions of the late-1960's continued to emphasise increasing 
the water available for use. In Central Asia one solution envisaged 
diverting water from the Yenisey and Ob rivers to agricultural and in-
dustrial regions. 65 There were no suggestions for limiting the use of 
water, only for increasing the amount for use. 
The official concern in Sinkiang was similar to that in Kazakh-
stan. It was directed towards improving the use of water by increasing 
its flow to the land and to industry, and storing it in newly built 
reservoirs. 66 This attitude, which was displayed by both Governments, 
only could result in a reduction of the water table. Given the limited 
rainfall and run off its replenishment would take a very long time. 
But without water neither industry nor agriculture could be sustained. 
In both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang it thereFore may not be a case of 
achieving a high level of economic development, but one of achieving a 
level of development that can be maintained without the danger of over-
exploiting the natural resources. 
The ecological problems were by no means obVious in the 1950's and 
. 
they may not have been perceived as problems by the indigenous people 
even after that date. Nonetheless, they will have to be dealt with in 
the future. Some aspects of the increased economic development and 
regional integration that the indigenous people became keenly aware of 
were the influx of non-turkic people, the destrucion of their tradi~ 
tiona 1 way of life and the exploitation of the natural resources. 
IV:4 Turkic cadres on 
the local level 
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One difficulty raised by the increased level of development was 
that :of work allocations to Turk~c cadres. Th 
• ose of the local popula-
tion who had been trained as cadres no doubt expected to be put into 
responsible administrative posts. In addition the increasing number of 
local graduates also expected an opportunity to supervise or work in 
their areas of specialisation. If these hopes were disappointed and 
Russian and Han cadres appointed to supervisory posts, the local cadres 
were unlikely to be particularly well-disposed towards non-Turkic 
cadres. These flames of discontentment would have been fanned if in 
addition the non-Turkic cadres displayed attitudes that could be inter-
preted as great nation chauvinism. 
The difficulties that arose were not confined to the local level. 
In the governmental and party structures as well as the local work, 
Russian and Han cadres dominated the leading positions. As long as the 
indigenous people were badly educated this state of affairs could be 
justified. But the argument was limited to the earliest periods of 
development and became increasingly weaker as trained local cadres 
became available. Then the indigenous people had good cause for dis-
contentment if they were being overlooked for important positions. 
IV:4;i Leadership positions in the 
government and party structures 
From the appointments of Chairman and Vice-chairman of the provin-
cial government in 5ihkiang there emerged some remarkable ethnic con-
sistancies. In the '949-55 period -Burhan was Chairman and Kad Chin-
ch'un, of the First Field Army, and 5aifudin were Vice-chairmen. 5ai-
fudin became Chairman in 1955, while the First Field Army continued to 
be represented by Kao Chin-ch'un and Hsin Lan-t'ing as Vice-chairmen. 
From 1958 onward only the latter served in this post. After the elec-
tion of 1954 local people were appointed as Vice-chairmen also, three 
in 1955, two in 1958 and three in 1965. The question that arose from 
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this concerned the political functions that the local people performed 
rather than their numbers. 
What well may have been the two most important posts in the pro-
vincial administration, the Chairman of the Financial and Economic 
Committee and the Director of the Commercial Department, were filled by 
Chinese First Field Army personnel. Similarly Burhan was the Chairman 
of the 5inkiang CCP and Saifudin of the Nationalities Affairs Commit-
tee. These appointments were filled in this way throughout the 1949-
65 period. There were similar developments in the party. The First 
secretary in Sinkiang was always the First Field Army Commander and 
only in the 1952-65 period was Saifudin appointed as one of the secre-
taries. He remained the only non-Chinese in the secretariat through-
67 
out the 1949-65 period. This indicated that both the provincial 
government and party structures were controlled by Chinese or those 
natives who were loyal to Peking. 
In Kazakhstan the developments were similar. Between 1955-72 the 
native proportion in the party secretariat, central committee depart-
ments, pres~dium of the council of ministers and all leading adminis-
trative posts was below 50 per cent. Only among the general members of 
the council of ministers did the indigenous population constitute 50-
68 74 per cent of all representatives. A comparison of the staffing of 
leading governmental and party positions in the two regions indicated 
that there were some similarities. 
The percentage of natives of the total rumber of 
occupants of leading government and party 
posts in Sinkrang (1949-1965) and 
Kazakhstan (1955-1972)69 
Posts 
(Sinkiang/Kazakhstan) 
Per cent of all 
holders in 5in-
Kiang that were 
Per cent of all 
holders in Ka-
zakhstan that 
were natives natives 
Provincial/Republican Government 
Chairman 
Vice-chairmen/Deputy chairmen 
100.0 
55.0 
100.0 
43.7 
Table continued 
Posts 
(Sinkiang/Kazakhstan Per cent of all holders in Sin-
kiang that were 
natives 
Per cent of all 
holders in Ka-
zakhstan that 
were natives 
Chm. of Fin. & Eco. 
Gosplan 
Provincial/Republican Government (cont.) 
Comm./Chm. of 
Dir. of Consumer Dept./Chm. of 
Sovnarkhoz 
Dir. of cultural & ed. Dept./ 
Culture & ed. combined 
Dir. of Civil affairs 
Averaged percentages 
of natives 
00.0 
00.0 
66.7 
100.0 
53.6 
Party structure 
20.0 
50.0 
100.0 
33.0 
57.8 
33.0 
29.5 
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1st Secretary 
Secretaries/cc Secretariat 
Dir. of Propaganda 
00.0 
13.6 
00.0 100.0 (Dept. 
Dir. of Work/Organisation of 
party work 
Dir. of cult. aff. & ed. dept./ 
Culture 
Dir. of organisation dept./ 
Organisation Sect. 
Dir. of rural work dept./ 
Agricultural Sect. 
Dir. of Fin. & Trade dept. 
Dir. of Pol. & Legal dept./ 
Party state control Sect. 
Averaged percentages 
of natives 
00.0 
50.0 
00.0 
100.0 
00.0 
100.0 
29.3 
of pro-
paganda 
od.o) 
20.0 
100.0 
00.0 
40.0 
NA 
00.0 
40.3 
In both regions key posts_related to finance, trade, policy making 
and planning were dominated by non-natives, while culture and education 
were largely filled by natives. An interesting departure from the 
Soviet model was the Chinese tendency to put natives in charge of in-
ternal security and legal affairs in both the governmental and party 
structures. Perhaps the Chinese leadership considered itself more 
secure in Sinkiang because of the PLA troops stationed there than the 
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Russians thought their position to be in Kazakhstan. But while the 
average proportion of Turkic people in the governments of the two 
regions were very nearly equal, those of the two party organisati6ns 
differed markedly, falling well behind those of both governments. This 
was an indication no doubt that both the political and party organs 
were dominated by Russians and Chinese and that they rather than the 
Turkic people were in control. In the Chinese case, where the time 
that had elapsed since the revolution was short, this might have been 
expected. This was not the case in the Soviet Union. There the Rus-
sian predominance pointed to other problems, possibly even a policy of 
outright political domination~ 
IV:4;ii Education as a factor in the 
employment of Turkic cadres 
It could be argued that the low proportion of Turkic cadres in 
governmental and party work was the result of a lack of qualified na-
tive recruits. While this argument was not totally unfounded it was 
not entirely correct, especially in Kazakhstan. In the 1960-61 school 
year the number of Kazakh students in the higher educational establish-
ments of Kazakhstan approached that of the Russian students. 
Enrollment in the higher educational establishments 
of Kazakhstan in 1960-61 70 
Kazakhs 
Russians 
Total 
31 ,351 
34,039 
Per cent 
of total 
enrollment 
40.6 
44.1 
Per cent 
in day 
courses 
61.8 
50.5 
Per cent Per cent 
in evening in correspnd. 
courses courses 
01.7 36.5 
05.6 43.9 
This near equality in tha number of stUdents was not reflected in 
either the number of Kazakh cadres working in Kazakhstan or in those 
having higher educational qualifications. Between 1959 and 1966 the 
d 4 2 cent of the ye arly totals, while their Rus-Kazakhs average 2. per 
sian counterparts averaged 53.8 per cent. Even more remarkably, the 
range of fluctuation in the yearly percentages was only 2.2 per cent 
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for the Kazakhs and 1.9 per cent for the Russians. 71 A similar consis-
tancy appeared in the number of Kazakh scientific workers in Kazakhstan 
between '950-60. 
Kazakh scientific workers in 1950_6072 
Number of scientific workers in 
Kazakhstan 
Number of Kazakh scientific workers as 
number and (per cent) of total 
Nuber of Kazakh Dr. of Science as 
number and (per cent) of Kazakh scien-
tific workers 
Number of Kazakh Candidates of Science 
as number and (per cent) of Kazakh 
scientific workers 
1950 
3,305 
739 (22.4) 
19 (2.6) 
181 (24.5) 
• # • '-
1960 
9,623 
2,290 (23.8) 
42 (1.8) 
597 (26.1) 
Here too the range of total fluctuation for the Kazakh personnel 
was very slight, only 1.4 per cent. However, the number of Kazakhs who 
had a Doctorate of Science degree declined in proportion to the total 
number of Kazakh scientists. At the same time the number of Candidates 
of Science increased. It was the consistency in the 1950-66 period 
that was most ramarkable. Throughout the sixteen years the number of 
Kazakh scientific workers always represented 22.4-25.8 per cent of the 
total number of scientific workers in Kazakhstan. This extremely limi-
ted fluctuation suggested that the figures may have been tampered with 
or that the number of Kazakh cadres was increased artificially to main-
tain their proportion of the total. To some extent these suspicions 
were supported by the figures themselves. Their consistency simply did 
not make sense against the background of events in Kazakhstan: First, 
the large influx of non-Turkic people in the 1950-60 period should have 
produced a marked fluctuation. However the figures remained stable. 
Second, this stability should have been reflected also in the school 
pattern of Kazakhstan. This too was not the cass. The figures for the 
primary school attendance suggested that ths proportion of students 
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that went beyond the seven~h grade was very low compared to the total 
enrollment. 
Total enrollment in primary, seven year, eight 
year and middle schools of Kazakhstan 
in thousands73 
Although these figures did not indicate the number of pupils that 
went on to higher educational institutions, they did suggest that the 
number qualified to do so was unlikely to be very large. The loss of 
pupils after the fourth grade was striking. Only the years 1953-54 and 
1955-56 were exceptions. This no doubt was due largely to the influx 
of people during the Virgin Lands Campaign. It was possible only to 
guess at the reasons for the reduction in the number of pupils after 
the fourth grade. The Turkic people may have withdrawn their children, 
particularly the girls, aFter they had received the traditional five or 
six years of formal education. On the other hand the failure rates in 
the first four grades may have been enonmous, causing the numbers in 
them to rise. But certainly for one reason or another a large propor-
tion of the children in Kazakn§tan did not go beyond, more correctly 
far beyond, the fourth grade even in the 1961-62 school year. This 
made it extremely unlikely that the proportion of Kazakh scientific 
workers and those with higher educational qualifications could have 
been as constant as the statistics showed them to be. 
It was not possible to present a similar analysis for the 1949-60 
period in Sinkiang, as the figures were lacking and the educational 
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system had not had sUfficient time to tral.'n th e necessary cadres in any 
case. By 1960 those advances that had been d t rna e hrough the formal 
educational system were insignificant by comparison to the total number 
of cadres required in the province. 
Enrollment in th~ educational institutions 
of Sinkiang in 196074 
Institutions 
Sinkiang University 
Eight institutes of higher 
learning 
250 middle and secondary 
technical schools 
Primary schools 
Total 
Total number of students 
including Han-Chinese 
1,000 
5,000 
130,000 
950,000 
1,086,000 
The largest number of students were obviously still acquiring 
their primary and secondary educations. In the meantime the Han and 
PLA cadres were relied upon mainly to fill top level administrative 
posts. At the same time the various cadre institutions and the PLA did 
train local cadres, but the level of training they received did not 
prepare them for top level posts. It has been noted already that most 
of the Turkic cedres were trained over the period of a few months in 
what were little more than introductory courses on the new politics of 
China. This not only made the qualifications of these cadres suspect, 
but also called into question the value of the training programme and, 
above all, the loyalty of those who had been trained. 
The Central Nationalitie& Institute in Peking trained both Han and 
minority nationality cadres. The latter were encouraged to practice 
75 
their cultural traditions while attending the institute. This policy 
not only was consistent with the Government nationality programme, but 
also permitted Han stUdents the opportunity to acquaint themselves 
with some aspects of the Turkic and other cultures. However, this 
lenient attitude towards the cultures of the minorities also may have 
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given minority students the impression that their cultural traditions 
did not have to change under communist rule. If this attitude was pre-
sent and perhaps even wide-spread among the Turkl.'c cadres it limited 
their usefulness in both leading positions and the work related to the 
transformation of the Turkic'people in general. Furthermore, the very 
loyalty of those displaying this sort of attitude would have been in 
doubt~ To some extent it may have been precisely this problem that was 
illustrated by the number of graduates from the cadre institutions of 
Sinkiang who Joined the CCP and NDYL. 
Graduates who Joined the CCP and 
NDYL after graduating76 
Institutions 
Junior Department of 
the cadre institute 
of the Sinkiang Sub-
Bureau of the CCP 
North-west Institute 
of Nationalities 
(Year or period) 
and total number 
of graduates 
(1951 ) 
1,044 
(1950-54) 
2,573 
Number and (percentage) of 
those who joined 
CCP NDYL 
77 (7.4) 726 (69.5) 
68 (2.6) 338 (13.1) 
These figures were far too limited to allow hard and fast conclu-
sions to be drawn from them. Nevertheless, those for the North-west 
Institute of Nationalities suggested that in the 1950-54 period rela-
tively few cadres joined either the CCP or NDYL. To some extent this 
cast doubt on their commitment to both Communism an~ the Party. In ad-
ditlon these doubts made the ability of these cadres to convince the 
Turklc people of the advantages of Communism equally dubious. 
Another problem the Chinese faced was related to the number of 
Turkic people available for training. It was difficult to project 
whether the Chinese were more successful in their educational endea-
vours in Sinkiang than the Russians had been in Kazakhstan. In 1951 
the number of minority children in the schools of north-west China was 
given as 3,000. 77 The total primary school enrollment of the north-
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west in 1954 was 430,000, while the number of children of herdsmen en-
rolled in the mobile schools was claimed to have been over 46,000. 78 A 
report of 1953 claimed that the 1951 figure had increased by 60 per 
cent. 79 As the 1951 figure was rather low for the entire north-west it 
was conceivable that it had resulted from an error. Certainly a figure 
, 
of approxim~tely 30,000 minority students would seem more appropriate. 
On the basis of this figure and the 60 per cent increase in 1953 a mi-
nority enrollment of 48,000 would have been reached by the latter date. 
This figure was more compatible with the claimed 46,000 children of the 
1954 report. These figures still failed to account for the sedentary 
population. In 1960 the total enrollment in the intermediate and pri-
mary schools of 5inkiang was 950,000, while its population should have 
80 been apprOXimately 6,251,356. Of this figure the given primary and 
intermediate enrollment represented 15.3 per cent. Without an age dis-
tribution of Sinkiang's popUlation it could not be established whether 
this included all school age children. The 1939 and 1959 figures for 
Kazakhstan provided what may have been a not altogether irrelevant 
comparison. 
Children in Kazakhstan by age as percentages 
of the total population81 
Age group 
0-9 
10-15 
1939 
22.0 
14.0 
1959 
27.8 
08.6 
These figures also represented an abnormal situation. As a result 
I 
of the popUlation losses of the collectivisation, purges and War the 
number of young children were a larger proportion of the total popula-
1 h b It also was not obvious what tion than they normally wou dave een. 
number of children fell into the primary and intermediate school age 
group. Given these distortions the 15.3 per cent figure for Sinkiang 
appeared to represent at least a majority of the school age children. 
The degree to which the traditional Turkic educational attitudes 
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had been superseded by those of the new society did not seem particu-
larly marked in Kazakhstan. For Sinkiang the evidence was insufficient 
for a definite conclusion to be reached. But if Kazakhstan could be 
taken as a general indicator for the Turki 1 th in c peop e e advances made 
the schools of both region~ ~hould have been approximately the same. 
Thus, the supply of qualified Tu~kic people who could be recruited for 
cadre training may have been limited not for the lack of educational 
facilities alone, but also because of the continuation of the traditi-
anal practices. 
IV:5 Changes in the social 
and cultural traditions 
After their respective takeovers both Governments had made promi-
ses to safeguard the cultures of their minorities. These promises may 
have been a double edged sword. Because of them the Turkic people ex-
pected their cultural traditions to be respected, while the Communists 
were committed to cultural change. Consequently, it had to be expected 
that the Turkic people would resist cultural changes for these reasons 
and also because of the natural resistance within a society towards 
cultural change. 
It could not be denied that considerable cultural change had taken 
place in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. However these changes did not 
necessarily involve the replacing of the Turkic traditions with those 
of the new society. In some cases they were no more than the moderni-
sation of the Turkic culture and a readjustment of the values of the 
new society. 
IV:5;i Agriculture and 
live-stock raising 
In both countries one of the primary concerns after the takeovers 
was the reorganisation and communalisation of agriculture and animal 
husbandry. According to the statistics, the collectivisation of agri-
82 
culture in Kazakhstan was completed within approximately five years. 
In Sinkiang the collectivisationproceeded more gradually, especially in 
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the live-stock regions. 
According to the plan of October 1955 agricultural producer co-
operatives in Sinkiang were to have increased from 1,700 to 5,100 by 
1956, bringing a total of 17 per cent of all peasant households into 
the co-operative movament. 8y 1957 the proportion of peasant house-
holds in co-operatives was to have been 36 per cent and 85 per cent by 
1960. The plan was revisad upward in December 1955. The new plan en-
visaged 41 per cent of peasant households to be co-operativised by 1957 
and 92 per cent by 1959. 83 Among the live-stock herders this gradual 
co-operativisation process was to be still more gradual. Even by mid-
1957 only approximately 20 per cent of the pastoral Mongol, Kazakh, 
Kolkoz, Tadjik, Yuku and Solon households had joined co-operatives. 84 
But not on~y was the co-operativisation to be gradual, the process it-
self was hardly comparable to the full-scale collectivisation movement 
of the Soviet Union. 
A CCP Central Committee directive published in 1957 permitted 
those who Joined co-operatives to continue raising privately owned 
live-stock and engage in small-scale private enterprise. In addition 
special allocations of live-stock were to be made to Mongol herdsmen to 
meet their requirements of meat, milk and animal transport, while the 
Uighurs were permitted larger orchards so that their private production 
of nruit could continue. 85 This co-operative movement was far removed 
from Stalin's collectivisation and it may have been specifically in ten-
ded to avoid both the lossas of live-stock and the local opposition 
that the latter had aroused in-Kazakhstan. At the same time co-opera~ 
tivisation based on the Chinese programme fitted in well with the local 
traditions. 
In neither Kazakhstan nor Sinkiang was mutual-aid a new concept 
that had been introduced by the Communists. Oases agriculture had 
always demanded communal ~ork. The irrigation ditches were dug by all 
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those engaged in agricultu~e and water rights were subsequently shared 
out in accordance with the labour each person had contributed. Only 
the underground irrigation channels or ~ tended to be financed by 
the wealthy landlords. These then rented the water to the peasants for 
a share of their crops. The· expenses of digging the ~ combined 
with the risks of not. striking water made them Undertakings that few 
. 86 
peasant communities were able to afford. Among the live-stock her-
ders the communal spirit prevailed also and live-stock herding was a 
group undertaking. This may have resulted from the geographic condi-
tions of the regions. The nomads traversed considerable distances and 
the movement of live-stock demanded a reasonable supply of labour. At 
the same time the larger number of people provided some protection from 
raiders. 
Amo~g the Turkic people these conditions made mutual-aid a neces-
sity of daily life. But there was a crucial difference between their 
concept and that of the Communists. In the terminology of the latter 
it meant a permanent union whereas the Turkic people joined together 
for specific tasks or during particular seasons. To some extent this 
character of mutual-aid was accepted by the two regimes. In 1954 it 
was noted that of the more than 50,000 mutual-aid and co-operative or-
ganisations in Sinkiang only 5 per cent of the mutual-aid teams were 
t . t· B7 permanen organ1sa 10ns. This tended to indicate that the tradition-
al joining together of the Turkic people simply had been given a new 
name. 
Until the establishing br-the 451 people's communes in 1958 the 
Chinese agricultural policy in Sinkieng met with little resistance. 
The primary reason for this was no doubt that the changes which had 
been implemented did not affect the traditional practices to any great 
extent. The mutual-aid teams and co-operatives had not affected pri-
vate property. But the communes did, and both they and the communalisa-
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tion of the land and live-stock were opposed. SS The difficulties that 
resulted from this resistance must have affected production considerab-
ly. This was indicated by the reallocation of some of the communal 
lands to their former owners for private use during the reorganisation 
of the communes in 1959. The reorganisation also permitted a more 
flexible policy in the commune administration. One commune In the 
Urumchi hsien consisted of two groups, the settled farmers and herda-
men. Each group concentrated on its own activities and catered to the 
S9 
needs of the other group. While the farmers grew fodder the herdsmen 
continued herding the animals. Except for the fact that both groups 
were organised in a single commune there seemed to have been~little 
change in their traditional way of life and the nomads continued 
roaming as before. 
A similar pattern had emerged in Kazakhstan after the collectivi-
sation. The live-stock herders continued to graze the kolkhoz herds by 
moving them from one seasonal pasture to another. One kolkhoz engaged 
in live-stock herding was "Bel'bazar." It consisted of 116 households 
of which all but 15 were Kazakhs. Of these 15 households 13 were Azer-
baidzhanis and 2--the assistant manager and carpenter--Russians. The 
cattle drives of the kolkhoz were carried on over four seasons snd 
covered distances of 100 kilometers or more. 90 These examples indica-
ted that the traditional nomadic herding patterns had continued both in 
Kazakhstan and Sinkiang and that the lives of the nomads remained much 
as they had been before the takeovers. The one difference under commu-
nist rule was that instead of being organised in clans as before the 
't 91 herders now were a part of the kolkhoz un1 • Many of these develop-
ments were the result of necessity rather than nomadic opposition to 
change. Although there was a need to pacify the indigenous population 
it was necessary also to employ the live-stock herders and maintain the 
herds. The traditional herders were no doubt the best suited for this 
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task. furthermore, geographic conditions determined the form of live-
stock herding in the regions. The grazing grounds were limited and 
this necessitated the movement from one grazing ground to another. 
Hence the climatic conditions had made nomadism necessary and this 
climatic necessi ty continued under communist rule. The lives of the 
Turkic herders were modernised to some extent no doubt by improvements 
in feeding and liue-stock rearing techniques and generally by improve-
ments in their domestic living conditions. In addition there was a 
greater opportunity to settle permanently in kolkhoz settlements. The 
number that did so could not be determined. 
IV:5;ii Cultural 
changes 
Just as the kolkhoz did not end the wandering of the live-stock 
herders, so it did not end the adherence to their traditional customs. 
On the contrary, it may have perpetuated the latter. The Kazakhs of 
the IIBel'bazar" kolkhoz all belonged to one kinship group of the old 
horde. It was noted also that the conditions were similar in other 
kolkhozes. There too the total Kazakh membership consisted of a single 
kinship group. Having e single Kazakh clan as the largest single mem-
bership group of a kolkhoz may have prevented the intermingling of the 
Kazakhs with the other nationalities and the cultural exchanges that 
would have resulted from this intermingling. In "Bel'bazar ll it was 
noted that in 1950 the traditional Kazakh family and marriage customs 
continued, including; searching out a bride among different kin in 
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another kolkhoz, the bride price and polygamy. . It also was not only 
a matter of the Kazakhs of IIBel'bezar ll clinging to their own cultural 
traditions. That they continued to do so was evidence that their spi-
rit of internationalism had not been raised appreciably. This was par-
ticularly evident from the number of international marriages. By the 
late-1930's the intermarriages among the Kazakhs were the lowest among 
the Turkic people of Soviet Central Asia. 
Thei intermarriages of the titular nationality of 
eBch republic in 1936 as percentages of the 
tota~ number of marriages entered into 
by each sex93 
i 
Republic and 
nationality 
Kazakhstan--Kazakhs 
Uzbekistan--Uzbeks 
Kirghizia--Kirghiz 
Turkestan--Turkmen 
Tadjikistan--Tadjiks 
lntermarriages 
as percentage 
of " all mar-
riages 
2.8 
4.8 
3.5 
3.6 
6.8 
Intermarriages 
into by 
Men 
4.8 
6.3 
4.4 
6.0 
9.2 
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entered 
Women 
0.8 
3.3 
2.5 
1 .1 
4.2 
On the basis of this data little could be said about the nature of 
the intermarriages themselves, except that men were more likely to en-
ter into them than women. There was no indication of the number of 
marriages between Turkic and non-Turkic people, or more precisely, 
between Turkic people and Russians. The existence of intermarriages 
generally suggested that they should have occurred also between the 
Turkic and Russian people. These appeared to have been rare. This was 
especially the case for intermarriages between Russian men and Turkic 
women. Mixed marriages in Central Asia tended to be primarily between 
Muslims, either within the Turkic group or between Turkic Muslims and 
non-Turkic Muslims such as Arabs. Of 82 mixed marriages with Arabs 
between 1936-38 only one was between a Turkic man and Arab woman and 
94 
only one between a Arab man and Russian woman. Generally this pat-
tern seems to have continued. Even in the 1960's mixed marriages in-
volving Russian and Turkic people from among the urban population of 
Frunze were not particularly n~merous. Those between Russian men and 
Turkic women even less so. 
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Intermarriages registered in Frunze 
Year 
1927 
1936 
1960 
1963 
Turkic men to 
Russian women 
10 
12 
68 
78 
Turkic women 
to Russian men 
o 
o 
14 
28 8 
179 
Table continued 
a' . 
The 1963 figure d~d ~ot apply to only Turkic women married 
to Russian men. It 1ncluded also 19 Tatar, 6 Chuvash, 
1 Uzbek and 2 Kirghiz women. 
Thus, even in 1963 few of the mixed marriages entered into in 
Frunze were between Russian men and Turkic women. Of the 28 listed 
only three women were of the local Turkic Muslims. On the basis of 
this it was likely that the 1960 figure included non-Turkic women also. 
I' 
Although marriages between Turkic men and Russian women occurred 
more frequently, they often involved a complete change for the women. 
They tended to live in the aul of their Turkic husbands where they were 
exposed to and gradually adopted the Turkic way of life. Although 
Soviet sources claimed this led to a mixing of cultures this, was not 
always the case. Many of the Turkic customs were adopted by the Rus-
sian women and one of the latter, married to a Kirghiz, quite frankly 
admitted that, II 'in my homeland I live according to my rules, but hara 
I must live according to theirs.' .. 96 This was not to say that the 
Russian women had no efFect on the lives of their Turkic mates. Their 
influence, however, was restricted to the immediate family and involved 
I 
what were rather minor matters like giving their children both Turkic 
d . 97 an Russ1an names. 
From this it may be concluded that the traditional marriage pat-
tern in Kazakhstan and Central Asia had not broken down. Although 
detailed in~ormation was lacking for Sinkiang it seemed reasonable to 
assume that conditions there were similar to those in Kazakhs~an. 
IV:5jiii The status 
of women 
In both regions there have been movements to take women out of the 
home and bring them into the work-force. These endeavours were inten-
ded to provide women with equality and end all sexual discrimination. 
In China the pre-conceived notion was that women in some areas of the 
north-west had not been permitted to work in the fields before the 
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Communists took over. As the Turkic women always had performed a 
great deal of the manual labour this view was qUl.'te erroneous. But the 
arguments were intended primarily to draw more women into the labour 
force available to agriculture and industry. In Sinkiang, as a result 
of the small population, the~e was labour scarcity, while in Kazakhstan 
and in the remainder of the Soviet Union there was a general shortage 
of men. Drawing women into the work-force therefore became essential, 
although the political significance for doing so must not be over-
looked. So long as the women remained confined to their own households 
influencing them politically was far more difficult than it was once 
they had joined the work-force. 
Among the Turkic women, especially among those of the nomads, 
working in the fields or tending the live-stock could not be taken for 
evidence that they had been liberated or that their social values had 
changed. Throughout their history they had done a good deal, if not 
most of the field work or that connected with the live-stock. Soviet 
and Chinese statements claiming that Turkic women were active in such 
duties,99 only indicated that those particular traditions and practi-
ces affecting women had not changed. Evidence of the extent to which 
the local cultural traditions had changed would have been a large num-
ber of women moving upward into high positions for which extensive 
educations and training were required. Such figures were lacking for 
Sinkiang. For Kazakhstan it was possible only to establish a general 
trend based on the total number of women in the work-force, th~ CP of 
Kaza.khstan and those who were -full members of the CC of the CP of 
Kazakhstan. 
.' Women of all· nationalities in the work-force, 
the communist party of Kazakhstan and as 
full members of the central committee 
of the communist garty of 
Kazakhstan1 0 
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Year Women as percentage Womsn as percentage Women as percentage 
of the work-force of total party mem- of full central com-
bership in Kazakh- mUtee members of 
stan the CP of Kazakhstan 
1922 15.0 nd nd 
1933 20.0 nd nd 
1937 nd 12.0 2.4 
1949 nd 19.3 10.6 
1950 39.0 nd nd 
1951 nd 19.1 10.5 
1958 37.0 nd nd 
1961 nd 17.4 11.5 
1970 47.0 nd nd 
1971 nd 19.0 9.9 
Increase-from 
first to last 
statistic in 
each column 32.0 7.0 7.5 
These figures showed that the women were underrepresented in both 
the central committee and the party in comparison to the total propor-
tion of the work-force that they constituted. While these figures did 
not reveal hbw Kazakh women fared it may be possible to calculate a 
general trend. In 1927 Kazakh womsn constituted 2.1 per cent of all 
101 Kazakh party members. Assuming that their membership increased by 
the same proportion as that of the women in the Kazakh CP and the CC of 
the Kazakh CP, they should have constituted approximately 9.1 per cent 
of women party members and 9.6 per cent of the full women CC members of 
Kazakhstan by 1971. Of the 15 full women members of the CC in 1971,102 
this should have given the Kazakh women one, possibly two full members, 
or 0.7-1.3 per cent of the full members of the CC. While this metho-
dology wa.s obviously open to errors it nonetheless allowed a general 
indication. According to this the Kazakh women lagged well behind the 
European women in the top party positions of Kazakhstan. A similar 
trend appeared in education. 
Of the 360,000 women holding higher and middle specialist qualifi-
cations in Kazakhstan in 1967 only 57,000 or 16 per cent were Kazakh 
women. 103 This was a slight improvement over the number of Kazakh wo-
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men enrolled in higher edu~ational institutions in Kazakhstan during 
the 1960-61 school year. Then they numbered 11,195 of a total of 
77,135 students or 14.5 per cent, while Russian women constituted 24.7 
per cent. Of the total 1960-61 enrollment in higher educational insti-
tutions in Kazakhstan women tonstituted 45.8 per cent. In the whole of 
the USSR they accounted for 43.5 per cent of all students in such 
" tOt t" 10l~ l.ns 1. u loons. On the basis of this it may be concluded that the 
ratio of men to women in the higher educational institutions was near-
ing 1:1. This ratio was inconsistent, however, with the number of 
women graduates and suggested either artificially inflated figures or 
an extraordinarily high failure rate. At the same time, while the 
figures showed that Kazakh women made up a considerable proportion of 
the women students in Kazakhstan they continued to lag well behind 
their European-Russian counterparts. Although it was not possible to 
state conclusively that this was the result of lingering cultural tra-
ditions end resistance to change these possibilities could not be ruled 
out entirely. 
IV:5;iv Language 
reforms 
Both central Governments opted for reforming the Turkic languages 
of their respective regions by introducing new scripts. In Soviet 
Central Asi~ and K~zakhstan the latin alphabet was introduced in 1924, 
only to be replaced by the cyrillic in 1939-40. Several suggestions 
have been made for these two changes. One was that the Russians feared 
that the introduction of the latin script in Turkey could make Central 
- - k" 105 
Asia more susceptible to Pan-Tur l.sm. Accoraing to another theory, 
the two changes following one another as they did served to sever the 
Turkic generations linguistically from each other. This in turn per-
mitted for more rapid cultural chenges. 106 Each of these propositions 
k " th h nges However, Stalin's may have been a consideration in rna long e ca. 
determination to make the Russian culture the culture of the USSR would 
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appear to have been the detisive factor. Not only did the cyrillic 
alphabet make the Turkic languages appear closer to the Russian lan-
guage, it also made it unnecessary to learn two alphabets. Further-
more, the written similarities of the two languages no doubt encouraged 
the use of Russian loan word~. From this it followed that the intro-
duction of the cyrillic alphabet was the logical step on the road 
towards Russification. 
The change to the latin alphabet in 1924, however, may have been a 
direct consequence of the internationalist thinking among the Bolshe-
viks. Some supported the use of the latin alphabet for the Russian 
1 107 h . anguage, per aps 1n an effort to establish closer bonds with the 
European proletariat. The fact that the various people of the USSR who 
lacked written languages of their own were given latin scripts also,108 
lent this theory additional weight. 
In China the reasoning concerning the language question was simi-
lar to that in the Soviet Union. In 1956 the Turkic people were to be 
provided with cyrillic scripts, but in 1956 the latin script was adop-
ted instead. 109 At the outset the Chinese too were concerned with pra-
serving the linguistic unity within the worker's states. This attitude 
changed during 1957, perhaps as a result of the Hundred Flowers period 
and the Rectification Campaign that followed. In 1957-58 there were 
demands in Sinkiang for union republics similar to those of the Soviet 
Union. liThe local nationalists use learning from the experience of 
the Soviet Union as a excuse, advocate the establishing of union repub-
.-- - 11 110 lics to oppose the unity of our fatherland. Given this attitude 
among some within the province Peking was unlikely to encourage even 
closer ties with the soviet Union by introducing the cyrillic script. 
No doubt the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship also figured in the 
decision. 
The reforms introduced by Peking were clearly intended to draw the 
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Turkic people closer to the Chinese language. Any resistance to the 
scheme was considered unpatriotic and the scheme itself was based on 
the latin phoneticisation used for Chinese. But the Chinese also left 
little doubt as to their intentions in introducing this particular 
scheme. 
In this way, where language is concerned, a bridge of 
convenience can be built between the Uighur or Kazakh on 
the one hand and the Han and the other peoples using the 
Roman alphabet, on the other. This will promote cultural 
exchange~ and solidarity among the various nationalities.111 
In official pronouncements on the subject it was made quite clear 
that new words and technical terms that were lacking in the Turkic lan-
guages had to be borrowed from the Chinese. 112 This unyielding atti-
tude was a considerable change from the hitherto gradualist policies 
towards cultural changes among the Turkic people. It was unlikely that 
the policy change had come about only out of fear that the Soviet 
influence in Sinkiang could increase. A more likely explanation was 
that it resulted from the revelation of the Hundred Flowers period and 
the Rectification Campaign. During these it had become obvious that 
the gradualist policy had not achieved the transformation of the minor-
ities. Worse still, the R~ctification Campaign revealed that in Sin-
kiang there existed considbrable dislike if not actual hostility for 
the Chinese people. These reactions made it essential to draw the Tur-
kic people closer to the Han-Chinese and, as in the Soviet case, lan-
guage was the obvious tool. 
Among the Turkic people the language reforms resulted in even 
greater dislike for the Russians and Chinese. The indigenous people of 
Sinkiang refused to learn Chinese, while the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan 
. . 113 
refused to learn Russ~an. Such resistance could only be limited in 
its duration. The children in schools were taught in the Russian and 
Chinese languages and had little choice but to learn these if they 
hoped to advance. Nevertheless, among the Kazakhs there was particu-
larly fierce resistance to adopting loan words from the Russian. It 
was advocated that instead of adopting RUssl.·an loan 
words new Kazakh 
terms should be coined and that the use of RUssian expressions when 
equivalent Kazakh terminology existed be avoided. 114 This was not a 
simple refusal to change, but the refusal to be swamped by what was 
vaunted as the superior Russian or Chinese culture. In both regions 
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the Turkic people apparently considered the language reforms a danger 
to the continued existence of their own cultures and languages. While 
they may have been perFectly willing to modernise their cultures, they 
were not willing to adopt another culture and language in place of 
their own. This attitude did not augur well for the socialist trans-
formation and the drawing togather of people adhering to different cul-
tures. It especially indicated a lack of the socialist internation-
alist spirit among the Turkic people. 
IV:6 The union of nationalities 
and the Turkic expectations 
In their respective minority regions the two central Governments 
were constantly confronted by two problems. These they termed great 
nation chauvinism and local nationalism. Generally it was believed the 
former fostered the latter. To some extent this was no doubt so, but 
it was not necessarily the only cause for local nationalism. The edu-
cational, political and social policies of the two Governments also 
could have resulted in the phenomenon by encouraging political, cultu-
ral and various other expectations among the indigenous people. Nei-
thar of the two Governments may have wanted to fullfil these e~pecta­
tions and the rsulting dissatisfaction that was shown by the local 
people may have been interpreted as a manifestation of local nation-
alism. In the latter case it would have been more accurate to define 
it as the failure of the two Governments to convince the local people 
of the benefits of a common socialist culture and policy. 
IV:6;i Political, cultural and 
employment dissatisfaction 
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In both regions there was considera~le local reaction to the poli-
cies of the Centre, the nnn-Turkic cadres occupying leading positions 
and the general influx of no.n-Turkic people. This led to resentment 
towards the Russians and Chinese, destroying rather than fostering the 
concept of national unity and that of a single nation. The extent of 
the resentment in Sinkiang became evident during the Rectification 
Campaign. 
One of the most frequently made demands by those who were offici-
ally condemned as local nationalists was for an independent Sin-
o 115 k1ang. The reason for these demands was attributed to ~he belief of 
the local nationalists that Sinkiang's " 'organisations were dominated 
by the Han and self-government was nothing more than an empty slo-
gan.' II This argument the Government attacked with the claim that 
5inkiang wa~ being governed democratically. 
i 
For exam~le in all the districts all ranks of people's 
representatives number 63,314. Among these the minorities 
have 58,711 people or 92.7 per cent; all ranks of people's 
representative committee members number 19,612 people, 
among them the minorities make up 92.3 per cent. In the 
aree of fostering minority cadres and building Party orga-
nisations enormous successes have been achieved also. At 
present there are a total of 106,026 cadres in the self-
governing region, among them the cadres of the minorities 
number 62,233 or 53.54 per cent. 116 
It was dubious that the local people were swayed by this argument. 
They were primarily displeased by the manner in which the local admi-
nistrative machinery functioned. Locally it was feared that th~ Han-
Chinese had come to the province for no other reason than to exploit 
o t 117 ~ . The reasons for these fears could be discovered in the events 
that followed the takeover. 
In 1954 there had been considerable criticism of both the Han and 
Turkic cadres. The former stood accused of displaying great nation 
chauvinism or IIGreat Hanism" and the latter of local nationalism. But 
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the Han cadres also were accused of showing disrespect for "the func-
tions and powers of minority cadres."118 Th ese were early indications 
that the relationship between the Han and Turkic cadres was hardly con-
genial. It was not until the Hundred Flowers period that some light 
was thrown 6n the extent of the local discontent. Then even high 
ranking Turkic cadres, the heads of the water conservancy and grain 
departments, believed the number of Han cadres in Sinkiang too large 
and that Turkic cadres were being neither trained in sufficient numbers 
nor given positions carrying any real responsibility. The latter 
charge--that Han cadres were placed in charge while minority cadres 
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were to do the work--was echoed repeatedly. This revealed that the 
Turkic cadres were keenly aware that they were not in charge of the 
afFairs related to the region. 
The dissatisfaction also was not confined to the failure to make 
use of Turkic cadres. Another target for local criticism was the PLA 
production and construction corps. It was accused of being a " 'inde-
pendent government' and a 'independent monarchy' " and that "the pro-
duction and construction corps was able only to reclaim wasteland, but 
. 120 
unable to organise other economic matters." In addition the induB-
trial policy for the industrialisation of Sinkiang came under attack. 
There was concern that the pace of industrial development had been too 
121 great and that industry had crowded out agriculture. This last com-
plaint may have been some evidence that the local people were b~ing 
affected by water shortages as the industrial development of some 
oases increased. 
While these complaints allowed some insight into the practical 
difficulties and the res~lting dissatisfaction with communist rule, the 
Rectification Campaign also revealed what may have been the most impor-
tant concern of the central Government. This was the ideological pro-
blem that the complaints had made obvious. From the complaints it 
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s,merged that the indigenous people were not only dissatisfied, but that 
they continued to think in terms of their own locality and society 
rather than in those of a socialist communl."ty. Db i I v ous y the socialist 
transformation had not yet, been achieved. T o encourage greater success 
in future it was not only local nationalism that had to be struggled 
against but also those cadres who hod failed to encourage social change 
and the past policy of the Party. During the Rectification Campaign 
demands were voiced For changes in the attitude of the Party leadership 
towards the national customs of the minorities • 
••• under the influence of reVl.sl.onism from 1956 up to 
the eve of the rectification movement and anti-rightist 
struggle, we neglected in our cultural work, and even in 
our sntire ideological work, to propagandise socialism. 
We ignored the general, unduly stressed the particulari-
ties of the different nationalities, confined ourselves to 
these particularities, misinterpreted 'national character-
istics,' and regarded as 'national characteristics' the 
backward customs and habits that hampered production and 
national progress, respected them. 122 
The new attitude was that in the past the transformation had not 
been pressed sufficiently from above. To rectify this anomaly cadres, 
especially those from among the minorities, were to be trained. They 
were to acquire the political attitude that would Facilitate a complete 
transformation to Communism. In particular cadres had to be made to 
understand the difference between the bourgeois and proletarian con-
ceptions of nationalities. 123 This attitude prevailed throughout the 
Great Leap and communalisation period. However, the reorganisation of 
the communes tended to indicate a return to what was perhaps not the 
pre-Rectification Campaign att~tude_ but certainly 6ne that was, more 
relaxed than the post-Rectification policy. 
Many similar problems had been evident also in Kazakhstan. In 1923 
one of the tasks of the Bolsheviks was to struggle against local natio-
nalist tendencies. At the same time Party workers of Russian origin 
were cautioned against displaying great Russian chauvinism in the vari-
ous nationality regions. 124 There was concern also over local nationa-
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Hsm. In 1920 there had been demands for the creation of 
a " 'great 
Turkic federation' of 'Republics of the Turkic nations' " and even 
while the national republics were being established there were demands 
from local nationalists. 
The Kazakh nationalists demanded the creation of 'grea-
ter K?Zak~stan' on the territory from the Bukhara steppes 
and S1ber~a to the Volga, the Uzbek nationalists--the crea-
tion of the 'greater Uzbek state,' the Kirghiz nationalists--
'greater Kirghizia. '125 
These Turkic tendencies towards regionalism in both Kazakhstan and 
Sinkiang were incications that the expectations of the Turkic popula-
tion in general had not been met. The demands for greater self-deter-
mination and local control showed that the people were not satisfied 
entirely with their system of government and local administration. 
Generally they feared that the Russians and Han-Chinese swarming into 
their respe~tive regions were little more than exploiters. 
In Kazakhstan there was reason for believing this. In 1920 "ap-
, 
proximately 11,500 'rabochikh-prodotryadchikov' from Moscow, Petrograd, 
Ivanovo-Voznesensk and other cities of Central Russia,1\ arrived in 
Kazakhstan. There, according to one source, they were to set the 
national economy in motion and train local people in production 
k 'll 126 s ~ s. Another definition indicated that in the 1917-20 period 
these particular people were sent from various cities to requisition 
. d t . ti 127 grain and see to it that th~s reachehe c~ es. The events that 
followed--collectivisation, industrialisation and the Virgin Lands Cam-
paign-no doubt reinforced the feeling that Kazakhstan was being 
exploited by the Russians. The condescending attitudes towards and 
128 
outright discrimination against Kazakh workers, also was not condu-
cive for fostering a feeling of friendship between the Russians and 
natives. 
From the reaction of the indigenous people it was unimportant whe-
ther the policies of the central Governments were intended for the 8CO-
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nomic exploitation or development of the regions. The failure to in-
clude the Tu~kic people in the policy formation and local administra-
tive processes in a meaningful way gave rise to a great deal of mis-
trust. This was so especially in Sinkiang. Among the dominated natio-
nalities this was likely to give rise not only to resentment towards 
the dominatirg nationality, but also to a feeling of helplessness. 
Neither of these were encouraging signs that the socialist transforma-
tion had proceded very far. Furthermore, as long as these feelings 
were present it was unlikely that such a transformation could occur. 
IV:6;ii Change and the Islamic 
and cultural traditions 
The Turkic people of both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were in no posi-
tion to show their dislike for the policies of their respective central 
Governments through open rebellion. They could resist only by refusing 
to accept the new cultUre. This form of resistance was particularly 
suitable for an Islamic society. The emphasis on the purity of the 
heart rather than on the actions of the believer and the lack of reli-
gious show in daily life allowed the believers to retain their tradi-
tions in private, while seemingly being good Communists in public. 
Also, sunn! Islam did not stand in the way of modernisation even if 
this affected the religion itself. The differences that resulted From 
the changing values among the different generations could be accommo-
datedrbecause of the flexible sunni approach. Rather than permitting 
such differences to become insurmountable each generation accepted that 
there could be changes so long as what was accepted as the basic spirit 
- 129 . . 
of Islam remained intact. The evolutionary process was an intr~ns~c 
part of Islam. It permitted the adaptation to changing external condi-
tions without compromising the existence of Islam itself. 
Even when such changes were radical departures from the Islamic 
traditions, such as the attempted secularisation of Islam by AtatUrk in 
Turkey, Islam reasserted itself. Not only did the Turks of Turkey con-
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tinue to consider themselves Muslims, they even made AtatUrk a part of 
their Islamic tradition by attributing great religious significance to 
him. 13D This demonstrated both the flexibility of Islam and its capa-
bility for dealing with those forces opposed to it. The latter were 
transformed into an honourable part of the Islamic tradition. Thus the 
Turkic Muslims of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang also may have adopted some 
aspects of Communism as part of their traditions. But as in Turkey 
this was unlikely to make them lesser Muslims. Perhaps the most not-
able group of Muslims to have remained faithful despite wide-spread 
cultural changes were the Hui-Chinese. Although they have become 
almost indistinguishable from the Han-Chinese they remain Muslims. 
This aspect of Islam, combined with the possibility of an Islamic 
revival and the large popUlation increases among the Muslims of the 
Soviet Union must give the Soviet regime reason for concern. In the 
past Muslim nationalism was characterised as a negative nationalism, 
based on the desire of the Muslims to rid themselves of a alien, domi-
nating power. In these endeavours a leading role was attributed to 
131 Islam. It was entirely conceivable that Islam could play such a 
role in Kazakhstan and Soviet Central Asia. The difficulty for the 
Chinese remained the possibility that any unrest in the USSR could 
spread to Sinkiang. 
But the Soviet and Chinese Governments not only have been confron-
ted with a religion Far more adaptable than their own ideology. The 
latter has placed them also in the positions of fostering the Turkic 
culture and in doing so fosterlng a separate sense of identity for the 
Turkic people. By creating separate republics, autonomous regions and 
areas and encouraging the Turkic written languages and literature an 
awareness of the Turkic heritage was bound to arise. Thus their ideo-
logy had forced both Governments into a position of working against 
rather than for the union of the various ethnic groups into a single 
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socialist nation. Although the Kazakhs lived in the cities rather than 
1n the steppes, they displayed no great longing for the Soviet culture. 
Insofar as literature may be taken as an indicator, their longing 
remained for the steppes and their traditional life • 
. . . 
At five a halter was entrusted to me, 
however, 
I did not learn for long--
and at fifteen, on a tall bay runner 
I brought to bay a strong wolf. 
But here a towndweller I, 
son of the market square, 
in a streetcar I change melodiously ••• 
Ah but in the dis favoured Kazakh steppes 
I am always that same--
shaggy urchine. 132 
... 
This and other poetry reflected a longing for the happier days 
spent on the steppes rather than for the liFe in cities. Over nearly 
half a century Communism had failed to change this longing in the 
Kazakh poet. Although the need to change it to a longing for Socialism 
became even more urgent in the present than it had been in the past, it 
seemed unlikely that it can be achieved in the near future. 
IV:? Conclusions 
The obvious conclusion that emerged from the above was that both 
Governments have failed to make much headway in transforming their 
respective Turkic people. Although there were definite changes in the 
extecior aspects of daily life the indigenous people have retained most 
of their cultural traditions. Since the Kazakhs have clung to their 
traditions despite the length of time they have been under Soviet rule 
it was difficult to envi~agi-that greater changes have occurred in 
Sinkiang. Conseq~ehtly it seemed reasonable to suggest that the extent 
and speed of the cultural change in both regions has been approximately 
the same. 
For both communist regimes the lack of a marked advance in trans-
forming the Turkic people had bath ideological and political implica-
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tions. The failure of the Turkic people to embrace Communism whole-
heartedly was an ideological embarassment. It'was even mare pronounced 
because of the Marxist claim that given the opportunity to do so the 
workers and poor throughout the World would willingly embrace Commu-
nism. Instead the Turkic people of bath regions developed their own 
cultural heritage. These developments, especially in literature, did 
not produce a Soviet Central Asian literary heritage that espoused 
Socialism, but one that was exclusively Turkic and held high the tradi-
tional values of the Turkic people. 133 For the two Governments it 
remained to evaluate these literary and cultural developments against 
the contemporary situation in the Islamic World. Against the back-
ground of the Islamic revival in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan neither 
of the two Governments can exclude the possibility that their respec-
tive regions will be affected. 
In Sinkiang the problems appeared much the same as in Kazakhstan. 
Within the province the economic disruption that could be caused by 
political unrest would be less serious for the Chinese economy than 
similar unrest in Kazakhstan would be for that of the Soviet Union. 
For the Chinese the real danger continued to be from a Turkic popula-
tion running amuck on the Soviet side of the border. The latter would 
be in a position to lend both morel and material support to their eth-
nic kinsmen in Sinkiang. There can be little doubt that both countries 
can easily deal with a rebellion by the Turkic Muslims. However, World 
opinion, especially within other Muslim regions such as the ail-rich 
Middle East, could hardly be sympathetic if their Muslim b~etheren were 
butchered mercilessly. At a time when the USSR too is becoming mare 
dependent on ail from the Middle East and China is turning to the World 
for assistance in its modernisation programme--for which the Middle 
East could provide a great deal of financial support--all internal un-
rest in the Turkic region may be dealt with best through diplomatic 
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rather than military means. At the same time, however, both regimes 
must avoid the development of a separate Turkic state in Central Asia 
if the socialist ideology concerning national unity is to retain any 
significance. 
Chinese history provided a precedent for dealing with alien cul-
tures without resorting to forced assimilation. Although the Hui have 
not been totally Sinicised they were tolerated as a cultural group 
within China. A similar development is not unlikely in Sinkiang and, 
perhaps, in Kazakhstan. On the surface Moscow and Peking would con-
tinue ruling the Turkic people, while the Turkic culture would remain 
unchanged except for the natural evolutionary changes occurring within 
the Islamic culture. Then the question would revolve around which cul-
ture-the Islamic or the socialist-would be the more adaptable. The 
latter characteristic likely would decide which would dominate the 
regions. 
Since neither regime had much success in destroying the Islamic 
culture and institutions in the past co-existence appeared a reason-
able alternative. One difficulty that arose from this was that the 
continued existence of Islam also kept the possibility of an Islamic 
revival alive. Thus, while co-existence well might become the policy 
initiated by both central Governments, their doing so would be tanta-
mount to admitting defeat. Furthermore, it'lIJould not be the Russians 
and Chinese who would be agreeing to co-exist but the Turkic people. 
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CHAPTER V 
Kazakhsten and Sinkiang in the Context 
of Sino-Soviet Relations 
V:1 Introduction 
In 1960-61 the friendly" relations between the Soviet Union and the 
Peopl~ls Republic of Chine t ff· i 1 came 0 an 0 1C a end. Since then ana-
I 
lysts have been attempting to discouer what caused the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute. Their analyses brought numerous factors to light. These and 
their number suggested that the reason for the rift was not to be found 
in anyone factor. 
An assessment of the Sino-Soviet interaction in Central Asia, par-
ticularly Sinkiang, may edd a new dimernsion to the existing factors in 
the dispute. By examining the local demographic, economic, geographic 
and political factors it may be possible to discover their significance 
in ·the dispute, 
The first of these, pbpulation, heightened the awareness that the 
relations between the Russians and Chinese had been conducted for a 
considerable length of time. But these were recent by compariaon to 
the interrelationship between the Turkic people of Kazakhstan and Sin-
kiang. It was the Turkic lnterrelationship that represented the tradi-
tional pattern of interaction in this region. This pattern changed 
only after the Russian conquest of Turkestan in the nineteenth century. 
Until the Russian conquest the Chinese had been the only foreign 
• 
conquerors in the region. Following the Chinese;conquest of East Tur-
kestan the traditional pattern of interaction among the Turkic people 
remained largely undisturbed. This was due primarily to the Chinese 
insistence on tributary rather than trade relationships. The lack of 
interference left the Turkic people free to continue their traditional 
practices. But these conditions were affected by the rising and fal-
ling fortunes of the Chinese military. When the Europeans arrived in 
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the region the Chinese military weakness became a real problem. The 
inability of the Chinese to control the local population encouraged and 
abetted the political intrigue that made the local population little 
more than pawns in the great game of power politics. 
Although not only the Russians and Chinese were involved in Sin-
kiang, they became and remained the main protagonists. As their con-
trol over their respective Turkic regions tightened boundaries were 
delineated. This made the inter-Turkic relations more difficult. 
After the Chinese Communists came to power the interaction in Central 
Asia became dominated increasingly by the Sino-Soviet relationship. In 
theory the rise of Socialism should have encouraged the interaction 
between the Turkic people of the two countries. The gradual worsening 
of relations between the two socialist states, however, resultad in the 
increased confinement of the Turkic people to their respective regions 
of residence. 
The Turkic people were only one aspect of the Sino-Soviet rela-
tionship in this region. Since the 1930's the Soviet Government showed 
considerable interest for the natural resources located in Sinkiang. 
After the Founding of the Chinese People's Republic this interest was 
renewed. To some extent the Chinese appeared to have welcomed the 
Soviet involvement. This may have been due to geographic considera-
tions. Sinkiang was effectively isolated from China. Its only connec-
tion to the other Chinese provinces of the north-west was a caravan 
track. 
In the past the geographic faclor had been an important considera-
tion for successive Governors of the province. Its remoteness added to 
the difficulty of controlling it militarily. Consequently the Turkic 
people enjoyed considerable political freedom, while the province suf-
fered from a lack of military protection. Also the Governors lacked 
the military power to control the local people and quash rebellions. 
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This situation encouraged Doreign intervention, intrigue and even local 
rebellions. 
Another aspect of the geographic factor was its effect on trade 
and economic development. It effectively limited the choice of trading 
partners and gradually their number was reduced to one, the Soviet 
Union. The early economic development of the province too was depen-
dent on Soviet equipment and expertise. This economic and commercial 
involvement gave Moscow considerable scope for increasing its political 
influence in the region. Such increased influence in turn gave rise to 
Chinese suspicions that Moscow's interests went beyond the economic 
development of and trade with Sinkiang, but extended to detaching the 
province from China. If this was so, communist rule had not changed 
the traditional problem of Central Asia. This was the interference of 
foreign governments in the internal affairs of the region. 
V:2 Sinkiang, a traditional 
sphere of foreign influence 
The region that will be dealt with primarily in this chapter is 
East Turkestan or Sinkiang. While there was no Chinese activity in 
Kazakhstan both the Russian and the Soviet Governments were very active 
in Chinese Turkestan. But interest in this region was not confined to 
the Russians alone. The British, Germans and Americans, among others, 
also became involved. However, of the European powers, the Russian and 
British influences predominated. From an economic point of view the 
foreign interest in Sinkiang--including that of China--was baffling. 
The region was too remote to allow _economic benefits to accrue, to 
either the Chinese or British and it was unlikely that the Russians 
could have benefitted materially before the 1930's. This left only 
imperial rivalry and expansionism to explain the foreign interests, no 
doubt assisted by internal weakness. 
V:2;i The political and military 
instability of 5inkiang 
For the first Manchu rulers of China East Turkestan had become a 
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troublesome neighbour. Unruly l'Iongoli t ib an r esmen Used Sinkiang as a 
base from which they undertook repeated attacks on both l'Iongolia and 
Tibet. Although the Chinese sent punitive missions in retaliation for 
these attacks, it was not until 1755-65 that they actually conquered 
the region. Even then a conquest had not been planned by the Ch'ing 
rulers. Had it not been for the emergence of a tribal empire dominated 
by the Mongols the Chinese may not have undertaken the conquest at 
1 
all. This permitted the Chinese action to be seen as a defensive ef-
fort,intended to prevent a militarily powerful northern neighbour from 
emerging. 
The Chinese conquest did not end the political instability in 
Sinkiang. It waa followed by considerable fighting both among the 
various tribes and against the Chinese. 2 During the 1864-77 period the 
Chinese Government was preoccupied with the Taiping and l'Ioslem rebel-
lions. As a result it was unable to deal with the unrest in Sinkiang. 
This permitted Yakub 8eg to seize power and rule part of the province--
Kashgaria and parts of the north--from 1865-1876. It was during his 
rule that the Rus~ian and British rivalry began in Sinkiang proper. 
80th powers accepted Yakub Beg's rule and concluded agreements 
with him. 
. 3 
Russia in 1872 and Britain in 1873. Their reasons for 
~ecognising his rule differed only slightly. While the British consi-
dered him a welcome buffer between Russia and the British sphere of 
influence in India, Russia saw him as a safeguard for its interests in 
Sinkiang, especially its newly gained foothold i~ IIi. Thus, the inde-
pendent but more stable regime-of Yakub Beg suited both the British and 
Russians. But the Chinese upset the new status quo by reconquering the 
region in 1877. 
The traditional goal of Chinese rule in the province was to main-
tain internal control rather than to safeguard the region from British 
and Russian intrigue. Such undertakings were beyond the capabilities 
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of imperial China in any case. 8y the end f th i o e n neteenth century 
its military power had shown itself incapable of withstanding the Euro-
peans. This left Sinkiang precariously balanced on weak Chinese rule 
while both 8ritain.and Russia sought to tip the scale in their respec-
tive favour. The rivalry between the two powers continued until the 
outbreak of war in 1914. Only then did the representatives of the two 
countries in Sinkiang assume the hitherto unaccustomed role of suppor-
ting each other against increasing Chinese hostility towards foreigners 
generally, but especially towards the Russians. 4 The respite from for-
eign interference did not lest. From 1911 the provincial Governors 
were unable to muster sufficient military forces of their own to ovar-
come ~ocal unrest. Furthermore,. they had no defence against the grow-
ing military might of their northern neighbour. The situation was made 
worse by the withdrawal of Britain as an effective check to Russian 
expansionism. Thus, after 1918 there was no effective force to counter 
the Russian threat to Sinkiang. 
V:2;ii Russian and Soviet eims 
in Sinkiang up to 1949 
The Russian conquest of the Central Asian Khanates had not fol-
lowed a plan carefully worked out in st. Petersburg. This view has 
been disputed in modern Chinese scholarship. One writer claimed that 
since 1759 the Tsars have attempted to take over and exploit Sinkiang 
and that the Soviet Union has followed the same expansionist policy 
since Stalin. 5 Such long-term plans were difficult to support on the 
basis of the events that occurred in Central Asia. During the mid-
1860's the Russian generals in Central Asia on the whole were able to 
devise and follow their ow~ quite independent policies. 6 In st. Pe-
tersburg the Foreign Ministry and War Ministry were divided over the 
conquests. While the former opposed, the latter supported the gene-
rals. The Tsar, on the other hand, was happy to accept the new terri-
t f hi . thereby lend~ng his tacit support to the tories as par a s emp~re, ~ 
208 
generals. The difficulties thet arose from the lack of a policy were 
added to by the actual conditions prevailing in Central Asia. Vast 
distances made communication between sUbordinates and their superiors 
difficult. In addition the forces opposing the Russians were relative-
ly weak and disorganised. As a result even minor local commanders with 
relatively small forces at their disposal could win victories over in-
dividual khanates. The increased likelihood of 1 success on y encouraged 
greater independent action in the hope of gainiRg individual honour 
and glary. 
It was not until late in the nineteenth century that an overall 
strat~gy for the Far East emerged in St. Petersburg. But this too 
seemed closely tied to Russia's E~ropean policy. The weakening of the 
Ch'ing dynasty had brought the major European powers to China. This 
effectively transferred Russo-European rivalries to the Far East and 
demanded a corresponding readjustment of the Russian foreign policy_ 
Thus, a policy had to be designed that prevented the European powers 
from gaining a foothold in what Russian policy makers considered the 
Russian sphere of influence in Asia. One plan put forward and accepted 
was that of Badmaev. 7 In 1893 he had suggested that Mongolia, Tibet 
and north-west China should be detached and brought under Russian rule. 
Witte, the Finance Minister, accepted this plan. In his supporting 
letter to Alexander III, Witte pointed out that the plan, "undoubtedly 
will have a powerful influence in all relations of European countries 
with the Asiatic East and especially in the relations with Russia--not 
8' 
only with the Asiatic East, but els-o with the European West." While 
this was a further indication that the eestern foreign policy was not 
separated from the European policy, Witte's pronouncements also had to 
be considered with cars. By emphasising the foreign policy advantages 
vis-~-vis the European powers Witte may have intended to gain the sup-
port of the Tsar for his economic policies. These included building 
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the Trans-Siberian railway and industrialisation schemes, all of which 
9 
required the Tsar's approval. While Badmaev's plan may have been fan-
tastic, elements of it continued to reappear in R ussian policy. 
In the aftermath of the Boxer rebellion in 1900 the Russians at-
tempted to gain exclusive rights in those Chinese provinces that bor-
dered on Russia, including several districts of Sinkiang. 10 Hence, 
what may have been fantasy when BadmaBv proposed it originally became 
part of Government policy in the twentieth century. By the time of the 
October revolution these efforts had come to naught, but the Soviet 
foreign policy continued to follow this aspect of Tsarist policy. The 
Soviets carved out spheres of influence in Outer Mongolia, Tannu Tuva 
and Sinkiang. Their attempts were rewarded with greater success then 
those of the Tsars. Outer Mongolia became a Soviet sphere of influence 
in 1945 and Tannu Tuva was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 
1944. 11 Only Sinkiang remained Chinese. 
The continued independence of Sinkiang to a large extent was a 
direct consequence of the policies pursued by the first three succes-
sive Governors after the fall of the Ch'ing. After the bolshevik take-
over all three, Yang Tseng-hsin (1912-28), Chin Shu-jen (1928-33) and 
Sheng Shih-tslai (1933-44), pursued pro-Moscow policies. The first 
steps in this direction were taken during the Russian Civil War. Some 
White Kazakh forces had crossed into Sinkiang and the provincial 
government assured the military commander of Semipalatinsk in March 
1919 that these forces would be d' d 12 ~sarme • This agreement was fol-
lowed by others. In May 1920 it was agreed to establish diplomatic 
I 
relations and trade between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union and to repa-
triate refugees and Kazakhs who had fled from Russia. Another agree-
ment in June 1921 asked for Soviet help in dealing with White forces in 
the Chuguchak (Tarbagatai) district and, in September 1921, an agree-
ment was signed allowing the Red Army to liquidate White forces in the 
210 
Altai district.
13 
In addition each of the three Governors in due 
course fell back on Soviet military support either for dealing with the 
White Russian forces or to maintain his own rule against local opposi-
t . 14 l.on. It was to be expected that such assistance carried a price. 
In the case of Sinkiang it wes the gradual transformation of the pro-
vince into a Soviet sphere of influence. 15 
This did not mean that Stalin wanted to dominate the province 
militarily. The fact that he failed to do so when given the opportuni-
ty spoke against this. His primary concern seemed to have been the 
I 
creation of a buffer between the Soviet Union and China. The semi-I •. 
independent warlords fulfilled this demand admirably. Furthermore, by 
the ear ly-1930 I s Moscow also was ini economic control of the province. 
Of Sinkiangls foreign trad~ 82.5 per cent was with the Soviet Union. 16 
In addition the development and exploitation of its mineral resources 
was in Soviet hands. The provincial Governor was excluded from the 
production process and unable to oversee the nature and quantities of 
17 the minerals that were mined and shipped to the Soviet Union. This 
indicated that the influence of Stalin was supreme until 1942 when 
Sheng Shih-tslai broke with Moscow and realigned Sinkiang with Chiang 
Kai-shekls Government. When Sheng expelled the Russians they meekly 
capped the main oil well, removed the refinery equipment along with 
18 their armed forces and departed. The Soviet withdrawal may have been 
prompted by Stalin's fear that a forced occupation could cause diffi-
culties in the European alliance against Germany. Above all he may 
have seen it as a threat to the supplies from the United states and to 
the second front in Europe. At the same time the Red Army was fully 
engaged in fighting Germany. A second engagement, even if only minor, 
was hardly to be welcomed. Finally, Japan could be offended by a 
Soviet move into China and launch a counter attack. For all these 
reasons it was sound strategically to withdraW from Sinkiang. 
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Stalin may have believed also that it would be possible to restore 
the dominant position of Moscow at some future date. The Kazakh rebel-
lion, which began in November 1944" did provide some opportunity for 
reactivating the Soviet activities. Soviet agents certainly were among 
the rebels. One of them, Saifudin, was a member of the KPSS until 
1950, when he Joined the CCP.19 Th b IIi e re e on also received the active 
support of Soviet agents and that of both the ethnic kinsmen of the 
rebels from across the border and the Soviet consulates in Sinkiang. 20 
It was difficult to assess to what extent the events in the three dis-
tricts that reb8l18d~Ili, Chuguchak and Altai--both before and after 
the East Turkestan Republic had been set up were influenced by Moscow. 
Whatever the Soviet gains,'however, they were lost after the Chinese 
Communists c~me to poLer. 
! 
V:3 Soviet activities in 
Sinkiang after 1949 
As a result of the takeover in 1949 some aspects of the situation 
prevailing in Sinkiang changed markedly. The PLA was able to deal with 
local unrest. This ended the need for Soviet military intervention. 
In the economic sphere, however, the need for Soviet assistance in-
creased. Only the conditions under which it was to be rendered should 
have changed, since both countries were governed by communist r~gimes. 
Such assistance as they rendered each other should have been given in 
the spirit of Socialism. 
V:3ji Stalin and Mao 
in Sinkiang 
Generally Stalin dealt ~~th Mao as he had with the previous Gover-
nors of Sinkiang and Chiang Kei-shek. A glimpse of the Moscow attitude 
was provided at the Yalta Conference of 1945. There Stalin demanded 
that the status quo be upheld in Outer Mongolia, that Dairen be made a 
international free port with a preferential status to be accorded the 
Soviet interests, that Port Arthur be turned into a Soviet naval base 
and that the Chinese Eastern end Southern Manchurian railways be opera-
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ted jointly by China and the Soviet Union. 21 These demands were embo-
died in the treaty of friendship and Co-operation signed by the Soviet 
Union and China on 14 August 1945. This treaty indicated that Chiang 
had succeeded in getting some safeguards written into the text. He was 
assured of Soviet assistance-and support to maintain his Nationalist 
Government "as the central Government of China," Soviet respect for 
Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, Dairen and Port Arthur and that there 
would be no Soviet interference in the internal affairs of China with 
ti 1 f t S ' k' 22 par cu ar re erence 0 ~n ~ang. 
I 
Although Chiang was forced to make 
the cqncessions Stalir wanted he also had secured--for whatever Sta-
I 
I 
lin's assurances were: worth--the Joint Chinese-Soviet border. 
I 
With the overthrow of the Kuomintang regime this agreement became 
void. In 1950 it was replaced by a .new treaty of friendship, co-opera-
tion and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the People's 
Republic of China. This treaty limited the periad of jaint operatian 
af the Chinese-Changchun railway and the Soviet use af Port Arthur and 
Dairen to the signing af a peace treaty with Japan or to 1952 if such a 
treaty was not signed. The agreement also made 300 million American 
dollars of credits available ta China and established three Sino-Saviet 
joint-stock companies in Sinkiang. These were ta exploit the oil and 
non-ferrous metals of the province and provide a joint aviation ser-
, 23 
v~ce. An additional joint-stock company, the Sino-Soviet ship buil-
ding company, was established in Dairen. 24 The companies in Sinkiang 
were to operate for a period of thirty years. These agreements gave 
. 
reasons for concluding th~t Mao had fared even worse than Chiang in the 
negotiations with Stalin. One indication that there had been consider-
able differences in 195~ was the length of time spent negotiating. It 
took over three months to finalise the agreements. Mao gave further 
indications of such differences in papers released after the Sino-
Soviet rift had been made public. 
In 1950 I argued with Stalin in Moscow for two months. 
On the .question of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance the Chi-
nese EasteDn Rai~way, the Joint-stock companies and the bor-
der we adopted two attitudes: one was to argue when the 
other side made proposals we did not agree with and the 
o~her was to accept their proposals if they abs~lutely in-
s~sted. This was out of consideration for the interests of 
socialism. 25 
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The indication was that Stalin had forced his will on Mao and the 
terms of the 1950 treaty demonstrated that the Soviet intentions after 
1949 had not changed. In the new treaty the period for the Joint ope-
ration of the ChinesB~Changchun railway and that for the Soviet use of 
Port ~rthur 'and Daire~ wer~ reduced from the original thirty years of 
the 1~45 treaty to three years. However, the Joint-stock companies 
were a new addition in 1950 and in Sinkiang they were to operate for 
thirty years. I ' To Mao it must have appeared that the communist takeover 
in China had changed little in the 'Sino-Soviet relationship. 
for Stalin the Joint companies may have been a means for gaining 
concessions in China. Khrushchev, in his memoi~s, accused Stalin of as 
much and even blamed him for arousing Mao's suspicions about the Soviet 
26 intentions, thereby endangering Sino-Soviet relations. But the in-
tentions of Stalin towards Sinkiang were not entirely clear. Although 
it was unlikely that he intended to take the province over, it could 
not be ruled out entirely that he sought to detach it gradually in a 
manner similar to that employed in Outer Mongolia. 
V:3;ii Benefits from the Joint 
companies in Sinkiang 
It would have been inappropriate to assume that the joint compa-
nies benefitted only Moscow. The C~inese too drew benefits f~om them. 
Each country has,refrained, however, from publishing complete statis-
tics coveFing the operations. As a result the benefits derived by each 
state remained impossible to calculate. Even estimates were hazardous 
because some of the benefits were not immediately obvious and their 
values not easily calculable. 
The companies were founded on the understanding that their produc-
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tion would be "divided equally between the USSR and China. Similarly, 
all expenditures of the companies and profits will be divided between 
the parties.,,27 This agreement raised immediate difficulties for the 
Chinese. They lacked the necessary capital and the geographic isola-
tion of Sinkiang made it difficult, if not impossible, to ship the pro-
ducts to China proper. Apparently these difficulties were overcome by 
having the Soviet Union supply the necessary capital equipment and 
technical knpw-how, while the Chinese provided the raw materials and 
labour. Through this! exchange the thin~se were able to acquire indus-
trial equipm~nt and p~ants as well as a skilled labour force. At the 
. i 
same time th~y could repay the Soviet credits with the products that 
were produced in Sinkiang. This arrangement had some real benefits for 
the Chinese and they readily acknowledged the aid given through the 
joint undertakings. In public statements they vowed to remember the 
Soviet people's "friendly, brotherly help, the Soviet experts' selfless 
work and internationalist spirit.,,28 There could be little doubt that 
these acknowledgements were sincere and that Peking was grateful for 
the economic assistance that Moscow had rendered. The less visible 
benefits were acknowledged in a similar manner. 
Sinkiang now has large-scale mining enterprises, a big, 
integrated complex of petroleum plants, and also power plants, 
all equipped with Soviet installations and run by thousands 
of technicians and workers who have been trained by Soviet 
experts. The output of modern industry now comes to 20 per 
cent of the total value of SinklBngts industrial output. 29 
The general lack of technical training institutions in Sinkiang 
made the training provided by ~ovie_t experts all· the more valuF\ble. 
For this reason the Chinese were keen no doubt to establish proper 
training programmes. One of these was established by the joint petro-
leum company in 1953. 
A Techincal Institute has been set up in Tihua, capital 
of Sinkiang Province, by the Sino-Soviet Joint stock Petro-
leum Company. 
The school provides four years of training in prospec-
ting for non-ferrous and rare metals and oil, mining, are 
dressing and oil refining with guidance by Sovi t t 
in these fields. e exper s 
Among the 199 students who have already enrolled are 
people of the Han, Uigur, Kazak! Uzbek Khalkhas T t 
Sibo and Russian nationalities. 30 , , a ar, 
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But this was not the ~nly mean~ for training skilled and semi-
skilled workers. By 1954 the Sino-Soviet non-ferrous and rare metal 
company was credited with having trained over 370 specialised technical 
cadres and more than 5,000 technical workers "in the fields of dril-
ling, mining, ore-dressing and machinery." Similar activities were at-
tributed to the Sino-roviet petroleum company, aviation company and the 
h · h . 31 C .l.nese-C angchun ra.l.lway.; Hence cadres were being trained not only 
in specialised instit~tiona, but also on-the-Job. The training was 
given by the Soviet specialists who in effect performed two roles. 
They assisted in setting ub China's industry and training Chinese wor-
kers and specielists. Consequently their withdrawal in 1960 must have 
been a considerable loss for the Chinese. 
V:3;iii The benefits of 
Sino-Soviet trade 
Another aspect of the joint companies was their significance for 
Sino-Soviet trade. Essentially they provided a means for bridging the 
gap between the inability of the Chinese to pay for imports and the 
need for industrial goods. But there were other factors that also had 
to be considered. Among these the geographic isolation of Sinkiang 
which made trade with the Soviet Union essential. 
The export of agricultural and pastoral products from Sinkiang to 
the Soviet Union doubled between 1950-53, while in 1950 approx~matelY 
70 per cent of the consumer goods oame from the Soviet Union. After 
the opening of the Tienshui-Lanchow railway in 1952 consumer goods from 
China proper reached the province. The rail-link also altered the com-
f th S i t U i on Henceforth 70 per cent position of the imports rom 8 oven • 
of these were made up of industrial equipment and supplies rather than 
consumer goods. 32 This dependence an Soviet industrial goods continued 
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until the end of 1959 when the Lanchow-Urumch; ~ railway reached Hami. 
Only then did it become possible to conduct an I' it Un ~m ed exchange of 
heavy and bulky industrial goods between Sinkiang and the other Chinese 
provinces. 
Ha~i on the edge of the Gobi Desert in east Sinkiang 
has become a busy traffic centre since the new Lanchow-
Sinkiang Railway reached the town at the end of 1959. Trains 
are arriving daily with full loads of rolled steel buil-
ding material and other commodities from Anshan Shanghai 
and other areas ~nd leaving with petroletim from'Karami, cot-
ton from the Tar~m 8asin, Turfan raisins, Hami melons and 
other goods. The price of nearly 10,000 kinds of goods have 
been reduced since shortly after the first train reached 
Hami. 33 
It may be concluded then that for the Chinese Sino-Soviet trade in 
Sinklang had not been a simple exchange of goods, but a necessary eco-
nomic function for the economic development of the province. This was 
true espe·cially for the 1949-59 period. 8y contrast, it has been 
argued that the Soviet Union derived no economic benefits from these 
ties with the People's Republic. On the contrary, according to this 
argument, the Soviet economic support granted the Chinese effectively 
slowed Soviet economic growth. On the other hand it may be argued that 
Sino-Soviet trade stimUlated Soviet manufacturing industry and that im-
ports from China added to the consumer goods available in Soviet shops. 
Against this it was argued that the overall volume of Sino-Soviet trade 
was insufficiently large to have any real impact on either the Soviet 
34 production or the Soviet consumer. These arguments, whatever their 
individual merits, drew attention to one very important point. The aid 
that Moscow granted Peking, re~ardl_ess of its amount, was a debit on 
the Soviet balance sheet. The difficulty lay in assessing whether the 
Kremlin was able to transform this debit into a credit at the expense 
of the Chinese! 
It has been suggested that the Chinese exports to the Soviet Union 
were generally of lesser value to the Soviet economy than Soviet ex-
35 ports were to the Chinese. While this well may have been true for 
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many of the goods from China, a case ld 
cou be made to prove that this 
particular argument-did not apply to Sinkiang. Soviet figures indica-
ted that goods known to be found i th 
n e province made up a considerable 
proportion of Sino-Soviet trade. 
Selected Soviet imports from and exports to 
China in thousands of rUbles36 
Year Crude 
oil 
Non-Fer-
rous me-
tals and 
alloys 
Wool 
Soviet imports from China 
1955 224,829 94,571 
1956 201,704 85,704 
1957 206,986 95,617 
1958 195,626 84,876 
1959 219,613 87,746 
1960 44,044 17,418 
1961 30,768 9,346 
Soviet exports to China 
1955 56,466 27,671 
1956 59,372 40,288 
1957 56,845 5,798 
1958 59,864 42,67B 
1959 54,955 6,711 
1960 10,904 2,918 
1961 2,459 
Natural 
silk 
86,003 
93,926 
85,181 
65,278 
69,37.5 
10,792 
4,004 
Silken 
fabric 
24 
32 
1,49B 
95 
94 
41,628 
The above goods as percentages of total 
Soviet trade with China 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Imports 17.2 25.3 16.0 12.1 9.7 
Exports 2.9 3.5 2.9 4.2 1 .6 
Animal 
hides 
13,941 
36,482 
31,787 
21,639 
13,771 
1,169 
533 
Cement 
22,841 
35,375 
53,692 
59,174 
34,092 
7,649 
8,676 
1,521 
2,168 
1,431 
1,286 
479 
632 
1960 1961 
10.6 10.8 
2.0 13.3 
These figures permitted aome interesting deductions. Foremost 
among these was that these goods made up a considerable proportion of 
the Chinese exports to the Soviet Union. The decline in this propor-
tion, beginning with 1958, may have been an indication that.'more of the 
goods were baing used in the Chinese manufacturing industry. This 
would have been true especially after the Lanchow-Urumchi railway 
reached Hami in 1959. A noteworthy gap in these figures was that for 
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Soviet crude 011 l~ports. The joint 041 • ~ company ~n Sinkiang surely 
must have shipped oil to the Soviet Union. By 1955 the company was no 
longer operating as a joint company, hence the Soviet Union may no lon-
ger hava imported crude oil from China. H tl owever, 1e Chinese figures 
for exports to the Soviet Union going back to before 1955 also failed 
to list crude oil axports, but did indicate that petroleum products 
were among the Chinese imports from the Soviet Union. 37 It was incon-
ceivable that no oil was exported to the Soviet Union between 1950-54. 
Moscow may not have published such figures for strategic reasons. On 
the other hand, the Russians may not have kept the Chinese informed of 
how much oil was being taken out of Sinkiang. In this case it would 
have been prudent not to publish any figures at all. 
It was important to note also that some of the products from Sin-
kiang were of considerable value. Both the natural silk and non-
ferrous metals and alloys had a high industrial and monetary value. 
They also could be rasold on the world market. This gave Sinkiang a 
significant role in Sino-Soviet trade as a whole, but especially in the 
Chinese repayment of the Soviet credits. 
V:3;iv The dissolution of 
the joint companies 
The joint companies should have permitted for the economic devel-
opment of Sinkiang to proceed from approximately 1950 until the pro-
vince was linked to the remaining provinces by the railway. In this 
period they could have played an important role in ensuring that this 
development was systamatic. To some extent tha companies did perform 
. 
this function, but there also must have been soma discontent. In Octo-
ber 1954 they were dissolved. The Soviet shares were taken over by the 
Chinese as of 1 January 1955 in return for payment. "The value of 
these shares will be reimbursed in the course of a number of years, to 
be delivered to the Soviet Union in goods such as those usually expor-
. ,,38 
ted from the Chinesa People's Republ~c. From the premature dissolu-
219 
tion of the co'mpanies it may be deduoed that the Chinese were unhappy 
with this particular arrangement. 
The Rectification Campaign revealed that the post-1945 activities 
of the Soviet Union in China had been criticised during the Hundred 
flowers period. It had generally been implied that the Soviet Union 
had taken advantage of China by removing machinery from Manchuria and 
occupying Port Arthur. Although those who made these allegations were 
criticised in turn during the Rectification Campaign, the substance of 
th k d . d 39 e remar s was never en~e. There also was no obvious link between 
the critics and the Chinese leadership. Nevertheless, the Chinese may 
have used the Rectification Campaign to air their grievances against 
the Soviet Union. In 1977 this certainly was the Soviet interpretation 
of both the Hundred flowers period and the Rectification Campeign. It 
was alleged they had been used for anti-Soviet propaganda purposes, 
that mass anti-Soviet demonstrations were organised and that those who 
had criticised the Soviet Union, including Lun YOn, were rehabilita-
ted. 40 If this interpretation was correct--it was written long after 
1961--it indicated that by 1957 there was considerabla anti-Soviet 
feeling in China. To some extent this could have resulted from the 
1950 treaty. Its similarity to the 1945 treaty and the failure to make 
allowances for the fact that China was also a communist state aroused 
considerable resentment. Consequently, the Chinese Government would 
41 
have felt gratified by the criticisms that had been voiced. In this 
light the dissolutlon of the joint companies in 1955 was the first step 
. 
taken by the Chinese to reassert their independence from Moscow. 
V:4 Unity and diversity within 
the communist block 
In 1949 the differences in the respective levels of economic de-
velopment in China and the Soviet Union were immense. While the former 
was an agrarian state the latter was among the foremost industrial pow-
ers of the World. Added to these differences was that of population. 
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The Chinese population was almost three times that of the Soviet Union. 
These differences called for differing economic development stra-
tegies. They had to be suited to the prevailing conditions in China 
and not those in the Soviet Union. E t th i ven a e t me of the October 
revolution Russia had been mDre industrialised than China Was in 1949. 
It was not difficult for the Chinese Communists to devise their own 
economic development policy. They had a long history of not following 
the orders from Moscow. In March 1958 Mao even went so far as to state 
that the Chinese revolution had succeeded because the Chinese Commu-
nists acted "contrary to Stalin's will.,,42 Their success gave the 
Chinese even greater claim to independent action. 
V:4;i Differing develop-
ment strategies 
Unlike Stalin, who had insisted on the development of Soviet heavy 
industry at the expense of agriculture, Mao wanted the Chinese economy 
to be developed as a single unit. He foresaw the simultaneous develop-
ment of both heavy and light industry in combination with agriculture. 
His reasons for this deviation were that China's backwardness and semi-
feudal and semi-colonial state demanded an approach that placed the 
emphasis on the development of industry and the gradual transformation 
f . It 43 o agr~cu ure. It was claimed that this policy was perfectly con-
sistant with the Leninist principles for socialist development during 
. ·i d 44 the trans1tion per 0 • By taking this approach the Chinese did not 
deny the validity of the Soviet case. Their arg~ment was that there 
could be different development strategies and that the particular eco-
nomic and social conditions of China could not be overcome with the 
strategy that Stalin had used. 
It was not until 1956 that Mao formalised his strategy in his "On 
the Ten Great Relationships." He argued that it was important to meet 
all the needs of the people by simultaneously developing heavy and 
light industry with agriculture. The emphasis was to be on fulfilling 
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the needs of the people even if, in order to do so, light industry and 
agriculture had to be developed more extensively than heavy industry.45 
This in effect set out the strategy that culminated in ! the communalisa-
tion qf agriculture and the industrial policies of the Great Leap. It 
has been suggested that by 1956 "Mao was in full rebellion against the 
46 
Russian mode'l." While Mao without doubt was moving away from the 
Soviet model by 1956 it would appear to overstate the case to impute to 
him a full-scale rebellion by this date. 
It was difficult to gauge how prepared Moscow was to accept the 
Chinese strategy for development. At the XX Party Congress in 1956 
Khrushchev certainly opened the floodgates to diversity when he de-
nounced Stalin. Perhaps even more significant, he endorsed the Chinese 
and Yugoslav strategies for developing Socialism. 47 There could be 
li ttle doubt that Khrushchev intended to foster unity through limited 
and controlled diversity. But in 1956 the Poles and Hungarians too 
had deviated from the Moscow line. Even worse for unity, the Chinese 
and Moscow differed in~their interpretations of the developments in 
Eastern Europe. The Chinese tended to be more sympathetic than the 
Russians and only opposed the developments in Hungary after the upri-
sing had begun. It has been suggested that the Chinese intention was 
48 to avoid a split in the communist block. This contention was borne 
out generally by the 1957 world congress of communist parties held in 
Moscow. There Mao apparently rejected Khrushchev1s offer to split the 
World into two spheres. In the one, consisting{of Asia and Africa, 
. 
the Chinese experience in deve1.oping Socialism was to be the model. 
The Soviet model was to be followed in the other sphere, consisting of 
. i 49 Western Europe and the Amer cas. 
This account, if accurate, indicated that both Mao and Khrushchev 
were intent on preserving the unity of the block which was threatened 
by the doctrinal differences that had been developing between them. 
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Both leaders were caught also in ideological webs of their own making. 
~ao, if he was to continue with his own development strategy in China, 
had to endorse diversity in ideological interpretation. Khrushchev, on 
the other hand, desired greater flexibility within the block, but pa-
nicked when this threatened Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe. When 
the Chinese differed with Moscow on Eastern Europe Khrushchev no doubt 
sufFered even greater discomfort. He well may have concluded that Mao 
was making a bid for the block leadership. To prevent this eventuality 
the proposal for sp~itting the World into a Chinese and Russian sphere 
of influence was sensible. A compromise that allowed greater diversity 
without threatening Moscow's leadership of the block was necessary. 
The statement released after the 1957 world congress of communist par-
ties indicated that an attempt had been made to find such a compromise. 
In the statement the Soviet Union was proclaimed the leader of the so-
cialist countries. At the same time all socialist states ware granted 
an equal status within the block and permitted to apply Marxism-Leni-
nism to the socio-economic conditions prevailing in their respective 
t r 50 coun r~es. While this statement endorsed diversity it also provided 
Moscow with the means for controlling the influence of the Chinese. In 
effect it limited the Chinese experience to the non-industrial coun-' 
tries, while the industrialised countries were to follow the experience 
of the Soviet Union. 
This trend in Soviet intra-block policy became even more pronoun-
ced in 1958. In that year MoscOW acknowledged t~at the simultaneous 
development of industry andagricufture was a necessary condition in 
China, where "the primary position in economics is still occupied by 
, . u 51 A similar position was adopted in response agricultural product10n. 
to the communalisation of agriculture. It was claimed that tha peo-
ple's communes had grown out of the Chinese co-operatives and were a 
d . 52 At the same time the Soviet ideologues made step towar s Commun1sm. 
clear that the Chinese development pattern was limited in its appli-
cation. 
It is believed that the European socialist countries 
united in a single economic union of mutual-aid comprise' 
a particular economic zone and will be the first to 
achieve Communism. The Asiatic socialist countries being 
more general in their economic and cultural develop~ent 
comprise another regional zone and will also achieve Co~mu­
nism jointly.53 
With or without the consent of Mao the Soviet strategists had 
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divided the socialist countries into economic regions. For the sake of 
unity division had been introduced. There was little if any evidence 
to suggest that Mao was in fact seeking the leadership of the block at 
this time. It has been claimed that he was prepared to take over if 
the Moscow leaders proved too weak to provide effective leadership and 
54 that he delighted in his growing prestige in Eastern Europe. The 
intervention in Eastern European ideological matters only indicated 
that Mao was prepared to debate ideology in the wider context of the 
block and not only in its application to China and other Asian and 
African countries. On the whole it appeared that by 1957 Moscow and 
Peking had agreed to disagree in matters relating to the development 
policies in socialist states. 
V:4jii Military power and the problem 
of diploma tic recognition 
Anothex; element of the differences between Moscow and Peking was 
that of arms control. This question was connected closely with the 
Chinese quest for World-wide diplomatic recognition as the Government 
of China. While the USSR was accorded recQgniti6n in the World commu-
nity of nations the People's Republic was passed over for Chiang Kai-
shek's Taiwan regime. Mao was anxious to change this state of affairs. 
As early as 1949 he had stated that the People's Republic would be 
prepared to lido business and establish diplomatic relations with all 
foreign countries on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.1I
55 
It was not China 
who spurned diPlomatib and other exchanges with the non-Communist 
countries. 
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In the first instance Peking relied on the Soviet Union to present 
its views and plead fbr China's admission to the United Nations. Until 
1957 Mao generally supported'Moscow on the broad topic of nuclear dis-
56 
armament. There may have been good strategic reasons for this, par-
ticularly in the early-1950's. In this period the Soviet nuclear cap-
ability was inferior to that of the United states and the Chinese were 
concerned that n~clear weapons might be used against them in Korea. 57 
While this influenced the Chinese strategy until after the Korean War, 
the fact that no nuclear weapons were used no doubt allayed these 
fears. Some evidence of this and the subsequent shift in Chinese stra-
tegy was provided by the first bombardment of Quemoy in 1954. 
The bombardment was significant from a strategic point of view. 
Both Peking and Taiwan were allied to Moscow and Washington respective-
ly. By forcing a military confrontation Mao demonstrated that Peking 
was still a force to be reckoned with and could not simply be ignored. 
According to a recent account the bombardment of the off-shore islands 
in 1958 also was a demonstrative operation and not an attempt to seize 
the islands. By not seizing the islands, Mao declared, Peking could 
58 
cause Chiang Kai-shek " 'discomfort any time we want.'" He might 
have added Khrushchev's name to that of Chiang. Moscow h.d reason for 
worry. If the Americans had responded to the Chinese bombardment, 
either in 1954 or 1958, the result could have be~n a military confron-
tation between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Another element of the 1954 bombardment, perhaps one that sur-
prised the Chinese, was ~he reaction of the Russians. Following the 
crisis a Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev went to Peking. There 
they agreed, among other things, to terminate the joint-stock compa-
nies, the Soviet presence in Port Arthur, to build a railway link to 
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extend the Lanchow-Urumchi railway to Alma-Ata and the granting of 520 
million rubles in long-term credits to the Chinese. 59 It was suggested 
that these negotiations occurred because both sides recognised the need 
for redefining their ~elationship after Stalin died. 60 While Khrush-
chev no doubt was keen to redress the balance and seek the good will of 
other block members, this explanation seemed inadequate. The negoti-
ations were a complete and overwhelming victory for the Chinese. Fur-
thermore, coming as they did immediately after the bombardment of Que-
may, they suggested that Khrushchev was inclined to buy peace in the 
Taiwan Straits. His primary concern may have been that the actions of 
Peking should not be permitted to undermine the disarmament negotia-
61 tions to begin in July 1955. Although the Chinese were not invited 
to the disarmament conference, the crisis did provide them with an 
indication of how great were their powers to coerce. 
Perhaps it was because of this newly discovered power that Peking 
set its course in a direction that was diametrically opposed to Mos-
cow's disarmement policies. In 1955 an agreement signed between Peking 
62 
and Moscow was to assist the Chinese nuclear research programme. 
Because of Moscow's policy to limit the spread of nuclear weapons this 
agreement was unlikely to result in the development of a Chinese nucle-
ar device. But.the Chinese view was not in accord with this policy. 
According to Peking, MosCOW had agreed in 1957 to grant them even 
greater nuclear assistance. This was to include sample nuclear ma-
terials. Although the existence of a 1957 agroement was never denied 
by Moscow, there must be some doubt· about the Chinese interpre'tation of 
its terms. An alternative view was that Moscow had agreed to no more 
than the stationing of Soviet nuclear weapons under Russian control on 
Chinese territory.63 This hardly would have satisfied the Chinese. 
Nuclear weapons on Chinese soil but under Soviet control could .not be 
equated with a Chinese nuclear force. These weapons were unlikely to 
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open the door to Chinese participation in disarmament conferences. 
That Mao wanted to be included in such conferences was made obvious in 
February 1958. Then the Chinese actively supported the call for a dis-
armament conference to be attended by the United States, the Soviet 
Union and Britain, but also the Chinese hoped that "France, Canada, 
India, Egypt and China" would take part in it. 64 However, within two 
years the Chinese view changed. From expressing the hope that they 
would be included they went to passing a resolution in 1960. According 
to this China did not consider itself bound by any agreement reached in 
conferences in which the Chinese had not participated. 65 This indica-
ted that Mao had decided to insist on Chinese participation in inter-
national disarmament conferences for reasons of prestige and that he 
had lost faith in the ability of Khrushchev to represent both the Chi-
nese point of view and interests. To a considerable extent this atti-
tude could be justified. 
In 1963 the Chinese charged that in 1959 the Russians had colluded 
with the United states. The Soviet response to these charges indicated 
that the matter at issue was that of nuclear weapons. Apparently Mos-
cow had agreed not to give China nuclear arms if the Americans did not 
66 provide such arms for the Federal Republic of Germany. By refusing 
to be 'bound by agreements reached on their behalf by other states the 
Chinese sought recognition for both their point of view and the right 
to make their own policy. 
The difficulties arising from the two policies were thus made ob-
vious. Mao believed China eQuId gain World-wide recognition if she 
became a nuclear power. It has been held that this was responsible in 
part for the nuclear programme and development of nuclear arms in 
Ch ' 67 ~na. th hand, was committed to arms control Khrushchev, on the 0 er 
Ii i that could not be reconciled with and peaceful co-existence, po c es 
the Chinese quest for nuclear arms. To resolve these policy contradic-
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tions both sides resorted to coercive measures. The bombardment of 
Quemoy in 1958 was intended to bring pressure to b ear on Moscow and the 
United states. The Chinese by then had several reasons for doing so. 
They included coercing Moscow to provide them with tactical nuclear 
weapons and increasing the military commitment to China. 68 In the 
relations with non-block states the crisis also proved advantageous. 
It restarted the ambassadorial talks between China and the United 
states,69 while in the United Nations the Soviet Union made a strong 
plea for China's admission in place of Taiwan. 70 But while pressure 
was brought to bear and the Chinese achieved same positive results, Mao 
also discovered that Moscow was not prepared to use its nuclear advan-
tags for bringing pressure to bear on Washington. Khrushchev, as a 
result of the Chinese action, did become all the more aware of the dan-
gel' that the Chinese represented for his policy of peaceful co-exis-
tence. 
It followed that within the block there were problems peculier to 
each state. To resolve these in accordance with socialist internatio-
naliam flexibility and a desire for compromise were essential. Either 
one or both these qualities were lacking in the ideological and policy 
differences that had emerged. 80th states insisted that their particu-
lar needs were to be met even when this resulted in two contradictory 
policies. The result was more likely to be disunity than unity. 
V:5 Population as a factor in Sino-
Soviet relations in Sinkiang 
In Sinkiang the local population may have h~d a significa~t influ-
ence on the Sino-Soviet relationship. The deep-seated differences 
among the different Turkic people could have been exploited to create 
political unrest. But doing so also entailed some risks. There was 
the danger that the unrest could be transformed somehow into a strong 
pro-Turkic anti-foreign movemont. This could then spillover into the 
territory of the other state and result in a Central Asian independence 
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movemant. Unrest among the Turkic people on either side of the 5ino-
Soviet border therefore had to be considered d a oUble edged sword. 
Nevertheless there was some genuine dissatisfaction on both sides of 
the border. 
In Sinkiang Turkic dissatisFaction with Chinese Communist rule was 
caused in part by the belief that the Chinese denied the Turkic people 
the measure of independence that their kinsmen across the border enJoy-
ed under soviet rule. Given this attitude, especially if it was wide-
spread, an independence movement would not have been too difficult to 
foster. 
V:5ji The movements for greater 
independence and autonomy 
The close association with the Soviet Union had some distinct dis-
advantages for the Chinese. One of these was the committment to learn 
from the Soviet experience. Another was especially peculiar to Sin-
kiang. During the Hundred Flowers period and the Rectification Cam-
paignthe indigenous people demanded greater independence. They com-
pared their own provincial administration to the union republics of the 
Soviet Union. This comparison left the Chinese leadership open to the 
charge that it had chosen to apply that part of the Soviet experience 
that suited it and ignored that part which would have provided the Tur-
kic people with greater independence. In explaining their actions the 
Chinese invoked the view that the two countries had differing needs and 
that this necessitated different systems. 
The Soviet Union's Communist Party on the basis of its 
own state's circumstances. established union republics, 
exactly in accordanc~ with its federative system. However, 
the federative system is not the only system to be adopted 
by all socialist states. On the basis of the different 
circumstances in each state the general principle, that 
socialist people are equal, the solution ?f a countrY's71 
internal national question may assume a d~fferent form. 
By claiming that socialist countries could USB different methods 
for dealing with their internal national problems, so long as the gui-
ding principle was the same, the chinese allowed themselves consider-
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able latitude in applying the Soviet experience. At t he same time the 
explanation allowed an attack on those who had advocated 
union repub-
lics in Sinkiang. 
Local nationalists pretend to learn from Soviet ex-
perience, saying the Soviet Union utilised a federative 
system and set up union-republics, why does China not uti-
lise a federa~ive eystem and set up union republics. They 
demand that S1nkiang be made a union republic this is an 
oppositional tendency and reactionary activit; that is 
destructive to the unity of the state.72 
In this criticism those who had advocated union republics were 
branded elements that failed to appreciate the basic socialist princi-
pIes of the Chinese and Soviet states. In fact it was claimed that the 
indep,endence movement had been instigated by the imperialists. 73 While 
the demands for Spviet type union republics hardly supported the claim 
that the demands were made by anti-communists, there was no evidence 
either to suggest that Moscow was meddling. Even in the open pol~mics 
that followed the Sino-Soviet split no charges of Soviet meddling be-
fore 1962 were made. On the strength of this it was reasonable to con-
elude that the demands for union republics were voiced by the local in-
habitants. They had made them no doubt in the sincere belief that 
their ethnic kinsmen across the border enjoyed greater autonomy under 
the Soviet system than they did in Sinkiang. In contemporary Chinese 
writing this argument too has been refuted. One source claimed that 
the union republics have become only another means for suppressing the 
non-Russian nationalities. 
Through repeated far-reaching liquidations and replace-
ments from the Central Committee of the Party to the uniofl 
republics from the self.governing regions to the national 
districts' the important tasks of the Party end Government 
organisations throughout Russia are monopolised by new bour-
geois elements or such volunteers as demonstrated themselves 
to be reliable native upper class elements. They depend on 
the power concentrated in their hands to madly oppress and 
persecute all'non-Russian people. 74 
This less charitable view of the Soviet union rep~blics contrasted 
sharply with that of the earlier period. But it hardly could have 
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influenced the Chinese leadership in the 1950's. Another difficulty 
with the union republics was that they would have permitted the divi-
sion of Sinkiang according to the ethnic groups and presumably allowed 
each Turkic group a national republic of its own. But given the fact 
that the population of the province was far more mixed than that of the 
Soviet Central Asian region the Chinese hardly could divide the region 
! 
into national republics without uprooting and relocating large numbers 
of people. This pro~pect alone made union republics unfeasible. 
Another worrying factor about the demands for union republics was 
that they could have been made by local nationalists. In this case 
union republics would have become the first step towards an independent 
Sinkiang. This also raised the prospect of an independence movement 
sweeping through the whole of Central Asia. Just as the local people 
in Sinkiang were informed about the Soviet union republics, so the 
inhabitants of the latter would have known about the developments in 
Sinkiang. In 'this case Sinkiang well might have become the rallying 
point for local nationalism for the whole of Central Asia. The ethnic 
ties between the Chinese and Soviet regions were certainly an important 
consideration for both the Chinese and Soviet Governments. 
V:5;ii The inter-Turkic 
relationship 
One aspect of Stalin's strategy in the 1930's was the security of 
Soviet Central Asia. The Japanese drive into Manchuria and eastern 
China worried the Soviet leader. He feared Japan could gain control of 
northern China, including Sinkiang. 75 If the Ja~anese had suc~~eded 
been ~n a good position to mount attacks on the Soviet they would have ... 
Union. This made Sinkiang Stalin's first line of defence. To ensure 
Governor had t o be kept in a reasonably strong posi-its stability the 
tion and friendly towards MoscoW. At the same time intrigue among the 
1 b J ese sgents, had to be prevented. indigenous people, especial y y apan 
Such intrigue was dangerous, especially because it could spillover 
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into the Soviet Union. It has been t sugges ed that Stalin formulated 
his war-time policy towards Sinkiang on the basis of these considera-
tions. 76 Hi t 1945 1 spas - po icy may have been based on similar concerns. 
According to the 1945 treaty the Soviet Union could not interfere in 
the internal affairs of Sinkiang. This made it necessary to find a way 
of legitimising Soviet intervention in the province in the event that 
this became necessary. 
In the past both Britain and imperial Russia registered people 
living in Sinkiang as their citizens. This was a ploy to give their 
respective Governments greater influence in dealing with the local 
. 77 
government. Stalin resorted to similar tactics. In November '945 
and January ~946 decrees of the Supreme Soviet granted approximately 
, 
120,000 Kazakhs, Uighurs, Russians and others who had emigrated from 
Russia and the USSR to Sinkiang the status of Soviet citizens legally 
78 living abroad. If these 'Soviet citizens' were thought to be in dan-
ger Soviet intervention would have been conceivable and could have been 
legitimised on these grounds. 
This was not to say that Stalin sought to gain control of Sinkiang 
in the post-1945 period. On the contrary, he refused to take the pro-
79 
vince over when it was offered to him in 1941 and again in 1949. His 
immediate policy concern was to prevent the status quo in Sinkiang from 
being upset and to safeguard the region from foreign influences. In 
general this remained the Soviet policy after Stalin's death. 
After 1961 whenever the polemics of China and the Soviet Union 
turned to the north-west border an~ its people there was considerable 
caution and ambiguity about what was said. In 1963 the Chinese charged 
the Soviet leaders with misusing the KPSS organs and their personnel in 
Sinkiang. They were accused of having undertaken "large-scale insur-
rectionist activities, inciting and coercing many tens of thousands of 
. 80 Chinese citizens to run away to the Savlet Union." This outburst 
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well could hava been prompted by the need to explain why Turkic people 
were crossing the border into the Soviet Union. A ccording to a Soviet 
source over 113,000 people fled from Sinkiang to the Soviet Union in 
the periods of April-June 1962 and October 1962-1'1ay 1963. 81 80th the 
Chinese and Soviet sources agreed that the 1 d peop e id cross into the 
I 
Soviet Union and that they numbered several tens of thousands. 
No doubt the Chinese were smarting from the mass exodus. By bla-
ming it on Soviet subversive activities the need to Justify it on the 
basis of local reasons was cleverly circumvented. Another possibility 
was that the Chinese were ridding themselves of the 'Soviet citizens' 
that Stalin had decreed to be living legally in Sinkiang. But this ap-
peared rather remote. According to the Soviet sources the migration 
was brought on by internal conditions in Sinkiang. One refugee who 
then had been living in Kazakhstan for less than three years explained 
that the Turkic people in Sinkiang suffered persecution and repression 
and that the province was being Sinicised. "Peking does not disguise 
its intention to 'Sinicise' Sinkiang, to fence it off from its northern 
neighbour-the USSR-with a blank wa11.,,82 The basic problem with 
these polemics was some question about their validity and therefore 
their significance for the Sino-Soviet dispute. While it was unlikely 
that either the Russians or the Chinese would incite the Turkic popula-
tion in the other state, such charges were made by the Chinese in 1964. 
With the stepping up of anti-Chinese activities by the 
leaders of the C.P.S.U. in recent years, the Soviet side has 
made frequent breaches of the status quo on .the border, oc~ 
cupied Chinese territory and PFovoked border incidents •.. 
still more serious the Soviet side has flagrantly carr~ed 
, t' 
out large-scale subversive activities in Chinese fron ~er 
areas trying to sow discord among China's nationalities by 
means'of the press and wireless, inciting China's minority 
nationalities to break away from their motherland, and in-
veigling and coercing tans of thousands of Chinese citizens 
into going to the Soviet Union. Not only do all the~e acts 
violate the principles guiding relations between soc1alist 
countries they are absolutely impermissible even in the 
, 83 
relations between countries in general. 
It was difficult to decide whether these charges amounted to any-
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thing. By 1963 the Sino-Soviet dispute had become a heated issue. 
80th sides were attempting to gain the support of the international 
communist movement for their respective point of view. While the Chi-
nese were accusing Moscow of border infractions, the latter made simi-
1 h ' t P k' 84 ar c arges aga1ns e 1ng •• The difficulty lay in sorting out how 
much of these charges was justified and how much was pure allegation 
intended for propaganda purposes. Although hard Facts on which to base 
a conclusive analysis were lacking the practical conditions of the 
period may disprove some of the allegations. 
The Chinese charge that the Russians used "the press and wireless" 
to sow discord among the Turkic people in Sinkiang raised some doubts. 
The problems of illiteracy have been noted already. Given these limi-
tations any real appeal through the written media could be only of 
limited value. Similarly the wireless could provide only a limited 
outlet in the early-1960's. Although this was the period of the 'tran-
sistor revolution' in the industrial countries of the West, radio re-
ceivers were not yet household items in either Kazakhstan or Sinkiang. 
Most, if not all of the people in these two regions depended on the 
speaker boxes provided by their respective Governments. These only 
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received broadcasts relayed by a State controlled radio receiver. 
Consequently the listeners were unable to listen to the programmes of 
their own choice. In the 1960's these conditions made all appeals over 
the wireless fruitless. In more recent years the situation may have 
changed as more radios became available. As a consequence these regi-
ons now could be vulnerable to-broadcasts originating in third coun-
tries, particularly other Muslim states. 
The Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border difficulties also gave rise to some 
questions. One concerned the population which traditionally pastured 
its herds on one side of the border in summer and on the other side in 
winter. There was some evidence that suggested that this practice 
generally continued until about 1960. 
The population in the border regions maintained b d 
ties, engaged in lively trade, set up cultUral exchange~~a 
r~solved economic problems through their Joint efforts, as-
s~sted each other and together struggled against natural 
disaster. _ The Soviet authorities allowed the Chinese popu-
lation to engage in the making of hay, to occupy state farm-
steads, to catch fish and participate in other economic 
activities in part carried out on Soviet territory.B6 
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Although it was not specifically stated this statement strongly 
suggested that traditional nomadic grazing practices were still being 
carried on. Hence the difficulties that arose in the-Suz-Aigyr region 
during the summer of 1960 may have been a response to Soviet attempts 
to close the border to the nomads. 8? The local co-operative activities 
also entered into manufacturing and the marketing of consumer goods. 
In 1959 contracts for the exchange of goods were signed between Kazakh-
stan's consumer organisation and the Sinkiang provincial trade organisa-
tion. They ensured the exchange of locally produced goods between the 
t ' 88 wo I'eg~ons. By no means did this mean that there was a completely 
free and uncontrolled border traffic between the two regions. Indeed 
for the trade to be organised it had to be controlled. This interac-
tion did indicate, however, that there were few real border problems in 
the S1nkiang-Kazakhstan region. Those that did arise may have resulted 
from the traditional practices of the inqigenous people rather than 
actual border differences. 
V:6 Socialist 
internationalism 
Another aspect of the Sino-Soviet relationship was the theory of 
l ' -It was- to prov~de the framework f~r the socialist internationa 1sm. • 
, l' t t ' But it also may have given relationship between soc~a 1S coun r1es. 
Id t b f If ~lled Not necessarily rise to expectations that cou no e u. • 
because the expectations were unrealistic, but because of differing 
views about their general importance. The difficulty then became one 
of definition. Socialist internationalism could be taken to imply that 
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all e*pectations of s60ialist states were t 
a be fulfilled, or that only 
some would be fulfilled. The latter also implied that someone had to 
decide on which expectations were to be met. 
This difficulty was compounded further by the vast economic, 
social, political and demographic differences between China and the 
Soviet Union. To a great extent these factors were decisive in deter-
mining the basic policies of Bech state. It then followed also that 
each state had to develop its own policies. The goal was to solve the 
problems that arose in each state within the framework of socialist 
internationalism. 
The viewsof Marx and Lenin on this theme have been discussed al-
ready in a different context. One of the crucial points was that dif-
ferent cultures were to disappear into the new World culture. This 
views made the differences between states unimportant during the period 
of the proletarian dictatorship. Each ruling proletariat was to guide 
its respective state to Communism. As more states underwent the revo-
lution there were bound to. be differences, but these had to be resolved 
with all concerned being p~epared to give and take. There could be no 
dominating state within the grouping of proletarian atates. 
It was in this regard that Mao made a fundamental error in 1949. 
He proclaimed, "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best 
, 89 
teacher and we must learn from it." This left the Chinese in a sub-
servient position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. They were the student 
while Moscow did the teaching. There CQuid be little doubt that this 
was not what Mao had intended.- In ~n earlier part of the same'speech 
he stressed the bases on which the new China would enter into internal 
and external relationships. 
(1) Internally, arouse the masses of the people. That 
ia unite the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty 
bo.~rgeoisie and the national bougeoisie, form a domestic 
united front under the leadership of the working class, and 
advance from this to the establishment of e state which is 
a people's democratic dictatorship under the laadership of 
the working class and based on the alliance of k d 
t war ers an peasan s. 
(2) Externally, ~nite in a common struggle with those 
n~tions of the world which treat us as equals and unite 
w7th the peo~les, of all ~ountries. That is, ally ourselves 
w1th the Sov1et Union, w1th the People's Democracie d 
. 1 s an 
w1th the pro 9ta~iat and the broad masses of the people in 
all other countr1es, and form an international united 
front. 90 
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This left little doubt that the external relationships were to be 
conducted on the basis of mutual equality. The countries with which 
Mao expected to enter into this sort of relationship were the Soviet 
Union and the East European states. It was to these states also that 
he believed China could turn to for help. "Internationally, we belong 
to the side of the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, 
and so we can turn only to this side for genuine and friendly help, not 
to the side of the imperialist front."91 This gave some indication of 
how Mao understood socialist internationalism. To him it represented a 
framework within which he could find genuine and friendly help. In 
1975 the Soviet tlefinition of socialist internationalism was very simi-
lar to Mao's understa~ding of the concept. 
Socialist internationalism above all signifies mutual-
aid in repelling imperialist aggression, united action in 
the struggle for preserving peace, active support for 
national-liberation and social revolutionary workers in 
capitalist countries, close co-operation for the purpose 
of building up the might and for the further development 
of all peaceful systems of Socialism and each individual 
country. Socialist (proletarian) internationalism is the 
highest stage in the development of contemporary interna-
tional law. 92 
The idea of mutual assistance and support were all there. Only 
one point was lacking, that of.equality within the socialist block and 
this was what was really at issue for Mao. 
There was no question that the Soviet Union led the socialist 
block. But this did not mean there were to be no differences. On the 
contrary, within the block all states were to be equals. This implied 
that while the Soviet Union was the economically most advanced social-
ist country, it did not have the right to dictate the policy to the 
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remaining block members. The leadership position of Moscow was due to 
its greater experience not to its ideological superiority. Further-
more, Mao believed that the socialist states would assist each other in 
their economic development and that such assistance would not be tied 
to ideological agreement or unanimity. 
On the question of Soviet development aid the Chinese had few if 
any complaints. After the Second World War the Soviet Union was hardly 
in a position to axtend credits to the Chinese. Nevertheless the cre-
dits granted Peking between 1950-61 amounted to approximately 1,370 
million American dollars. While this compared favourably with the 
Soviet credits extended to other communist states, the Chinese may not 
have benefitted from the partial enullment of debts the former had been 
granted. In addition the Chinese fared worse in a per capita alloca-
tion of the credits than did the other communist countries. 93 Although 
Mao could hardly expect the Soviet Union to extend credits on a per 
capita basis the inequality of the system employed in aid distribution 
may have rankled with Peking nonetheless. 
By granting other block members what were greater credits on a per 
capita basis Moscow may have offended Mao's senee of equality. But an 
even more significant factor was the unwillingness of the Russians to 
help the Chinese without being coerced. The Quemoy crises were two 
such attempts. In 1954 the intention likely was to coerce the United 
States. That Khrushchev in the end had to bear the brunt of the epi-
sode was accidental rather than intentional. However, by 1958 there 
. 
could be little doubt that the-bombardment was intended also to cause 
Khrushchev despair. The co-operative spirit in the relations between 
the two states by then h~d been largely exhausted. Although the open 
break did not come until 1961 the relationship based on any semblence 
of socialist internationalism for all intents and purposes had ceased 
to exist in 1958. 
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V:7 Conclusions 
The Sino-Soviet difficulties could not be attributed to either a 
single factor or to a specific time period. F t rom he above analysis it 
appeared that the differences began with the treaty of 1950 and became 
greater over the next ten years. There were basic differences between 
the two countries. To bridge these and maintain block unity both 
Peking and Moscow had to place that particular goal before all others. 
This did not occur. In their foreign policies the two states followed 
different lines based on their particular priorities. But their policy 
aims not only differed, they were diametrically opposed. They placed 
and drove both Governments forward on a collision course. 
In addition to the foreign policy differences there were differen-
ces over the economic development strategies. On the whole these were 
not beyond solution. But the doctrinal differences raised the spectre 
of leadership difficulties and this in turn the question of leadership 
within the block. Although it could not be st~ted with any degree of 
I 
certainty it was unli~ely that the Chinese aspired to the block leader-
ship. Mao no doubt wanted to be heard within and without the block, 
but this was consistent with the Chinese position. They were fighting 
for diverse opinions within Socialism. Khrushchev, on the other hand, 
was willing to liberalise the Soviet lead~rship, but feared also that 
this liberalisation would undermine his own position. To him Mao could 
but appear as a challenge, especially after the events in Poland and 
Hungary in 1956. These attitudes resulted in less flexibility and 
. 
greater division within the block. -If this pointed to any particular 
problem it was that neither MoscOW nor Peking were able to communicate 
their intentions to each other. 
Within the context of the overall Sino-Soviet relationship the 
difficulties in Sinkiang tended to be relegated to a secondary posi-
tion. if " d E1"ther the region was too sen-On the whole this was just 1e. 
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sitive and therefore had to be avoided as a friction point, or 5ino-
Soviet difficulties there were of minor importance. In fact both these 
contentions could be supported. To some extend they even logically 
followed one another. 
Both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang have military significance. At Lake 
1\ 
Balkhash in Kazakhstan the Soviet Union has a missile guidance and tes-
ting site, while the Chinese have nuclear installations at lop Nor in 
Sinkiang. Any Soviet or Chinese military activity in this area could 
but arouse the keen interest and suspicions of the other country. for 
this reason conflicts in this particular region no doubt have been 
. minimised. This reduced the Sino-Soviet difficulties there to insigni-
ficance. But the same reasoning did not apply to unrest among the 
indigenous people. 
The technological improvements and rise in the standard of living 
may be a source of danger in future. If radios capable of picking up 
foreign broadcasts become widely available to the Turkic people they 
could become receptive to the cries of Muslims in other countries. 
This well mig~t become a greater factor in creating unrest in the regi-
ons than the agents of the past .ever could have been. If wide-spread 
unrest were to result on either side of thB border the most immediate 
problem would be containing it. 80th the Russians and the Chinese 
would seek to prevent the unrest in the other region from spilling 
across the border. At the same time their interests demand that they 
ensure that local rebellions are quashed and that the status quo is 
i 
maintained. To maintain peace-in the region the two Governments even 
might be prepared to co-operate with each other. On the other hand if 
such co-operation were not given and a rebellion in one country threa-
tened the security of the whole area one state well might invade the 
other to ensure that the rebellion would be quashed. To some extent 
this may explain the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The in-
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tention may have been to contain the Muslim revival that had crept to 
the Soviet border. According to this analysis the Sino-Soviet rela-
tions in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang may be far more vulnerable to external 
factors than they are to internal ones. Third countries, especially 
Muslim countries, could create great difficulties for the two Govern-
ments. Hence, the population factor may assume far greater signifi-
cance in the future than it has had in the past. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
On the whole the difficulties that arose in Kazakhstan and 51n-
kiang were analogous. This made it possible to treat the two regions 
as one in the concluding remarks. The overwhelming conclusion was that 
in both regions there occurred a confrontation between the new social-
ist culture and the Turkic traditions. What remained to be discussed 
was how this confrontation developed. To a considerable extent both 
its severity and longevity were direct consequences of the policies 
pursued by the Soviet and Chinese Governments. 
The period of communist rule brought significant political, social 
and economic changes to the regions. These were both positive and 
negative. Although the effects of the changes were important in their 
own right, they also fostered a more significant development which the 
central Governments neither had envisaged nor desired. This was an 
increased local cultUral and political consciousness, a direct product 
of the modernisation process. 
To achieve any sort of modernisation in Kazakhstan and 5inkiang 
the traditional practices of the indigenous people had to be overcome. 
They also had to be replaced by what was an alien system in the eyes of 
the local population. This required a re-education programme. Its aim 
was to replace the traditional Turkic values with those of Socialism. 
By the mere fact of its existence and certainly because of its content 
the re-education programme was an attack on the Turkic culture. The 
latter was branded inferior b~~h b~implication and in the actual edu-
cational work. This was unlikely to convince the Turkic people to 
relinquish their traditions. On the contrary, it was more likely to 
stimulate and reinforce their awareness of these traditions. The 
result was the entrenchment of the Turkic cultural traditions and an 
inevitable cultural clash. 
The cultural and political awareness was heightened also by the 
249 
direct actions of the two Governments. Both emphasised the participa-
tion of the Turkic people in the political process. Thus political 
thought and awareness were encouraged. In addition both the actual 
participation in the political process, even if only to elect a local 
candidate, and the constant exposure to political propaganda aroused 
local interest. The Turkic demands for a greater say in the running of 
their own affairs and more extensive local autonomy indicated the 
extent of this interest. They also indicated that the increased aware-
ness was a Turkic political awakening. Those who had made the demands 
obviously were interested in the political process and the place of the 
Turkic people within it. A similar interest in the Turkic culture was 
fostered by the formal educational system. Although this system neg-
lected the Turkic cultural tradition for the study of the Russian and 
Chinese cultures, its negativity could arouse only a greater Turkic 
self-awareness. The Turkic children needed only to look at their Euro-
pean and Chinese counterparts to become aware of their physical diffe-
rences. In addition most, if not all of the Turkic children learned a 
different language in the home and had been exposed to their own cul-
ture. To leave these differences unexplained or accord them secondary 
importance only could increase the Turkic interest for their own cultu-
ral heritage. 
There was considerable evidence of this cultural and political 
awareness. It found expression in the demands for; greater political 
participation, greater autonomy, the more extensive use of the Turkic 
languages and the preservation· of the local culture. In addition it 
was reflected in the continued adherence to Islam and the poet's year-
ning for the steppes. But this could have been only the thin end of 
the wedge. The education of the Turkic people has lagged behind that 
of the Russians and the Chinese. As mare Turkic people achieved the 
educational standards of the Russians and Chinese their demands would 
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would no doubt become more pronounced. 
In the educational process this produced considerable difficulties 
for the two Governments. To transform the Turkic people education was 
necessary, but this very education prodUced local Turkic cultural and 
political consciousness rath~r than a socialist attitude. Essentially 
the difficulty was one of eqUilibrium. A balance needed to be struck 
in the education of the Turkic people. It was necessary to emphasise 
the local and socialist cultures sufficiently to satisfy the desires of 
both the indigenous population and those of the central administra-
tions. At the same time this process had to produce Turkic people who 
were devoted to the ideals of Socialism. This balance ramains to be 
struck in both regions. 
To equate the Turkic cultural and political consciousness with the 
Western concept of nationalism would have been quite erroneoua. The 
sense of Turkic identity that arose in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang remained 
a cultural and political awareness devoid of nationalism. It was a 
feeling of belonging to a religious and cultural group not a conacious-
ness of being a member of a national group. As such it was an aware~ 
ness that continued to encompass all the Turkic people of Central Asia 
and not only one particular group. This prevented the division of the 
Turkic people into national groups of Kazakhs, Uighurs, Uzbeks, 
Kirghiz, Turkmen and TadJiks. Furthermore, the Turkic people continued 
to identify with other Islamic groups in and outside their respective 
states. They therefore were and remain susceptible to the religious 
and cultural influences fromabroad-. 
Within the multi-national socialist states based on a social order 
devoted to cultural unity the emergence of the Turkic cultural and po-
litical awareness were bound to result in friction. Rather than cultu-
ral uniformity and unity they encouraged diversity and thus, animosity 
between the Turkic people and the Governments. In order to overcome 
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this the local culture had to be suppressed. This in turn allowed the 
Turkic people to charge the Russians and Chinese with cultural chauvi-
nism. In their view the Russians and Chinese were attempting to pre-
sent their own respective cultures as superior to the Turkic culture. 
This effectively reduced the. problem to a struggle between cultures. 
According to Marx the new socialist culture was to evolve from the 
combination of all the old cultures with the socialist ideals. This 
required someone to decide which aspects of each culture were to be 
included and which were to be rejected. If the decisions were made by 
the socially most conscious elements they had to convincs the less con-
scious that their choices indeed were proper and necessary for the 
development of a better society. This produced two difficulties; 
first, it limited the choices of the people and, second, it made a cul-
tural confrontation inevitsble. 
On the question of choice, the Turkic and for that matter all the 
people living in the Soviet Union and People's Republic were limited. 
The Governments of both states remained dedicated to establishing a 
higher social order. At the outset these aims could be appreciated 
only by the socially most conscious group and they alone could under-
stand the policies designed to foster the new society. The remainder 
of the population had to accept on trust that whatever they themselves 
were working for would benefit them and their offspring. This made 
the choices those of the group that had the political power. In making 
the choices the ruling group took for granted that the masses were in 
full agreement. Their only mandate for this assumption was the politi-
cal fact that they had been able to saize political power and main-
tained their political and military rule. After the seizure of power 
the masses were directed according to the ideals of the political lea-
ders. No doubt Marx had not envisaged this as a permanent feature. 
However, rule by an elite-in this case the dictatorship of the prole-
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tariat--entailed the danger of dictatorial rUle. Its most vivid exam-
ples were the Stalin era, the period of the Great Leap and the Cultural 
Revolution. During these periods the culture to be adopted was dicta-
ted from above. Evan more important, the periods indicated that during 
the preceding years the proletarian dictatorships had failed to con-
vince the masses of the benefits of Socialism. 
Under these circumstances a prolonged battle between the different 
cultural values had to ensue. But this in no sense was a struggle be-
tween social and political ideals. This battle had arisen from the 
attempts to transform the Turkic people socially and politically. It 
was a battle between conflicting cultural values. As such it could be 
reduced to a confrontation between the Turkic and the alien--Russian 
and Chinese--cultures, or the Turkic and non-Turkic. At the grass-
roots level Marxism did not even enter into the struggle. The issue 
was simply that of a conflict between the Muslim believers on the one 
hand and the Russian and Chinese unbelievers on the other. 
Another means for winning the indigenous people over to the commu-
nist cause was the new socialist economic system. By meeting the ma-
terial needs of the masses the new economic system was to demonstrate 
its superiority over the old mode of production. There could be little 
doubt that the economic, social and political values of Socialism were 
more likely to bring about the industrialisation of Kazakhstan and S1n-
kiang than the Islamic social order. It has been argued, however, that 
these developments would have occurred also if after 1917 central Asia 
had become independent or the mandate of a non-communist power~ This 
development even might have prevented the ravages that the callectivi-
aation wreaked upon Kazakhstan. 1 A question that arose from this argu-
ment was whether as much could have been accomplished in as short a 
period of time under a non-communist regime. The heavily centralised 
system of Communism allowed the economic developments to be undertaken 
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on the basis of State directives rather than the i d' t mme 1a e needs of the 
consumer. Consequently it has been argued that the strong central di-
recting force benefitted the industrial development of Central Asia. 2 
However, it was not at all certain that this forced development could 
win the Turkic people over to Communism. 
By failing to meet their material needs the economic system was 
more likely to alienate the Turkic people. As a result the leaders of 
the Soviet Union and Chinese People's Republic were deprived of what 
may have been the most promising means for convincing the indigenous 
population of the advantages of Socialism. In the short term an imme-
diets fulfilling of the local material needs would have demonstrated 
the central Governments' concern for their respective Turkic people. 
The failure to do this helped set the course on confrontation rather 
than co-operetion. The policy itself, therefore, may have fostered 
resistance instead of winning the support of the Turkic people. 
But the economic difficulties combined with the growing cultural 
and political consciousness in the two regions, helping to increase the 
latter even more. The overall effect of all the above factors was 
greater local resistance to change. This in turn prolonged the period 
of transition, the length of which was not defined in any case. Equal-
ly ill-defined was the relationship between communist states during the 
transitional period. The difficulties that arose from this were demon-
strated by the intra-state nationality problems and the inter-state 
relations between the two communist states. 
Before the rise of Tita end Mao the Russian leadership po~ition of 
the communist block remained unchallenged. Although not by intent, 
both Tito and Mao changed this situation. 80th had gained power with-
out help from Moscow and, unlike Moscow's puppets in Eastern Europe, 
Tito and Mao were free to base their policies on their own interpreta-
tions of Marxism-Leninism. 
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The needs of the RUssian and Chinese states were obviously diffe-
rent. However, within the communist block the ideological bond was not 
sufficiently strong to withstand the adaptations that were necessary. 
instead the fear that greater freedom for the block members would not 
preserve unity but sow the sseds of disunity was allowed to snap it. 
Paradoxically, in the intra-state nationality problems this fear yet 
may prove correct. The search for greater freedom that was fostered 
through the edUcational system may lead to disunity within the Central 
Asian region and to the reestablishment of the state of Turkestan. The 
Sino-Soviet dispute in this sense could be taken for a preview of the 
intra-state splintering of the futUre. 
Just as the Chinese were expected to follow Moscow's line, so the 
Turkic people in Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were expected to follow the 
line laid down by their respective central Governments. The evidence 
suggested some allowances were and continue to be made for local needs. 
The more recent Soviet attitude towards Islam indicated some attempts 
were being made to find a way that allowed a temporary co-existence of 
Islam and Communism. The Chinese have pursued this sort of policy 
since 1949. Nevertheless, the basic policy of both states remained 
anti-Islamic and blended into the Turkic and non-Turkic conflict. The 
effect of the policy will be to give the Turkic people a little more 
room for manoeuvre. This in turn may permit a further reinforcement of 
their cultural heritage. At the same time the central Governments, by 
initiating the policy of co-existence, have 'cli~bed' down from the 
, 
more radical Marxist position~- If this was the first sign of a weake-
ning resolve to destroy Islam outright the policy of temporary co-exis-
tence is likely to evolve into one of permanent co-existence. On the 
other hand, if the antagonism persits, the battle of cultures is equal-
ly likely to continue. 
f 1 On e of these is The outcome of this battle may be one a severa. 
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that Communism and Islam simply will continue to stand opposite one 
another in a state of permanent antagonism similar to that of religion 
and atheism. The long-lived existence of Islam in China suggested this 
to be a likely development. Other possibilities include the complete 
destruction of either Communism or Islam. This appears rather remote, 
especially in the case of Islam. It has been adapting for centuries, 
while Communism has proved far less adaptable over a very much shorter 
period of time. The Sino-Soviet rift provided ample evidence of its 
ideological inflexibility. While Islam is unlikely to dominate either 
the Soviet Union or Chinese People's Republic, its past history sugges-
ted that it would continue to do so in both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Pierca. Russian Central Asia 1867-1917, pp. 305-306. 
2 Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, pp. 229-234. 
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